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Abstract 
The introduction of administrative litigation in the People's Republic of China 
in October 1990 initiated a new era in the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship. It broke 
through the entrenched ruled-rulers dichotomy and established a formal legal 
channel for ordinary citizens to defend their personal and property rights against any 
infringement by government officials' unlawful specific administrative acts. This 
thesis is the first empirical analysis of administrative litigation in the People's 
Republic of China to use a cultural approach. 
A microanalysis was conducted through interviews with 738 individual 
household proprietors and 152 government officials from the Hai Dian, Xi Cheng, 
and Xuan Wu districts of the Beijing municipality between mid-1996 and early 1997, 
with a four-page questionnaire to assess their administrative litigation cultures. 
Complemented by a macro analysis, the survey also examined the structure and 
problems of the PRC's administrative litigation through comprehensive literature 
reviews, in-depth personal interviews, and attendance in court hearings. 
The PRC's administrative litigation is a top-down contrivance of the rulers to 
uphold their rule. As such, it has never been a fully-fledged redress mechanism, but 
only a confined concession with restricted jurisdiction bound by a narrowly but 
cautiously construed Administrative Litigation Law. Implementation of the PRe's 
administrative litigation has been difficult and problematic. The resulting 
consequences are confined and biased towards the rulers. The overall usefulness of 
the mechanism is restricted. And its prospect is worrying. 
The empirical survey generates extraordinarily interesting findings. The 
affective orientation of both sample groups on the need for administrative litigation 
was found highly positive and supportive. Their evaluational orientation on the 
consequences of administrative litigation in the country was highly affirmative. And 
their expectational orientation towards the future of the PRC's administrative 
litigation was equally optimistic. The surveyed rulers were clearly better informed in 
their cognitive orientation, but more reserved in their jurisdictional orientation. 
Meanwhile, the majority of the surveyed ruled were clearly dismayed in their 
appraisal orientation regarding the usefulness of the PRC's administrative litigation. 
The latter is obviously below the acceptable threshold, and substantial improvement 
is needed if it is to help ameliorate the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Rationale, Framework, 
Objectives, and Methodology of the Study 
The introduction of administrative litigation in the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) on October 1, 1990 has tremendous significance. It represents a move from 
the long-lasting rule of man to a nascent rule of law in the mainland. It signifies an 
important step forward in the Chinese modernisation drive from sheer economic 
reform to serious legal development. It constitutes a major improvement in the 
country's procedural law system, which now comprises all three important branches 
of civil, criminal and administrative proceedings. But above all, it initiated a new era 
in the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship. For thousands of years in the past, as well as 
in the earlier years of the PRC, the Chinese rulers were used to being over and above 
the ruled and the law. With the present administrative litigation, the rulers are, in 
legal terms, brought on equal status with the ruled and under the rule of the law. For 
an administrative state like the PRC, where the rulers predominate, the symbolic 
meaning of administrative litigation, not to mention its solid contributions, can 
hardly be exaggerated. Such an important issue deserves serious study. This thesis 
presents the first empirical analysis of the PRC's administrative litigation and the 
first cultural study of administrative litigation in the PRC. 
In this first chapter, an introduction to the research will be given, including its 
rationale, significance, theoretical framework, research hypotheses and questions, 
methodology and procedures, as well as limitations. It is hoped that together they 
will provide a sufficient background for understanding the discussions on the issue 
in the chapters that follow. 
A. Rationale of the Study 
1. Prolonged Ruled-Rulers Dichotomy and Infringement upon the Ruled 
My Chinese origin and political science training brought my attention to the 
dilemma of the relationship between the Chinese ruled and rulers. My concern is the 
daily life of 1.2 billion fellow countrymen. In the PRC, they are labelled masters of 
the country and the nation is proclaimed as belonging to them as a whole. But the 
ideal is not necessarily the reality. The actuality in the PRC is that individual 
interests are overshadowed by collective needs under socialist canons, citizens' 
rights are subject to party and state resolutions for revolution or modernisation, and 
democracy in principle gives way to centralism in practice. In a nutshell, the ruled 
are labelled as the rulers but they are not. The ancient ruled and rulers dichotomy 
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still exists today. 
A clear and rigid dichotomy between the ruled and rulers was an accepted fact 
of life in imperial China until the fall of the Son of Heaven. After the collapse of 
divine rule, the Chinese turned back on their secular world and began to try to 
eliminate the gap between the ruled and rulers, first by liberal democracy in the first 
half of the twentieth century and then by socialist democracy in the second half. Yet 
both attempts faced the same problem of linking the ideal to reality. At the end of the 
day, the ruled are still very much under the rule of the rulers and not vice versa (see 
Figure 1.1 below). Government of the people, by the people, and for the people is a 
distant promise yet to be realised in the mainland. 
Figure 1.1 The Ruled and Rulers in Imperial and Today's China 
Imperial China 
Dichotomy with formal hierarchical 
segregation and ideological support 
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Ruled 
Today's China 
Dichotomy without hierarchical 
structure nor ideological sanction 
Worse still, the dichotomy of the ruled and rulers can easily invite infringement 
and oppression of the fonner in various fonns by the latter. The ruled in imperial 
China were regarded as belongings at the disposal of the rulers, who alone held the 
power of life and death. The ruled were simply at the mercy of the rulers, who might 
or might not display the virtue of ren (benevolence, 1=-) deemed so important in 
Confucianism. Although nowadays China would not accept this feudal worldview, 
rulers' infringement and oppression of the ruled remains the order of the day, and is 
no less ferocious and endemic. Major or minor incidents of infringement have 
continued to appear in the PRC since 1949. Dichotomy and infringement is still one 
of the major problems between the ruled and rulers in China, and the search for a 
resolution is an urgent and important challenge calling for research in this area. 
2. Past and Present Ruled-Rulers Relationship 
Past and present ruled-rulers relationships have indeed changed a lot. In the two 
millenniums of imperial China, the ruled-rulers relationship was entirely an issue 
between the state and individuals, with the fonner represented by the emperor, his 
imperial family, the royal state officials and numerous local gentries vis-a-vis 
millions of loosely organised, broadly self-sufficient farmers and common folks. At 
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that time, the idea of a political party, in its modern sense, had not really emerged 
nor played any role in the political arena. However, since the state in its imperial 
form collapsed in 1911, its role suddenly almost vanished or at least was very much 
weakened, and was gradually taken over by the then emerging political parties. 
When the victorious Communist Party took over in 1949, the state came under 
the command of the party and never really came back in force. The ruled and rulers 
relationship then became a question largely between the vanguard party, headed by 
the supreme party secretary, and comrade individuals, with or without party 
membership. A sanctified royal clan was succeeded by an omnipotent party, loose 
submission was replaced by mass mobilisation, self-sufficiency was superseded by 
state provision, and politically indifferent fanners became politically driven 
proletariats, just to mention a few changes. The state in the new PRC became an 
administrative ann of the party only. A fonnerly direct bilateral relationship then 
became an indirect tripartite one (see Figure 1.2 below). 
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Figure 1.2 From Direct Bilateral to Indirect Tripartite Ruled-Rulers Relationship 
Individuals Individuals 
Due to the omnipresence of the party during its early years of rule, China 
studies - whether local or overseas - on Mao's period were almost entirely a study 
of the party because nearly all historical, political, economic, social, or even 
philosophical issues seemed inevitably hinged on the party. The state, once supreme 
in the prior two millenniums, had lost its central position in the study of the ruled-
rulers relationship in communist PRC. 
However, it did not take long for the uneasy blending of party and state to 
develop problems. Fusion of the party and state removed the latter's autonomy and 
efficiency. Fusion of the party and individuals eroded the latter's initiative and 
enthusiasm. Fusion of the three resulted in over-politicisation of the entire state and 
populace. Individual mistakes of the then party leader, Mao, during his chainnanship 
and particularly his last ten years of life, were unrestrictedly stretched into 
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destruction of the whole state administration and loss of an entire generation. 
However unwilling or unprepared they might have been, the succeeding Dengist 
leadership was forced to resolve the problems left by Deng's predecessor by a series 
of economic, political and legal reforms, which in tum worked together to promote 
the decomposition of the former fusion of party, state and individuals. 
Economic reform since the 1980s enriched a significant proportion of the ruled, 
such as the newly-risen individual household proprietors, who then demanded 
greater autonomy and personal protection against administrative impropriety. Later 
political reform empowered the state with greater discretion, responsibility and 
functional autonomy over state administration. Recent legal reform brought the 
party, state, individuals and their relationship more under legal principles and 
settings. The ruled-rulers relationship in the PRC has changed significantly in the 
1990s. The party's unilateral and unchallenged rule has been deflated. A more 
distinct state and individuals relationship under an emerging legal framework is re-
appearing in contemporary China. 
This research is based on a belief that fusion of the party, state and individuals 
under the unquestionable leadership of the party in the pre-reform PRC is currently 
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in transition, moving towards a more defined tripartite relationship among the three 
with more obvious autonomy for each of them (see Figure 1.3 below). And this 
transition has created the space and the need for China studies to move away from 
looking at the party alone for answers to all questions as it did in the past. 
Figure 1.3 Transition from Fusion to a More Defined Tripartite Relationship in the PRe 
Party 
State 
Individuals 
3. Latest Breakthrough - Emergence of the Chinese Administrative Litigation 
Ruled-rulers relationship in the PRC had indeed gone through extreme ups-and-
downs in Mao's era. From the 1950 anti-revolutionaries campaign to the 1966-76 
Cultural Revolution, continuous political movements increasingly discredited the 
rulers, outraged the ruled, heightened tensions between the two groups, and ruptured 
their good relationship established during the war years. Original mechanisms 
allowing the ruled to complain against the rulers' infringement and resolve their 
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conflict with the rulers were found to be insufficient. Administrative litigation 
emerged at the end when the rulers, after a long period of misrule, finally admitted 
mistakes in their governance, inadequacy of the existing administrative redress 
mechanisms, and necessity for a new approach to administer the country. The PRC's 
administrative litigation did not emerge by itself nor was it established by members 
of the ruled for their own protection. It was an experiment of the rulers to restore 
their disintegrating relationship with the ruled, an attempt to rescue their collapsing 
legitimacy to rule the country, and a contrivance to prolong their stay in power. 
Formerly in the PRC during Mao's era, the ruled were given two ways to 
complain against state infringement of their rights and interests, i.e. either by 
complaining to their representatives in the People's Congress or by petitioning to a 
higher level of the concerned state organ for an administrative reconsideration (see 
Figure 1.4 below). These two mechanisms are still in use today. But since the 
congressmen are not true representatives of the ruled and the higher level 
administrations are members of the rulers group, the usefulness and helpfulness of 
the two redress channels are very much in doubt. 
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Figure 1.4 Bipartite Redress System in Mao's Era 
Supervise People's 
1-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'- Congress , ~--~--~ 
Higher Level 
Administration 
1 t Supervise 
Front-line State 
Officials 
! Administrative 
Petition for 
Administrative 
Reconsideration 
Complaint to Local 
or Higher Level 
Representatives 
i .. · .... Acti'on ........ ·· .. ·· .... · ..·· .. ·· .... · .... ~ Individual Citizen 
In addition, the disastrous Cultural Revolution was so fatal that it shattered the 
ruled-rulers relationship in the mainland and rendered all redress mechanisms 
irrelevant. The rulers (and the ruled) learned with tears and blood the horror with 
rule by man, the misery of a country without laws. Together with the hope for 
attracting foreign investors under the new modernisation agenda, the post-Mao 
rulers decided to resurrect a legal system and to rule with laws. This shift led to the 
promulgation of a whole series of substantive and procedural laws in the country 
and paved the way for the emergence of administrative litigation in the mainland. In 
fact, a quasi-administrative litigation appeared under the PRC's Civil Procedure 
Law in 1982 when the latter allowed the ruled to complain against state 
infringement of their rights and interests through the civil procedure courts. The 
former bipartite redress system was then transformed into a tripartite review 
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structure (see Figure 1.5 below). 
Figure 1.5 Tripartite Review System after 1982 in the PRC 
r'-'-'-'-'-'-
. Supervise 
People's 
Congress -'-'-'-'-'-1 Supervise . , 
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I 
Supervise ~ 
Front-line State 
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Petition for 
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Civil I Procedure ~ 
~ Administrative "'--'""'I-nd""'i""'v"""'id""u""'al"--'" 
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ActIon Citizen 
, 
Higher Level 
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I 
~ Supervise 
Civil Procedure 
Court 
But the civil procedure system was not designed for administrative litigation 
and could not prove itself to be a proper and effective channel for administrative 
redress. One obvious case in point concerned the burden of proof. Requiring the 
ruled as accuser to prove in court the impropriety of the ruler as accused, according 
to civil procedure principle, was a Herculean task because the ruled simply had little 
access to the required information and documents. In view of the insufficiency of 
civil procedure to deal with the worsening problem of administrative impropriety 
since the commencement of the reform era, the government started to consider 
establishing an administrative litigation system in 1986. The Thirteenth National 
People's Congress of 1987 helped speed up the process when it announced an 
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ambitious political and legal refonn agenda. With a favourable political climate and 
after three years of serious drafting work, the PRe's Administrative Litigation Law 
(hereafter referred to as the Law) was finally promulgated and became effective 
from October 1990 (see Appendix 1). It opened up a new era in the PRe's ruled-
rulers relationship. Henceforth, the ruled are given a fonnal and tailor-made legal 
channel to check against administrative infringement through an institution of 
judicial review, commonly known as the institution of citizens suing the government 
(min gao guan, ~ % 1", see Figure l.6 below and chapter two for more details 
about the setting up of administrative litigation in the PRe). 
Figure 1.6 Formal Establishment of Administrative Litigation in the PRC in 1990 
r'-'-'-'-'-'-
. Supervise , 
People's 
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This latest development of administrative litigation in the PRe provides a new 
horizon for study of the ruled-rulers relationship in the mainland. This study 
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recognises the return of the state, the rise of the individuals, and the establishment of 
a legal framework regulating the relationship between the two. It seeks to examine 
this new min gao guan institution. 
4. First and Foremost - The Culture of Administrative Litigation 
The Chinese world is pulled together by a rich cultural heritage. Unique culture 
accumulated throughout China's history underpins the whole society. It nurtures the 
attitudes of individual Chinese, shapes behaviour of the masses, promotes socio-
political structures of the state, and influences even economic activities in the 
country. It is true that Chinese culture is a complex agglomeration which is not easy 
to define, does change over time, and may be affected by various factors. However, 
in China, culture is still one of the major independent variables that affects and 
explains the psychological environment, behavioural expressions and institutional 
settings of the Chinese. It confirms as well as suppresses mental orientations, 
emotional articulations and value judgements; supports as well as bypasses physical 
institutions, established structure and codified statues; fosters as well as dispels 
economic systems, activities and relations. Among others, the cultural factor is 
pervasive and important in the analytical discourse of Chinese problems. 
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This does not mean that other factors like geographical terrain and conditions, 
institutional constraints and dynamics, and external impacts and stimulation are not 
meaningful in the study of Chinese problems, nor that China issues can be solely and 
fully contemplated by cultural explanations. But the geographical factor is not the 
major consideration for the ruled and rulers in the pursuit and development of 
administrative litigation. Institutional consideration is distant and weak for the 
Chinese administrative litigation institution when the ruled and rulers do not have 
particularly strong devotion to its establishment nor strong compulsion to its 
perfection. Lastly, the external factor simply has little relevance in such a sovereign 
issue of the internal ruled-rulers relationship. It is argued that the study of the PRC's 
administrative litigation can be more meaningfully commenced through a cultural 
perspective on the mind-state of the ruled and rulers towards the administrative 
litigation institution and actions. 
It is out of the above-mentioned rationale that the present research is designated 
to be a cultural study of administrative litigation in the PRe. Although it may 
not cover every question from all aspects, it is still believed that this exploratory and 
pioneering study is meaningful and significant by itself. 
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B. Significance of the Study 
Studies of the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship, typically those undertaken by 
indigenous Chinese scholars based on local perspectives, emerged and evolved 
almost alongside the age-old relationship itself. Confucianism is a respected 
example of these studies and one of the major forerunners dating back to 200B.C .. 
Other studies include Chinese Legalism, Daoism, and Neo-Confucianism, just to 
mention a few. Though these studies may as well touch on anthropology, 
epistemology, or philosophy, an indispensable core of their contents is concerned 
with the problem of governance. They provide a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship in the past. But since the latter 
has always been changing, particularly in the modem age, renewed study is needed 
to keep track of its development in recent time periods under new socio-political 
circumstances. 
When China was opened up in the mid-eighteenth century by Western powers, 
China issues began to be studied by Western scholars, using Western methodologies 
and perspectives. These overseas scholars have very much enriched our 
understanding of modem China by providing a rich collection of comparative 
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literature from different angles. They may have different interests or standpoints, 
some in political science, some in economics, sociology, or history; some are liberal, 
some are pro-Communist, some are independent, yet they all help further our 
knowledge about Chinese society and its leadership. Unfortunately, few of them 
have touched on the latest issue of administrative litigation in the PRC, leaving the 
issue largely undocumented. In this respect, there is almost a blank in the Western 
literature, not to say Western understanding. 
Administrative litigation in the PRC is a new development with important 
implications for the PRC's ruled-rulers relationship. It has caught the attention of 
many mainland scholars who have already started writing on the issue. However, 
local studies of the issue so far are still wanting in many aspects. Mainland scholars' 
studies are mostly restricted to the basics of related legislation, explaining and 
elaborating concerned legal documents and state policy, without much critical 
judgement or independent investigation on controversial issues. Many questions 
about the PRC's administrative litigation are still awaiting research, and people's 
understanding of the issue is yet to be enriched. 
In response to our present thin knowledge, unfurnished understanding and 
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shorthanded documentation on the PRC's administrative litigation, this study 
attempts to enhance our understanding, reduce the gap in the existing literature and 
provoke further study on the stated issue. 
C. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
1. Difficulties with Approaches and Models on Public Administration 
Literature and studies on public administration in the West during the last 
century are rich and numerous. At the risk of oversimplification, they can be broadly 
classified into three different approaches and five major models (if the recent new 
public management movement in the United States is not yet mature enough to be 
categorised).! The former refer to the management approach, the political approach, 
and the legal approach. The latter include the classic bureaucratic model, the neo-
bureaucratic model, the institutional model, the human relations model, and the 
public choice model. These are invaluable in providing useful frameworks for 
studying the bureaucracy. 
Unfortunately, none of the above arise from or cater for the Chinese or socialist 
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context. Consequently, difficulties are inevitable when applying these approaches 
and models to the PRC's administrative litigation. For instance, economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness acclaimed in the managerial approach from Taylor to Wilson are 
not serious concerns of the Chinese bureaucrats.2 Likewise, representativeness, 
political responsiveness and accountability honoured by Appleby, Truman, and 
others in the political approach are more ritual than reality in the mainland.3 This 
leaves us with the legal approach as suggested by Bazelon, Chayes, and Dimock, 
etc.4 But given the expatriation of separation of powers and the long period of 
subservience of laws to political and administrative disposition in the PRC, judicial 
control of bureaucratic behaviour is only in a nascent and primordial stage of 
development in contemporary China. 
The classic bureaucratic model unfolded by Weber and Gulick, and the neo-
bureaucratic models put forward by Simon, March, and others, explain very well an 
independent civil service found in many European and American nations, but they 
cannot be comfortably applied to the instrumental and subordinate ruling machinery 
of a Leninist party state like the PRCs The public choice model emphasized by 
Tullock, Niskanen, and others, is equally at odds under a socialist nomenklatura 
system, where the public has, in fact, little choice.6 The remaining institutional 
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model, popularised by Thompson, Etzioni, and human relations model, promoted by 
McGregor, Likert, may be helpful for understanding the functioning of internal 
administrative reconsideration and guanxi (personal connections, n~ ~) in the 
mainland as alternative redress channels for the ruled, but they would not help much 
in explaining administrative litigation in the PRC.7 
2. Problems with Models and Methods in Communist China Studies 
Models and methods in Communist China studies are time and issue-bound. 8 
Study of the early PRC by Barnett and Friedrich drew upon the totalitarian model, 
which was originally developed as a critique on Stalinist Russia.9 Influence of this 
model faded away starting from the 1960s when China broke away from alliance 
with the Soviet Union, then through the 1970s when China was fragmented by the 
Cultural Revolution, and even more in the 1980s after China adopted the policy of 
reform and opening to the West. The passage of time and change of events did not 
only lead to the fall of the overbearing totalitarian model in China studies, but also 
gave rise to a variety of models which then became more specific in scope and focus, 
e.g. the faction model, class-struggle model, groups model, bureaucracies model, 
and neo-authoritarian model. Together, these models significantly enrich our 
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understanding of modem China, but they all have restricted applications. 
The faction model about the rulers explicated by Nathan, Whitson, Parrish, and 
faction model about the ruled expounded by Ling, Walder, and Oi, accentuates the 
formation and cultivation of factions in explaining the post-totalitarian power 
distribution and struggle during the fragmented years of the PRC. IO The class-
struggle model elaborated by Bettelheim and Robinson, originates from Marxism 
and applies exclusively to a class-labeled line struggle during major events of 
socialist transformation directed by Mao, partiCUlarly the Cultural Revolution. II The 
groups model used by Skilling, Tsou, Goodman, etc., goes beyond the faction model 
by pointing to the rise of interest groups in contemporary Chinese society as an 
account of the socio-political diversities in post-monolithic PRC. 12 The 
bureaucracies model employed by Lampton and Lieberthal, centres around the state 
machinery across vertical and horizontal lines to see how policy is formulated and 
implemented in reformist China. 13 The neo-authoritarian model enunciated by 
Petracca, Gong and Sautman, attempts to reconcile the uneasy coexistence of 
enlarged economic autonomy during the reform era with the totalitarian legacy of 
authoritarian political control. I4 All these models are helpful to our understanding of 
specific issues and developments during particular time periods of contemporary 
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China, but their being extraneous and antecedent to the introduction of 
administrative litigation in the PRC largely restricts their usefulness in explaining 
particulars of the latter. 
After all, this study is not a holistic diagnosis of the Chinese public 
administration or the political system of Communist PRC, but a focused analysis of 
the country's recently introduced administrative litigation as a major development in 
the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship. Though related, the issue of administrative 
litigation goes beyond the strict boundaries of all the above approaches and models 
which can, therefore, only provide ancillary but not direct reference for the study. A 
more methodological approach would better suit the present study. 
3. A Cultural Approach to the Study 
Alongside the rapid growth in human knowledge, an impressive accumulation 
of intellectual discoveries, diversification in academic disciplines, and advances in 
modem information technology, there is a parallel expansion in research 
methodology of various kinds. Scholars in the social science discipline alone have 
developed many analytical approaches over the years in their studies, the major ones 
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being the institutional approach, behavioural approach, cultural approach, system 
approach, and elite approach. IS These approaches have facilitated later followers 
with solid methodological know-how in tackling their own problems. Yet, however 
powerful these approaches may be, no one of them can be substituted for the others, 
nor claim to be fault-proof or "all-in-one". Each one of them has its own strength 
and limitations, hence, the question is basically which approach for what problem. 
The elite approach supported by Mills, Scalapino and Moore, is clearly not 
suitable for this study of the PRC's administrative litigation because it would 
exclude the most important group of actors in the institution, namely the common 
citizens. 16 Distinguishing between input and output of the system and examining the 
relationship between the two as would be required by the system approach 
maintained by Easton, can help illustrate how the administrative litigation institution 
is made up, but it cannot go further to demonstrate the ruled-rulers relationship 
found together in the input side of the institution. 17 On the other hand, to examine 
empirically what and why the ruled and rulers do in the process of administrative 
litigation in accordance with the behavioural approach as performed by Allison, 
King, Sanders and Dunleavy, would require case studies on behaviour of the 
participants in the litigation, which is technically hardly possible, if not impossible 
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under the present situation in the PRC. 18 
The institutional approach sustained by Finer, Johnson, March and Rhodes, has 
been a dominant tradition of political analysis in both Britain and the United States 
but it is not without problems. 19 Though powerful in explaining the causes and 
consequences of institutions by describing their formal set-up and evolution over 
time, the institutional approach fails to consider the informal aspects of the 
institutions, i.e. human beliefs and attitudes. The development of new 
institutionalism by Smith, March and Olsen, with more emphasis on the norms of 
the actors in the institutions, acknowledges the weakness in the institutional 
approach and confirms the importance of the cultural approach in intellectual 
discourse.2o In fact, the importance of attitudinal and emotional dimensions in 
political analysis has long been recognised by political scientists like Montesquieu21 , 
Rousseau22, and de Tocqueville23. It has also been vividly pointed out by sociologists 
like Max Weber4 and sinologists like Lucien Pye2S • 
It should not be taken to imply that formal aspects of the institution are not 
important for understanding administrative litigation of the PRC. However, such a 
descriptive, formal and historical method of analysis may not be very helpful in 
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analysing the PRC's administrative litigation at the present stage, due to the latter's 
short history and immature development. On the contrary, the cultural approach, 
though difficult to define and measure, has the advantages of going beyond formal 
structures of the institution to identifying the beliefs that affect the ways in which 
people act under the institution and defining the situation in which administrative 
litigation actions take place. It is particularly suitable as the starting point to 
investigate the new institution of administrative litigation in the PRC, where the 
cultural factor is believed to be pervasive and important for analytical discourse. 
4. Theoretical Framework of the Study 
The theoretical framework of this study is built upon ideas from the post-war 
empirical studies on political culture with some amelioration and supplement.26 
Using the words of Almond, it is the belief of this research that administrative 
litigation is embedded in a particular pattern of psychological orientations.27 Such 
orientations represent a constellation of attitudes and sentiments which may be 
called the administrative litigation culture. This administrative litigation culture 
consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and normative 
values which defines the situation in which the institution and actions of 
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administrative litigation exists and take place (see Figure 1.7 below). 
Figure 1.7 Administrative Litigation Embedded in its Surrounding Culture 
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In particular, Almond and Verba's definition of political culture in terms of 
three psychological orientations, i.e. cognitive, affective, and evaluational, provides 
a good theoretical basis for defining administrative litigation culture in this study.28 
However, their use of evaluational orientation is too general for focused study and 
the three orientations as a whole are not inclusive enough for a full-blown study of 
administrative litigation culture. Hence, evaluational orientation is specified in this 
study to refer to comments on the immediate consequence of administrative 
litigation only whilst comments on the empirical usefulness of administrative 
litigation is called appraisal orientation. Besides, two new orientations are added -
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jurisdictional orientation for ideas about the scope of review under administrative 
litigation and expectational orientation for belief about the future development of 
administrative litigation - to make the study more complete and thorough. Through 
examination of the six orientations, a holistic analysis of the administrative litigation 
culture can be obtained. In sum, administrative litigation culture is defined in this 
paper as the pattern of cognitive, affective, jurisdictional, evaluation ai, appraisal, 
and expectational orientations with respect to administrative litigation (see 
Figure 1.8 below). 
Figure 1.8 Definition of Administrative Litigation Culture 
Administrative Litigation Culture 
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The six orientations are used here as short-hand expressions representing six 
different dimensions of the administrative litigation culture. Cognitive orientation 
refers to the extent of knowledge and awareness among the ruled and rulers about 
the administrative litigation law and institution, and how much they have learned 
about the PRe's administrative litigation, whether from others, by self-study, or 
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through personal experience. Affective orientation measures the two parties' 
feelings towards the institution, their degree of support and enthusiasm for the 
institution, and whether they would subscribe to it as a redress mechanism and not 
regard it as alien and irrelevant to their lives in particular and to the country at large. 
Jurisdictional orientation stands for the two parties' ideas about the proper scope 
for administrative litigation in the way they see it, their conception about 
officialdom and administrative improprieties under the current situation in the PRe, 
i.e. what administrative actions or inactions, whether specific or abstract, they would 
regard as demanding litigation in its full sense. 
The term evaluational orientation speaks for itself as being the subjective 
judgement on the administrative litigation institution's likely impact on the 
government and society, how much positive effect it can likely bring forth, whether 
the institution has the potential to attain its immediate purpose of protecting citizens' 
legal rights and correcting officials' illegal actions, as well as other less direct 
consequences. Appraisal orientation covers a wide spectrum of attitudinal 
comments among the affected parties on the usefulness of the institution, how 
empirically useful they regard the institution, how they compare the institution with 
other redress mechanisms, and how they judge the role of the courts as arbitrator in 
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administrative litigation. The final expectational orientation contains no more than 
its literal connotation, i.e. faith and hopes of the concerned parties about the future 
of administrative litigation, how far they believe the institution should be further 
developed, on what grounds and under what conditions. 
Although the notion of administrative litigation culture is broken down into six 
orientations for measurement and discussion purposes, it does not mean that they are 
totally separated and independent from one another. On the contrary, they are inter-
related, with one affecting or affected by the others. Cognitive orientation is the first 
and foremost member of the six before the others can exist, but it may require just a 
basic knowledge and no more upon which to establish the other orientations. 
Affective orientation comes next. Limited enthusiasm and support for the institution 
might in itself already affect a person's attitude in the other four orientations. How 
much a person expects the institution to do in his jurisdictional orientation would 
also affect how much he expects the institution would achieve in his evaluational 
assessment, and how much hope he maintains for the institution in his expectational 
orientation. Likewise, how useful a person regards the institution in his appraisal 
orientation is also tied with how influential he regards it in his evaluational 
orientation and how optimistic he is with the institution's future. The relationship 
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among the six orientations IS an inherent characteristic of the administrative 
litigation culture salient for any discussion of the latter. 
Administrative litigation culture is very broadly defined above. The tenn refers 
to all orientations related to administrative litigation, whether of a cognitive, 
affective, jurisdictional, evaluational, appraisal, or expectational sort. It refers to the 
orientations of both parties at the two ends of an administrative litigation 
relationship, i.e. the ruled as the plaintiff and the rulers as the defendant; and it refers 
to orientations to all aspects of the administrative litigation institution, whether 
directly related to the litigation process or consequential to the institution. This 
broad definition is useful to direct attention to a general concern for the topic, to 
support a multi-dimensional analysis of the issue, and to promote an overall 
comprehension of the subject. Thus, the focus is not restricted to specific attitudes 
such as comments on bureaucratic behaviours, attitudes on the administrative-
judiciary relationship, and beliefs on individual rights, etc. This is not to argue that 
specific administrative litigation attitudes and beliefs are not important. On the 
contrary, it is these specific attitudes and beliefs that make up the whole of the 
administrative litigation culture. 
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To say that administrative litigation culture is important is not very informative; 
to say what aspects of administrative litigation culture are determinants of what 
phenomena - what the significant administrative litigation beliefs are, and how they 
are related to other aspects of administrative litigation institution - may be very 
important. Using the words of Kavanagh, the administrative litigation culture is an 
analytical abstraction, i.e. information can be abstracted from the larger environment 
about the knowledge, feelings, evaluations and appraisals of people to administrative 
litigation.29 Each of the six orientations is, in fact, related to a larger question about 
different aspects of the administrative litigation institution. Cognitive orientation 
relates to the developmental stage of administrative litigation, i.e. the drafting and 
promulgation of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law and setting up of the 
institution. Affective orientation is tied to the implementation of administrative 
litigation in the PRC. Jurisdictional orientation touches on the scope of review and 
protection under administrative litigation. Evaluational orientation concerns the 
consequences of the institution. Appraisal orientation is connected with the 
usefulness and limitations of administrative litigation. Finally, expectational 
orientation suggests the likely future for administrative litigation in the country. 
Borrowing from Pye and Verba, administrative litigation culture provides the 
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individuals with controlling guidelines for administrative litigation behaviour and 
gives the collectivity a systematic structure of values and rational considerations 
which ensures coherence in the performance of the administrative litigation 
institution. 3D The administrative litigation culture encompasses both the normative 
ideals and the operating norms of administrative litigation. It is the product of both 
the collective history of an administrative litigation institution and the life histories 
of the individuals in that institution; and thus it is rooted equally in public events and 
private experiences. In sum, the administrative litigation culture provides structure 
and meaning to the administrative litigation sphere in the same manner as culture in 
general gives coherence and integration to social life. In applying the analysis of 
administrative litigation culture to the question of implementation and development 
of administrative litigation, it is possible to throw light on the various combinations 
and constellations of values which may govern different patterns of implementation 
and different levels of development of the institution, and which may be the prime 
causes of frustration and disappointment over the prospect of improving the 
relationship between the ruled and rulers by means of administrative litigation. 
Analysis of the administrative litigation culture not only enables us to 
understand the larger cultural background within which the institution of 
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administrative litigation exists, but also allows us to look back into that institution 
and its problems through appreciation of the larger cultural background. In studying 
administrative litigation development in the PRe in terms of the administrative 
litigation culture of individuals in the country, it is thus possible to bring together in 
a common focus the approaches of macroanalysis and microanalysis, In sum, a 
microanalysis of the six orientations of the administrative litigation culture of the 
ruled and rulers in the PRe is also a macroanalysis of the PRe's administrative 
litigation law and institution in general (see Figure 1.9 below). 
Figure 1.9 Relationship between Micro and Macroanalysis of Administrative Litigation 
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The theoretical framework of this study is summarised in Figure 1.10 below. 
Related to the framework, research hypotheses and questions of this study are 
postulated and, based on the framework, empirical research methodology and survey 
questionnaire are designed. Finally, the framework also sets the themes for 
discussion in the subsequent chapters. 
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Figure 1.10 Theoretical Framework of this Study 
Administrative Litigation Culture 
I 
I I 1 1 I I 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
I I I I I I 
Knowledge Acceptance, Perceived Assessment on Rating on the Faith in the 
and awareness support and grounds the potential usefulness and future of 
about enthusiasm for warranting effects of limitations of administrative 
administrative administrative administrative administrative administrative litigation 
litigation litigation litigation litigation litigation 
_____ l ___________ -'- ___________ l ___________ l ___________ l ___________ 1 ______ 
Corresponding Macro Issues 
I 
------
Setting up of Implementation Scope of Consequences Usefulness of Likely future and 
administrative of administrative protection and of administrative administrative development for 
litigation litigation review under litigation litigation administrative 
in the PRC in the PRC administrative in the PRC in the PRC litigation 
litigation in the PRC 
Related Chapters of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law 
-----l-----------T-----------r-----------r-----------,-----------1------
1 4,5 2,7 8-11 3,6 
- general - participators - scope of - enforcement - jurisdiction 
provisions in proceedings acceptance - liability to of courts 
- evidence of cases compensate - bringing, 
- hearings and - foreign interest acceptance 
judgements - supplementary and hearing 
provisions of cases 
_____ 1 ____________ 1 ____________ l ___________ t ___________ 1 ___________ 1 _____ ~ 
Chapter for Discussion in this Paper 
34 
D. Research Hypotheses and Questions 
In no society is there a single uniform administrative litigation culture, and in 
all administrative litigation institutions there is a fundamental distinction between 
the culture of the ruled and that of the rulers. Different people are likely to have 
different combinations of psychological orientations towards administrative 
litigation. An overall parochial and apathetic administrative litigation culture is 
surely not favourable to the development of administrative litigation. A significant 
difference between the administrative litigation culture of the ruled and that of the 
rulers is also not favourable to the development of administrative litigation and to 
the improvement of ruled-rulers relationship by means of administrative litigation. 
The development of the administrative litigation and the improvement of the 
ruled-rulers relationship with the help of administrative litigation, viewed in terms of 
administrative litigation culture, involve the existence of some basic understanding, 
supportive feeling, relevant jurisdictional idea, positive evaluation, affirmative 
appraisal, and optimistic expectation towards the administrative litigation. The 
existence of these psychological orientations may not be alone sufficient but is 
certainly important and indispensable. 
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According to the above hypotheses, this research sets out to investigate the 
administrative litigation culture of the Chinese ruled and rulers in terms of their 
cognitive, affective, jurisdictional, evaluational, appraisal, and expectational 
orientations towards administrative litigation in the PRe. There are seven basic 
research questions in this study and each of them will be dealt with in each of the 
following seven chapters, respectively: 
1. How much do the ruled and rulers know about the PRC's administrative 
litigation? 
2. How well do the ruled and rulers accept the PRe's administrative litigation? 
3. What is the scope of protection and review expected by the ruled and rulers 
under administrative litigation? 
4. How do the ruled and rulers evaluate the consequences of administrative 
litigation? 
5. How do the ruled and rulers assess the usefulness of administrative litigation? 
6. How do the ruled and rulers expect the future of administrative litigation in the 
PRC? 
7. What is the administrative litigation culture of the ruled and rulers in the PRC? 
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E. Research Procedures 
1. Research Methodology 
This is a cultural study of administrative litigation in the PRC and, in particular, 
the administrative litigation culture of selected groups of the ruled and rulers in the 
mainland. The research methodology employed for this purpose includes literature 
reviews, empirical sample surveys, personal interviews, and attendance at court 
hearings. 
The literature reVIews examined related legislation promulgated by the 
People's Congress on administrative litigation in the PRC; explanatory papers issued 
by the Supreme People's court on interpretation of the Administrative Litigation 
Law; State Council and government orders in response to the introduction of the 
administrative litigation institution; court bulletins and legal casebooks concerning 
administrative litigation court hearings and law case reports; Chinese newspapers 
from 1990 onwards covering news about the PRC's administrative litigation; as well 
as journals, major books on the subject, monographs, and dissertations for general 
reference on the issue of administrative litigation. As a whole, this literature helped 
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provide the necessary pnmary and secondary information on the background, 
legislation development, implementation process, public response, major 
controversies, prevIous studies, and law case materials concerning the PRe's 
administrative litigation. 
Empirical sample surveys by means of questionnaire interviews were 
conducted to gather a sufficient pool of quantitative data in structured format for 
statistical analysis. The questionnaire covered all aspects of the culture model and 
corresponding research questions to be investigated to support discussion in and 
completion of the research. Samples of individual household proprietors, 
representing the ruled, and government officials, representing the rulers, were 
interviewed In the Beijing municipality to provide views on the PRe's 
administrative litigation for comparative analysis. 
Personal interviews were conducted in the mainland during the whole period of 
research. Initial interviews at the early stage of research helped solicit the 
background information about implementation of administrative litigation in the 
mainland since 1990 and set the stage for the empirical surveys. Subsequent 
interviews helped verify the empirical survey findings and collect more in-depth 
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materials for qualitative discussion. Three major groups of people were interviewed 
for different perspectives. State officials from the judiciary and the executive were 
interviewed to understand their on-the-job comments and personal experience with 
the execution and impact of the administrative litigation institution from a ruler's 
perspective. Individual household proprietors were interviewed to obtain their 
appraisals and feelings about the institution from a ruled's perspective. In addition, 
Chinese. mainland scholars and academics specialising in administrative litigation 
were interviewed to reflect the intellectual observation and analysis of 
administrative litigation in the PRC from a commentator's point of view. 
Finally, personal attendance at administrative litigation court hearings was 
carried out to observe the actual proceedings of administrative litigation in the courts. 
This may not be directly related to any of the specific research questions, but it can 
help provide better insight and understanding of how the ruled and rulers actually 
perform and behave in administrative litigation on the legal platform. 
2. Specific Procedures 
The research, conducted on a part-time basis, extended over a period of six 
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years. It started off with the preparation stage, which lasted for about one year when 
the research idea was fonnulated. The actual research work began with a year's 
literature reviews together with some initial interviews conducted in Beijing to 
clarify the issue under study. The subsequent empirical surveys began with 
questionnaire design and a pilot study, which took eight months to complete. 
Another round of interviews was conducted afterwards to collect more infonnation 
and materials. Analysis of the pilot study results required almost half a year to 
complete, but the data proved to be very useful and the exercise also helped improve 
design of the questionnaire and plan for the full surveys. Ten months of actual 
empirical studies in Beijing on the ruled and rulers yielded a total of 890 cases of 
successful interviews. Post-study data analysis, writing-up, supplementary 
interviews and literature reviews, attendance at court hearings, and review of 
relevant law cases took another 16 months. 
The specific research procedures are summarised in Table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1 Specific Research Procedures 
Sept. 93 - April 94 Research idea formulation and enrollment with Warwick 
May-June 94 Initial literature search and review 
June 94 Initial interviews in Beijing 
July 94 - April 95 Supplementary literature search and review 
May 95 Questionnaire design - first draft 
June 95 Questionnaire - second draft 
August 95 Questionnaire - third draft 
October 95 Pilot study with third draft 
November 95 Interviews in Beijing 
January - May 96 Pilot test data analysis and report writing-up 
June 96 Questionnaire design - final version 
June - August 96 Full survey on individual household proprietors 
Oct. 96 - March 97 Full survey on government officials 
April 97 - Feb. 98 Full survey data analysis and supplementary literature review 
January & October 98 Attendance at court hearings 
March 98 - October 99 Writing-up thesis 
3. Research Samples 
The research looks at both the ruled and rulers at the two ends of administrative 
litigation, hence the empirical surveys target both the PRe's citizens and 
government officials. However, it is obviously not possible to study all the 1.2 
billion PRe's citizens nor the 8,000,000 government officials. When defining the 
specific target groups for study, several factors were considered, namely, research 
assistance in the PRe, important sources of information for analysis, 
representativeness of the sample, close relation with the problems and issues under 
study. 
41 
The Place - Beijing 
Based on my working relations and personal acquaintance with vanous 
universities and research institutes in Beijing, the capital city stood out from the 
other cities as a good place to conduct the survey because assistance was readily 
available. In addition, the entire administrative litigation was basically developed in 
Beijing and the Administrative Litigation Law was drafted there by a working group 
of scholars and experts drawn from major universities and committees based in the 
capital city. Beijing was the birthplace and cradle of the PRC's administrative 
litigation, with the earliest and longest history of administrative litigation practice. 
Comments of the Beijing municipal citizens and government officials on the 
institution and their experience with it would be instrumental for the analysis of the 
institution. 
The Ruled - Individual Household Proprietors 
When choosing different groups of Beijing citizens for survey, one of the main 
considerations was their likely contact with government officials and administrative 
actions, and thus the relevance and importance of administrative litigation to them. 
Various groups had been considered, including urban dwellers affected by the state's 
resettlement program, property developers and contractors punished by the state's 
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Land Management Bureau, vehicle drivers fined by traffic control officers, 
entrepreneurs victimised by officials of the Industry and Commerce Bureau, and 
individual household proprietors running their business on the streets but challenged 
by state officials of various branches. 
The last group of individual household proprietors was selected for study out of 
the rest due to their easy accessibility and close relevance to administrative litigation. 
They are a new group of private entrepreneurs who emerged in the 1980s during the 
reform era. As of September 1998, there were a total of 29,574,000 registered 
individual household proprietors in the country.3) Unlike the traditional state-run or 
collective enterprises, they are not subject to a state plan but operate in very much 
like a free market system. Most of them operate in tertiary industries like retailing, 
catering, servicing, or repairing, e.g. hawkers, grocers, shopkeepers, small cafe 
owners, bicycle repairers, and barbers. In their daily business, they have frequent 
and direct contact with state officials of various departments, like the Public Security, 
Environmental Protection, Industry and Commerce, Hygiene, Fire Services, etc., and 
they have to face different sorts of administrative actions, e.g. public peace control, 
waste control, licensing and duties collection, hygiene control, fire prevention 
inspection. 
43 
However, due to various reasons, individual household proprietors are usually 
not good defenders of their own rights and interests, which are easily subject to state 
infringement. Firstly, they are newcomers in the socialist economy and they do not 
have the same established political status as their state-run and collective 
counterparts. Secondly, due to the lack of capital, they tend to be small in size and 
unorganised with little collective power. Finally, they also tend to be less educated or 
even illiterate, hence unaware of their rights and the channels to protect their 
interests. Although they may not have the resources to take unlawful administrative 
actions to the courts, it does not mean that they are unaware of the PRC's 
administrative improprieties or that administrative litigation is not relevant to them. 
On the contrary, understanding their difficulties with administrative litigation is 
important for advancing the institution itself. 
Beijing has over 290,000 individual household proprietors spread across its 
23,000-square kilometer municipal area. To define a measurable and representative 
sample, the survey took a cluster sample comprising all the individual household 
proprietors along the main streets of three different districts of the municipality: Hai 
Dian, Xi Cheng, and Xuan Wu. Hai Dian represents a district of higher education 
institutions, Xi Cheng represents a district of modernised commercial centres, and 
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Xuan Wu a traditional old district of local Beijing folks. The three districts are 
chosen so as to better reflect the possible diverse nature and varied experience of 
these proprietors operating in different environments and to provide a more 
interesting comparative study. 
Samples in Rai Dian were drawn from areas adjacent to the Renmin University 
and Summer Palace (!A:fa III). Samples in Xi Cheng were drawn from three main 
streets of the district: Xi Dan Da Jie (& ~ *.~), Xi Si Da Jie (& t?9 *.t!t), and Xin 
Jie Kou Da Jie (~~ 0 .k~). Those of Xuan Wu were from four main streets of the 
district: Qian Men Da Jie (;jfjr,.k~), Yong Ding Men Da Jie (7j(~r,.k~), Zhu 
Shi Kou Da Jie (~± 0 .k~), and Da Peng Lan Jie (.kM~~) (see map of Beijing 
below). A total of738 successful questionnaire interviews were conducted. 
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The Rulers - Government Officials 
Rulers in this research refer to the state's government officials, but they are not 
an easy group for study. Under a tight control system of party discipline and a 
culture of information protection, they would decline any interview or questionnaire 
survey unless properly organised through official channels or privately invited 
through personal connections. Attempts to draw a random sample of government 
officials working in the three districts of Hai Dian, Xi Cheng, and Xuan Wu through 
the official channels were not successful on two accounts. Without other alternatives, 
study of the rulers group was done by means of a convenient sample based on 
personal connections. Although interviewed members of the rulers were of different 
ranks and from different departments in the three districts, their representativeness 
might not be maintained and their responses might have bias. This is one of the 
limitations in this study. But every possible effort was made to ensure the quality of 
the rulers sample's responses in order to enable a meaningful comparison with the 
results of their ruled counterparts. A total of 240 copies of the questionnaire were 
distributed to the government officials for completion on a self-administered basis -
120 copies in Hai Dian, and 60 each in Xi Cheng and Xuan Wu. A total of 152 valid 
cases were collected and the response rate was 63 per cent. 
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4. Instrumentation 
Sources used in Literature Reviews 
Libraries of the City University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, and Beijing Administrative College were intensively used to support 
literature search and reviews. The University Service Centre of the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong was extensively surveyed, especially its comprehensive 
collection of Chinese journals and newspapers. Libraries of other Hong Kong 
universities were used when they had materials not found in the above-mentioned 
libraries. 
Data base CD-Roms were also used to identify useful printed or electronic 
materials, especially overseas research theses. This helped provide the latest 
infonnation on development of the research topic. 
Questionnaire used in Empirical Survey 
A structured questionnaire was used in the empirical surveys of both individual 
household proprietors and government officials (see appendices 2 and 3 for the 
translated questionnaires). The questionnaire was designed according to the 
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theoretical framework and aimed to collect data needed for discussion of each of the 
research questions. It was in Chinese and in simple language so as to ensure easy 
and clear understanding by the respondents. The wording of each question was kept 
as concise and precise as possible to enhance accuracy in response. 
The questionnaire contained an introductory paragraph at the beginning for 
explaining its purpose, after which followed seven sections of questions on the six 
orientations of administrative litigation culture (i.e. cognitive, affective, 
jurisdictional, evaluational, appraisal, and expectational orientations) and the 
respondent's personal particulars. The questions were basically the same for both 
sample groups except one question (question 3) about cognitive orientation and 
some of the questions about their personal particulars so as to better reflect their 
different status. A total of 46 questions were set for individual household proprietors 
and 45 for government officials (see Table 1.2 below). 
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Table 1.2 Number of Questions in Each Section of the Questionnaire for the Two 
Samples 
Proprietors Government Officials 
Cognitive orientation 5 5 
Affective orientation 6 6 
Jurisdictional orientation 7 7 
Evaluational orientation 6 6 
Appraisal orientation 8 8 
Expectational orientation 5 5 
Respondent's personal particulars 9 8 
Total 46 45 
Local Coordinator 
To facilitate execution of the empirical survey, a local coordinator was 
employed in Beijing to assist in the logistical part of the survey. He was Dr. Mao 
Shou Long, a lecturer in the Institute of Public Administration, Renmin University 
of China. His assistance was invaluable but largely in the logistical part of the 
survey, e.g. giving comments on the draft questionnaire in respect of its sensitivity 
and use of language, printing copies of the questionnaire for both the pilot and full 
survey, recruiting and training interviewers for the survey of individual household 
proprietors and arranging their interview with the selected proprietors, and 
coordinating the empirical survey on government officials. Dr. Mao was acting in 
his private capacity during the process and was paid for his effort. 
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Interview Notes 
Interview notes were kept for all interviews so as to ensure accuracy when the 
contents of interviews were used for discussion in this thesis. 
Computer Software used in Data Analysis 
SPSS 7.5 was used to process and analyse data obtained from the empirical 
survey. It was an accurate and efficient tool for basic frequency calculation, bi-
variate cross-tabulation, as well as correlation analysis. With the help of the software, 
a comprehensive and in-depth quantitative analysis was conducted to support 
discussion of the research questions. 
5. Pilot Study 
Pilot studies were conducted on individual household proprietors and 
government officials in October 1995. There were five objectives for the pilot study 
on the proprietors group: to train the interviewers and standardise their 
understanding and interpretation of the questionnaire questions; to find out the 
response rate; to verify the availability and condition of the sample groups; to 
examine the clarity and adequacy of the questionnaire; and to validate feasibility of 
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the survey procedure. 
The pilot study on the proprietors group was useful and successful, with all the 
above five objectives fulfilled. A pool of eight questionnaire interviewers, who were 
research students of the Institute of Public Administration in Renmin University of 
China, were recruited and trained. A total of 41 individual household proprietors 
were approached; 33 were successfully interviewed, and the response rate was 
80.5%. It was found that this sample group was quite easily available, with the 
participants basically willing to accept being interviewed and open enough to 
express their opinions. As for the questionnaire, it was found to be clear, easily 
understandable, and easy to fill out (see appendix 4). Some minor amendments were 
made on the questionnaire based on the pilot test experience. No major problem was 
encountered in the research procedure. All these tests proved to be very helpful for 
the subsequent full survey on individual household proprietors. The full survey 
indeed resembled in many ways the pilot study. 
The pilot study on government officials was not the same. Because of the 
limited size and special conditions of the sample frame, the pilot study did not aim 
to achieve all the above same five objectives. Interviewers were not required for this 
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group. Availability and condition of the study target and the research procedure were 
also not tested. The main objectives of the pilot study were to test the clarity and 
appropriateness of the questionnaire, and to try out the comparative study of their 
result with that of the individual household proprietors. As such, the pilot study did 
not directly approach officials working in the three selected districts, but used a 
convenient sample of 23 officials attending a training course in the Public 
Administration Institute of the Renmin University of China as a substitute. The 
study was smoothly completed and the comparative analysis was successfully 
conducted. 
6. Data Collection 
Literature Research 
Voluminous Chinese literature materials were acquired from bookstores and 
publishers in Beijing and other mainland cities. These materials included related 
legislation, explanatory papers on interpretation of these legislation, legal journals 
and casebooks, major books and research reports on the subject written or edited by 
mainland scholars, and departmental guidebooks for internal reference of respective 
civil servants. A large amount of unpublished conference papers on the subject was 
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also collected with the help of the local coordinator. 
Empirical Survey 
The empirical questionnaire surveys were conducted with the assistance of the 
local coordinator and the recruited interviewers. They assisted by providing 
comments on the questionnaire's use of language, printing copies of the 
questionnaire in local format, interviewing the sampled individual household 
proprietors in both the pilot study and full survey, and inviting government officials 
to participate in a self-administered survey. Their assistance greatly facilitated the 
progress of the surveys and reduced resistance from the interviewees, thereby 
ensuring successful completion of the surveys. In the process, their work was 
compensated with payment and monitored to ensure the good quality of the survey 
results, e.g. checking mistakes and correcting errors. 
Personal Interviews 
Interviews with a large pool of mainland scholars, government officials, and 
individual household proprietors in Beijing were arranged through three major 
sources of connection: the Law Department of the Beijing Administrative College, 
the Public Administration Institute of the Renmin University of China, and the Law 
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Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Their connections were 
instrumental in carrying out the opinion polling. All the interviews were conducted 
on the understanding that they were for academic research purposes, and some were 
private conversations only. As such, the names of all interviewees would not be 
directly identified or related to any specific piece of information. 
Attendance at Court Hearings 
Attendance at court hearings was arranged with the assistance of the Law 
Department of the Beijing Administrative College. Two administrative litigation 
hearings were attended in the Beijing Hai Dian District People's Court. 
F. Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations in this study. 
The first limitation is the willingness and ability of the interviewed individual 
household proprietors and government officials to support the survey, understand the 
questions asked in the questionnaire, and provide genuine heart-felt answers - in 
short, to provide useful data for analysis in the research. Freedom of expression has 
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not been unconditional in the mainland's civil liberty system. National security, 
public interests, party rule, collective benefit, and social stability are just some of the 
conditions to be observed when citizens exercise their constitutional liberty. People 
in the mainland may speak very differently in public and private, short and official 
in the former, expositive and critical in the latter. Design and wording of the 
questionnaire, interview procedure, training of interviewers, and subsequent data 
analysis have all been undertaken with due concern to this limitation so as to 
minimise its seriousness and unfavourable effect. Obviously, it is a constraint on 
work of this kind and its reality needs to be recognised. All possible steps have been 
taken in the research to minimise its significance, and it is believed that reasonably 
open and honest responses have been received. 
The second limitation relates to the sample size. A sample of 738 individual 
household proprietors from three districts certainly cannot be said to represent all 
290,000 individual household proprietors in Beijing, or the 29,574,000 individual 
household proprietors in the whole country, or the 1.2 billion members of the ruled 
in the PRe. Neither can 152 interviewed government officials be said to represent 
the entire 8,000,000 civil servants or the PRe's rulers in general. Given resources 
and other constraints, this study is just an initial and exploratory discussion of the 
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issue to be further verified by subsequent similar studies. 
The third limitation ties in with the research scope. As pioneering research, this 
is a cultural study of the PRC's administrative litigation, i.e. the cultural dimension 
of the issue only. Other dimensions like historical background, institutional 
arrangement, behaviour of participants, politics and economics of the institution, are 
not the main focus of this research. That does not mean that they do not deserve to 
be studied, but that is a task for later researchers. 
As with the ruled-rulers relationship in any country, the Chinese situation is no 
less complex, and this poses the fourth limitation. The ruled and rulers have a multi-
faceted relationship which exists not only in the legal context but also involves 
political, economic and social interaction. Similarly, resolution of their conflict is 
not confined only to litigation in court, but there are other channels as well, such as, 
in the case of China, administrative reconsideration, assistance from representatives 
of the People's Congress, plus other informal means like resorting to personal 
connections, and even illegal means like using money in bribery. The subject of this 
study, the PRe's administrative litigation, only represents one aspect in the Chinese 
ruled-rulers relationship and cannot be taken to represent the others. 
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Chapter 2 Cognitive Orientation and the Setting up of 
Administrative Litigation in the PRC 
The introduction of administrative litigation in the PRC marks the beginning of 
a long-awaited new era in respect of the contemporary Chinese ruled-rulers 
relationship. When students of China studies accused the early PRC's authority of 
being a totalitarian tyrant, it was easy by then to expect rulers' abuse of the ruled to 
the worst extent but very difficult to envisage the rulers granting a legal review 
system for the ruled to withstand corrupt rulers. Yet, such top-down deliverance may 
not live up to its promise if the ruled do not know about it, do not like to use it, do 
not know how it works, or do not believe it works, and if the rulers in practice do not 
respect it, do not work with it, or do not abide by it. The institution of administrative 
litigation will be left as a window display if there is not a positive and participatory 
administrative litigation culture among the ruled. Likewise, the institution of 
administrative litigation will be left severely constrained if there is a negative and 
defensive administrative litigation culture among the rulers. In short, the 
administrative litigation culture of both the ruled and rulers IS one of the 
fundamental factors determining the successfulness of administrative litigation in 
the PRC to improve the two parties' relationship. 
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This chapter begins to look at the cognitive orientation of the ruled and rulers to 
see how much they know about the PRC's administrative litigation, following its 
implementation almost a decade ago. The following sections will first project the 
macro context by reviewing the setting up of administrative litigation in the PRC 
and chapter one of the Law, then present and discuss the cognitive orientation of the 
ruled and rulers samples, respectively. 
A. The Setting up of Administrative Litigation in the PRe 
Bringing the rulers under rule has never been easy. Administrative litigation in 
the PRC has gone through two difficult stages before arriving at its present state. It 
went through the two stages of an unborn baby from 1949 to 1981 and a boarding 
child from 1982 to 1988, before finally becoming a grown-up standing on its own 
feet after 1990. 
In the first stage, administrative litigation was an unborn baby, made as early as 
1949 when the new republic was found, but it existed only nominally since then in 
the mainland and was not delivered until more than thirty years later. Like any 
generous inaugural pledge, both the para-constitution, Common Agenda, (Article 19) 
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of September 29, 1949 and the first formal PRe's constitution (Article 97) of 
September 20, 1954 provided for administrative litigation in the mainland. The 
former stated clearly that people and their organisations had the right to litigate 
against unlawful action of state organs and government officials in the people's 
procuratorates and the people's courts. The latter allowed citizens to complain 
against unlawful action of government officials through the state, implicitly 
including the judiciary. A similar provision was repeated in all subsequent 
constitutions of 1975 (Article 27), 1978 (Article 55), and 1982 (Article 41). 
However, the promise was never delivered, as there was no subsequent legislation or 
effort to actualise an administrative litigation institution in practice. The reasons for 
this were because legal development as a whole during this leftist period had not 
been taken seriously by the authorities, and the image of cadres as genuine servants 
of the people was widespread during the immediate years after victory, which made 
the problem of power abuse unbelievable and an institution of administrative 
litigation unnecessary. 
Thirty years of patience or ignorance were only long enough to see an 
irresponsible delivery with administrative litigation attached to civil procedure, as if 
conflicts between the ruled and rulers were no more than some kind of dispute 
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among the common people. The turning point for this second stage was the ten-year 
Cultural Revolution, which was tragic enough to reveal the disastrous consequences 
of extreme political struggles, result in a broken relationship between the ruled and 
rulers, denounce the uninstitutionalised methods of conflict resolution, and above all, 
confirm the danger of the rule of man. Post-Mao attempts to resurrect the legal 
system for disciplined rule of man and organised resolution of conflict brought forth, 
among others, the PRC's Civil Procedure Law on March 8, 1982, which contained a 
statement saying that, "This Act is applicable to the administrative cases which the 
people's courts hear according to the stipulation of the law." (Article 3.2) As such, 
administrative litigation in the PRC entered the second stage of no more than a 
boarding child attached to the civil procedure host mother. 
When compared with the first stage, in the second stage certain progress and 
concrete experience (negative included) in administrative litigation were made 
during these seven years of uneasy attachment. More than 130 laws and regulations 
were passed during this period, providing the people's courts with jurisdiction over 
administrative cases. Between 1983 and mid-1988, there were a total of 21 ,914 first 
hearing administrative cases and 1,217 appeal cases in the whole country. The first 
PRC's administrative litigation court was also established in November 1986 at the 
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Gu Luo District People's Court of Hunan province. This provided a pioneering but 
rudimentary trial with administrative litigation in the PRC. Even so, the experiment 
was destined to fail due to the fundamental difference between administrative and 
civil cases. The civil procedure practice of requiring the accuser to bear the burden 
of proof imposed an insurmountable onus on the ruled when trying to sue the rulers 
because the latter had monopolised access to the power and information of 
administrative acts. Not surprisingly, administrative litigation through civil 
procedure invariably failed, with not much actual benefit for the ruled.) It was only 
when the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law was completed and promulgated that 
administrative litigation entered a new stage, with its own identity and on its own 
feet. 
Drafting of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law was not only difficult but 
also highly controversial. Drafting work began with the calling of an Administrative 
Legislation Research Group (-ftJlt1L*-'1f~m) on April 10, 1986 at the direction of 
the Commission of Legislative Affairs (*.~.L 1~ ~ ft .. ) under the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee.2 The group was formed by leading 
administrative law experts in the capital, who bore the full responsibility of the 
drafting work.3 But the authorities remained the gate-keeper. Different expectations 
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were seen right from the beginning. The authorities expected the experts to prepare 
an overall administrative basic law (ftjJt.~*it.) for the country, but by March 
1987, after one year of hard work, the members reckoned it impossible at that stage 
and hence resorted to considering specific administrative laws, with the 
Administrative Litigation Law as the first of a series, followed later by the State 
Compensation Law (1994) and then the Administrative Penalty Law (1996).4 
Difficulties and controversies did not cease with the set of agenda for 
legislation work. The group took another half year to produce a modest and rough 
preliminary draft to test the comment of the authorities. Review by the Commission 
of Legislative Affairs only marked the beginning of many more revisions and 
consultations to follow. Different parties were consulted at different stages. First was 
examination by the immediate authorities, then by central officials, members of the 
people's congress, members of the lower level people's congresses, and later, 
consultation by officials of the judiciary and procuratory, local government officials, 
law experts of other provinces and institutes, as well as the public. Because the 
sensitive and delicate issue of the ruled-rulers relationship was involved and diverse 
interests were affected, consultation and examination of various sorts on the draft 
extended over a period of 20 months. New problems were raised at each occasion of 
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consultation, compromising of opinions was required at each stage, and the draft 
went through many changes over the period (see Table 2.1 below). A good example 
to illustrate this is the change on the proposed scope of acceptance of cases, from 
accepting both specific and abstract administrative acts to accepting only the former 
after a series of consultations and revisions.s 
Table 2.1 The Drafting Process of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law 
No. of No. of 
Date of Draft Kind of Draft Chapters Articles 
30 August 87 Preliminary Draft N/A 31 
13 July 88 Draft for Consultation 8 51 
8 October 1988 Draft for Examination by NPCSC· 8 49 
4 November 1988 Draft for Public Discussion 7 49 
30 November 1988 Revised Draft 10 72 
24 January 1989 Amended Draft 10 68 
1 March 1989 Draft for Examination by NPC# 11 44 
4 April 1989 Present Legislation 11 75 
• National People's Congress Standing Committee # National People's Congress 
Source: Interview Respondent no. 11, Beijing, June 1994. 
Fortunately, this stage of the drafting and consultation work took place in the 
wake of the memorable Thirteenth National Party Congress, where administrative 
litigation legislation was enlisted as crucial to the central theme of political and legal 
reform. This provided the formidable drafting work a favourable environment and 
important support to get through all the consultations and difficulties. At the end, it 
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took as long as two years and as many as eight major drafts before the present 
Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC was finalised and adopted on April 4, 
1989 at the Second Session of the Seventh National People's Congress.6 To allow 
time for resolving various practical difficulties with its implementation, the Law was 
extended for another one and a half years before it became effective on October 1, 
1990 (see appendix 1 for contents of the law). In the legislation history of the PRC 
so far, this Law took the longest time to draft and to become effective, fully 
reflecting the difficulties and controversies involved in the work. It is interesting 
then to see what the final outcome is after all these compromises and modifications. 
B. First Diagnosis of the Administrative Litigation Law 
To provide the necessary contextual background for discussion of the cognitive 
orientations of the ruled and rulers samples later in this chapter, an initial diagnosis 
of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law will be provided, particularly its basic 
purposes and functioning principles found in Chapter One of the Law. Other details 
of the Law, like the scope of acceptable cases, the courts' jurisdiction, and the 
litigation procedure, etc., will be examined in later chapters that deal with such 
topics (see theoretical framework in Table 1.10). 
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The Law consists of 11 chapters and 75 articles, the shortest of its kind when 
compared with its civil and criminal counterparts, probably because of its being 
more specific in nature and more confined in scope. Nevertheless, it draws an end to 
the fonner confusing situation, where administrative litigation provisions are 
scattered over different laws and administrative rules. In a single piece of legislation, 
the Law provides a clear set of guidelines and a comprehensive set of stipulations 
for the practice of administrative litigation in the territory. By nature, the Law is a 
procedural code for the arbitration of substantive rights and interests of the ruled and 
rulers. It stipulates in specific tenns, the scope of acceptable cases in administrative 
litigation, jurisdiction of the courts, admissible parties in the litigation process, the 
rules on evidence, the procedures for first and second hearings, and the executing 
procedures for court rulings. Table 2.2 below enumerates the contents of the Law in 
brief. 
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Table 2.2 Contents of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law in Brief 
No. of 
Chapter Title Articles 
1 General Provisions 10 
2 Scope of Acceptance of Cases 2 
3 Jurisdiction 11 
4 Participants in Proceedings 7 
5 Evidence 6 
6 Bringing and Acceptance and Hearing of Cases 6 
7 Hearings and Judgments 22 
8 Enforcement 2 
9 Liability to Compensate for Infringement of Rights 3 
10 Administrative Proceedings Involving Foreign Interests 4 
11 Supplementary Provisions 2 
Total 75 
Of central importance to a procedural code is the purpose of legislation, which 
sets the direction for the whole piece of legislation and defines the mission for all 
following provisions to fulfill. As stated in its Chapter One Article One, the Law 
aims to: 
(1) ensure the just and prompt hearing of administrative cases by the people's 
court; 
(2) protect the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other 
organisations; and 
(3) uphold and supervise administrative authorities in exercising their 
administrative authority in accordance with the law. 
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The first objective highlights the important and decisive role of the court in the 
pursuit of the just and prompt hearing of administrative cases, but in practice, it is 
more a means to achieve the following two more fundamental objectives that focus 
correspondingly on the ruled and rulers. Basic to administrative litigation is the 
protection of the rights and interests of the ruled. An administrative litigation law 
cannot do without this mission. But the weight of importance in the Law is not and 
has never been intended to be placed one-sidedly on this end of the ruled-rulers 
relationship. Equally important, or even more important, is the rationalisation of the 
administrative authority in respect of the other end of the relationship. As mentioned 
above, the PRe's administrative litigation is a concession of the rulers for the 
purpose of improving its rule in the name of obeying the law. The tricky point with 
this offer is whether the law to be obeyed serves the rulers or guides the rulers. 
Qualification in admitting the rule of the Law by the rulers can be found 
immediately in Article Two, which lists the components of administrative litigation: 
(1) citizens, legal persons or other organisations; 
(2) administrative authorities or their work personnel; 
(3) specific administrative acts; and 
(4) lawful rights and interests of(1) being infringed by (3) of (2). 
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Besides excluding illegal persons and organisations, as well as unlawful rights and 
interests, from protection of the Law, abstract administrative acts (commonly known 
as administrative rules and decisions) and non-administrative authorities and their 
personnel are also deliberately exempted from the rule of the Law. Administrative 
litigation in the PRC is applied on the rulers in a very narrow sense. Only those 
establishments and officials under commission of the State Council, i.e. the 
administration, are subject to the rule of the Law, and only in so far as to their 
specific administrative acts, not their abstract decisions. The judiciary, legislature, 
Communist Party, military, and their personnel, their acts and decisions, are all 
legally and practically free from the rule of the Law. 
Another concealed condition on the rule of the Law concerns the extent of 
independent adjudication by the courts as provided by its Article Three. Interference 
by administrative authorities (members of the rulers), social groups and individuals 
(members of the ruled) in the courts' adjudication of administrative cases is 
modestly ruled out under the provision. But according to the PRC's constitution and 
within the Chinese political system, the courts, in their exercise of adjudication 
authority, have to submit to the leadership of the Communist Party and be 
accountable to their supervising People's Congresses. Independent adjudication of 
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administrative as well as other law cases in the PRe cannot be mistaken as exclusive 
or free adjudication by the courts. The embracing political system still has its 
impress on the country's administrative litigation, and the rulers, as beneficiaries of 
that political system, can easily maintain their privilege under the new 
establishment. 
Within the confines of the above qualifications, the Law sets out to define the 
procedure for administrative litigation under a number of functioning principles. 
Seven articles out of ten in the first chapter of the Law are common principles of 
litigation procedure that also apply in civil and criminal cases (see Table 2.3 below). 
They are the operational guidelines for the courts and all parties to follow in general 
when a case is pursued. Guidelines for other specific issues, like acceptance of cases, 
jurisdiction of courts, identity of parties, admission of evidence, hearings and 
enforcement, are provided in subsequent chapters of the Law. 
70 
Table 2.3 Common Functioning Principles of Procedure 
Article Litigation Principle 
3 Independent adjudication by the court 
4 Facts as basis and law as criterion in hearing 
6 Practice of withdrawal, open trial and one appeal 
7 Equal legal status of the parties 
8 Use of native languages for ethnic groups 
9 Debate by the parties in the litigation process 
10 Legal supervision by the procuratorates 
Notwithstanding the confines imposed when the Law was drafted, the above 
functioning principles laid a good foundation for the practice of administrative 
litigation in the PRe. They represent a major step forward in the Chinese legal 
system because they constitute a genuine judicial review institution in the country 
established specifically for administrative litigation - an institution that is 
comparable in many ways to those found in many modem democratic countries.7 
These principles also consummate the Chinese procedural law system, which now 
comprises not only the civil and criminal branches but also the administrative trunk. 
If there is flaw in the practice of administrative litigation in the PRC, it may not be 
due to a fault with the provisions of the Law, but to perplexity resulting from innate 
deficiencies or problems in the course of implementation and execution.8 
The above diagnosis might be a bit difficult for the common citizens or even 
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the front-line government officials to comprehend. So, how much do the Chinese 
ruled and rulers know about the PRC's administrative litigation? Let's tum to look 
at the cognitive orientation of the ruled and rulers samples to see how much 
understanding they claimed to have about the Administrative Litigation Law and 
institution ofthe PRe. 
c. Cognitive Orientation of the Surveyed Individual Household Proprietors 
Cognitive orientation is the first component and the cognitive basis of 
administrative litigation culture. It stretches over different magnitudes and forms, 
relates in different manners with other administrative litigation orientations, sows 
the seeds for an overall administrative litigation culture, and not least of all, varies 
among individuals. Five questions were asked of the 738 successfully interviewed 
individual household proprietors to measure how much they knew about the PRC's 
administrative litigation in general, and to locate the cognitive basis of their 
administrative litigation culture in particular (see Table 2.4 for the questions). Their 
responses are presented and discussed below. Firstly, the overall level and pattern of 
their cognitive orientation, i.e. the general cognitive basis of their administrative 
litigation culture, are outlined. Secondly, the relationship between different aspects 
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(i.e. internal relationship) of their cognitive orientation is diagnosed to explicate 
their cognitive foundation. Thirdly, the relationship between their cognitive and 
other orientations (i.e. external relationship) is examined to unveil the role of 
cognitive orientation in their overall administrative litigation culture. Finally, 
cognitive orientations of different sub-groups of proprietors, sorted by their personal 
particulars, are analysed and compared to illustrate how cognitive orientation varies 
among individuals of the ruled sample. The sub-group of proprietors who had sued 
the government is also surveyed where appropriate to expound that distinctive 
feature of cognitive orientation among the proprietors. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Proprietors' Cognitive Orientation 
As much as three-quarters of the interviewed individual household proprietors 
had a basic awareness of the PRC's administrative litigation and Administrative 
Litigation Law - 70.8 per cent of them had learned about the existence of the 
institution by which citizens could sue the government, 75.3 per cent had heard of 
citizens actually suing the government, and as many as 77.1 per cent had heard of 
the Law (see Table 2.4 below). This compared very favourably with the result of a 
local investigation reported in the People's Daily earlier in 1991, soon after 
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promulgation of the Law. That investigation found that 60 per cent of the 
interviewed citizens did not know there was administrative litigation, 30 per cent 
had heard about it but did not believe it was true, and only 10 per cent claimed to 
have knowledge about it.9 The main reason for the lack of awareness among the 
citizens at the early stage was due to insufficient promotion by the government after 
it passed the Law and created the institution. lo It seemed that the rulers recognised 
the need for setting up administrative litigation in the country, but were not too eager 
to bring the institution to the ruled or the ruled to the institution. Perhaps it was 
because the idea of an administrative litigation was not originally from the masses, 
and hence, there was no obligation on the rulers to go back to the masses. As for 
those ruled in the rural and inland areas, the lack of awareness was even more 
serious, reflecting the general regional disparity in the mainland. II However, as 
suggested by the present survey, awareness of the PRe's administrative litigation 
among the ruled had been significantly improved over the period and five years did 
not appear to be too long for such an achievement. 
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Table 2.4 Responses of the Proprietors to the Five Cogniti ve Orientation Questions 
Yes No s.d. 
1 Have you heard of cases about citizens q 555 182 0.43 
- - - ----------- ----------
suing the government? % 75.3 24.7 
2 Have you heard that citizens can now q 521 215 0.46 
-- - ----------- ----------
sue the government? % 70.8 29.2 
3 Have you yourself sued the government? q 36 701 0.22 
- - - ----------- ----------
% 4.9 95.1 
4 Have you heard of the "Administrative q 565 168 0.42 
- - - ----------- ----------
Litigation Law"? % 77.] 22.9 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative q lSI 582 0.41 
- - ---------- - - ----------
Litigation Law"? % 20.6 79.4 
s.d. = Standard deviation; q = Frequency. 
"Missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation . 
However, although awareness might have improved over time with the increase 
in opportunities to hear of the institution, in-depth understanding of and personal 
participation in it might not. As for the latter, results of the survey showed much 
lower positive answers than for the former. Only 20.6 per cent of the proprietors had 
studied the Law, most likely through the newspaper, and five per cent had personal 
experience of using administrative litigation. This points to a limited and passive 
cognition among the proprietors in the sense that their cognition is confined to what 
is communicated to them from outside and has not been translated into solid 
individual understanding through personal perusal of relevant legislation or 
experience in practice. It may be argued that given the long tradition of authoritarian 
rule and the near absence of previous administrative litigation, it is already a great 
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leap forward for the ruled to be simply aware that they can now sue the government, 
not to mention having an in-depth understanding and personal experience. 12 Besides, 
20 per cent of the ruled having studied the Law and five per cent having sued the 
rulers can already be considered high by the standards of many European countries. 
But those European countries do not have such serious and endemic administrative 
improprieties as the PRe, and the tradition of authoritarianism should not be an 
excuse for the rulers to beguile the ruled into continual SUbjection and inertia. In fact, 
many of the interviewed proprietors admitted that although they had heard of the 
institution, they actually knew very little about it, reflecting that their cognition was 
indeed limited.13 It is true that cognition about the Administrative Litigation Law 
and institution is becoming more common among the interviewed individual 
household proprietors, but that cognition is largely oriented towards only a basic 
level of awareness whilst in-depth knowledge is still restricted to a small section of 
the proprietors. In a word, most respondents of the ruled sample had acquired the 
cognitive basis of an administrative litigation culture but that cognitive basis was not 
yet very strong and solid. 
As a whole, due to the extremely high level of negative responses by the 
proprietors on two questions, their overall cognitive orientation scores for the five 
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questions resulted in negative responses (50.3 per cent) being slightly higher than 
positive responses (49.7 per cent) (see Table 2.5 below). This reminds us that 
although the cognitive orientation of the proprietors is quite wide in reach, it is 
equally limited in depth. 
Table 2.5 Overall Cognitive Orientation Scores of the Proprietors 
Yes No 
tq 1828.0 1848.0 
_ .... --
---------------- ----------------
Overall Cognitive Orientation aq 365 .6 369.6 
........ -
---------------- ----------------
% 49.7 50.3 
tq = Total Frequency; aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Proprietors' Cognitive Orientation 
Internal relationship refers to the relationship between different aspects of the 
respondents' cognitive orientation. This is reflected by the relationship between their 
responses to different cognitive orientation questions. To begin with, the proprietors' 
answers to the first two cognitive orientation questions about awareness of the 
administrative litigation institution were found to be very closely related, with the 
phi correlation coefficient as high as 0.56 (see Table 2.6 below).14 To a lesser extent, 
their answers to the last two cognitive orientation questions on knowledge about the 
Law were also mutually related, with a phi coefficient of 0.20. Answers to the first 
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two cognitive orientation questions were also significantly related to that of the 
fourth but not the fifth one, meaning that proprietors who had heard of the institution 
were also likely to have heard of the Law but had not necessarily studied the Law. 
Table 2.6 Phi Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the Proprietors ' 
Cognitive Orientation 
Q 01 02 03 04 I 05 
I 01 .56 .15 i 
..................................... ..... + ............................ ... ... .. ........................... / .....................  .
02 .56 i .23 ! 
; ! 
03 .17 
, 
04 .15 ! .23 .20 
............................................. [ ....................... , ...................... ········· .. ·· .. · .. ·· .. ·t······················ 
05 i .17 .20 i 
Row highest in shade, average phi coefficient = 0.13. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
In fact, those proprietors who had studied the Law tended to be those who had 
sued the government, as indicated by the significant correlation between the 
sample's answers to cognitive orientation questions 3 and 5. A more elaborate 
examination by cross-tabulation on the responses of the small sub-group of 36 
proprietors who had sued the government did reveal that they had 30 per cent more 
than the entire sample in having studied the Law, plus 10 per cent more in having 
heard of the institution (details of the extensive cross-tabulation results are not 
displayed due to space constraints). This testified that those sampled ruled who had 
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sued the rulers would tend to have a higher level of administrative litigation 
cognition than those who hadn't. These findings reconfinn the above observation 
that cognitive orientation of the proprietors mostly stops at the gross basic awareness 
level. More in-depth cognition would not stem from a pure interest to learn, casual 
exchange of conversation, or concern for the country's legal development, but 
practical and imminent reasons like preparation for litigation. In fact, the long period 
of underdevelopment and inferiority of the law and legal system in the mainland, the 
passive tolerance of the ruled to infringement by the rulers, and the uncertain 
outcome of the newly introduced administrative litigation, are all factors for the lack 
of incentive among the ruled to learn more about the details and related legislation 
of administrative litigation, leading to a limited and passive cognitive orientation 
among them. IS 
When compared with answers to questions in the other orientations, the internal 
relationship of answers by the proprietors to questions in this cognitive orientation 
was the lowest, with an average internal correlation phi coefficient of only 0.13. The 
main reason for this was that the responses of the proprietors to the cognitive 
orientation questions were contradictory, rather than the questions themselves being 
contradictory. Whilst the five cognitive orientation questions are found to be valid 
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and consistent as measures of the respondent's cognitive orientation, with an Alpha 
coefficient of 0.50, the proprietors' cognitive orientation scores and hence, the 
cognitive basis of their administrative litigation culture, are indeed not particularly 
strong and agreeing. 
3. External Relationship ofthe Proprietors' Cognitive Orientation 
The proprietors' cognitive orientation was found to have a rather close external 
relationship with their other five administrative litigation orientations by the phi 
correlation analysis (see Table 2.7 below). It suggests that cognition of 
administrative litigation, however basic and weak, is important to the configuration 
of the overall administrative litigation culture of the ruled sample. 
Table 2.7 External Relationship of the Proprietors' Cognitive Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Affective Very Strong 
Jurisdictional Fairly Strong 
Evaluational Slight 
Appraisal Fairly Strong 
Expectational Slight 
Specifically, the proprietors' answers to cognitive orientation questions 1 and 2 
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about their awareness of the administrative litigation institution were closely related 
with their answers to questions in the affective orientation (phi correlation 
coefficients from 0.13 to 0.30), and fairly strongly with that in the jurisdictional and 
appraisal orientations (phi correlation coefficients from 0.12 to 0.26, see Table 2.8 
below). On the other hand, their answers to question 4 were closely related with that 
in the affective, evaluational, appraisal, and expectational orientations, with phi 
correlation coefficients from 0.13 to 0.30. Answers to question 5 were also found to 
be closely related with answers to questions of the affective, evaluational, and 
expectational orientations, with phi correlation coefficients from 0.13 to 0.34. The 
results suggest that an initial awareness of the institution is associated with and 
helpful to the building of positive affective, jurisdictional and appraisal orientations 
towards administrative litigation, whilst a more specific knowledge about the Law 
can further help the proprietors to comment in respect of the other orientations, 
including evaluational and expectational orientations. 
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Table 2.8 Phi Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Proprietors' 
Cognitive Orientation 
AtTec ti ve Jurisdic tional Evaluational Appraisal Expcctational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
1 22 20 14 16 14 14 15 13 14 14 15 15 13 17 14 15 18 15 16 
2 24 30 17 16 18 14 12 14 16 12 15 15 19 20 23 15 17 23 20 15 14 15 
3 14 12 15 15 
4 24 18 15 19 30 14 13 18 15 13 15 19 17 14 21 14 16 19 17 23 26 16 18 16 19 
5 13 14 13 15 34 16 16 14 14 13 16 16 15 18 15 14 17 17 
Phi coefficients at 2 decimal points, significance level at .05 , 2-tailed. 
As a whole, the proprietors' answers to cognitive orientation question 3 about 
their expenence with SUIng the government were found to have no signi ficant 
relationship with their other administrative litigation orientations, suggesting 
statistically that personal expenence was not a necessary pre-requisite for their 
responses in the other orientations. However, the same elaborate examination by 
cross-tabulation on the responses of the small sub-group of 36 proprietors who had 
sued the government revealed that this sub-group had more positive affective, 
evaluational, appraisal and expectational orientations. They had more positive 
answers In all affective orientation questions, especially in their support of, care 
about, and acquaintance with the institution. They also had better evaluational 
orientation with respect of the administrative litigation in protecting citizens' rights 
and interests, pushing the rulers to work according to the laws, and reducing the 
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cases of power abuse. For all appraisal orientation questions, the 36 proprietors gave 
more affirmative answers than the rest. They had more confidence in the institution 
and the courts. They were also less worried about implementation of the institution 
and likely revenge by the rulers. Lastly, they also had slightly better expectational 
orientation about the future ofthe institution, but they were not too sure with judicial 
independence as a necessary condition. 
After all, cognitive orientation appears to be the sampled ruled's first step to the 
building of their other administrative litigation orientations. However, different 
aspects of their cognitive orientation have quite distinct associations with their other 
orientations, leading to a different overall administrative litigation culture. It follows 
that promoting the general administrative litigation cognition of the ruled is 
important for strengthening their overall administrative litigation culture, and 
cultivating a more in-depth understanding of the country's administrative litigation 
is instrumental to increasing their further confidence in it. In particular, the 
experience with litigation is found to be an important factor that will bring a higher 
level of cognitive orientation as well as a stronger and more positive administrative 
litigation culture for members of the ruled. 
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4. Cognitive Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Proprietors 
Having presented above the cognitive orientation of the proprietors as a whole, 
this section will analyse and compare the cognitive orientation of specific 
proprietors' sub-groups according to their personal particulars. Statistical analysis of 
the proprietors' responses by means of cross-tabulation shows that their personal 
particulars have varying degrees of relationship with their cognitive orientation 
(details of the extensive cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space 
constraints). Four of the personal particulars showed little association with cognitive 
orientation of the proprietors, three were slightly correlated, and only two were 
found to have a significant relationship (see Table 2.9 below). 
Table 2.9 Relationship between the Proprietors' Cognitive Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Relationship with Personal 
Cognitive Orientation Particulars 
Gender 
Insignificant Working Years Kind of Business 
Working District 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Age 
Slightly Significant Political Status 
Income 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Significant Residency Education Level 
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Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Four of the proprietors' personal particulars, i.e. gender, working years, kind of 
business, and working district, were found to have little association with their 
cognitive orientation. Proprietors of different genders, with di fferent working years, 
in different businesses and working districts all exhibited the general cognitive 
orientation pattern of good initial knowledge but poor in-depth understanding. The 
cognitive orientation scores of both gender sub-groups and all three working district 
sub-groups were very much similar. Whereas, a random distribution of cognitive 
orientation scores was found among sub-groups of different working years and kind 
of businesses. The lack of correlation of these four personal particulars with the 
proprietors' cognitive orientation was confirmed by their phi correlation coefficients, 
which showed no significant correlation (see Table 2.10 below). 
Table 2.10 Phi Correlation Coefficients for the Proprietors' Cognitive Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
t:: 
Q) 0 
>'';::: t:: 
. .;::: ~ 0 
.......... '';::: 
t:: 5 VJ bO . ~ g 
800' 
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3 
4 
5 
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.11 
.15 
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Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Though having the same general pattern of good initial knowledge but poor in-
depth understanding, proprietors of different age sub-groups displayed slight 
differences in their cognitive orientation level and pattern. Younger proprietors 
tended to be more aware of the institution whilst older proprietors tended to be better 
informed of the Law. It seemed that the channel and focus of cognition for different 
age sub-groups were different. Younger proprietors seemed to engage more in social 
interaction and could maintain a good sense of public awareness, but they were less 
patient about learning the details of the legal stipulations. Older proprietors seemed 
to prefer newspapers as sources of information and were more ready to focus on the 
contents of the Law printed therein. 16 The phi correlation coefficients for different 
age sub-groups showed no significant correlation with the cognitive orientation, 
except in question 5 (see Table 2.10 above). 
Under the general pattern of good initial knowledge but poor in-depth 
understanding, proprietors with different political status demonstrated an interesting 
difference in their cognitive orientation pattern and level. Proprietors with 
Communist Party membership showed contrasting scores in that they had the 
highest percentage who had heard of and studied the Law, but also had the highest 
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percentage who claimed not to have heard of the institution. This might be related to 
their membership obligation of having to study party and state documents in the 
course of supporting the party and state organs. Proprietors without party 
membership were the group least informed of the Law. Political status seemed to be 
related with the proprietors' cognitive orientation towards administrative litigation 
in a rather arbitrary manner. Party membership appeared to work like a double-
edged sword that cut in two opposite directions. The phi correlation coefficients for 
this personal particular showed a significant relationship with questions 3 and 5 (see 
Table 2.10 above). Since there were only two proprietors belonging to democratic 
parties, their scores were regarded as not representative and were not statistically 
feasible to include in the discussion. 
The majority of the proprietors belonged to lower income groups, i.e. earning 
below RMB 1 ,000 per month. However, a higher monthly income did seem to be 
associated with a difference in the level and pattern of cognitive orientation among 
the proprietors. The lower income group tended to be less aware of both the 
institution and the Law, whereas the higher income group tended to be more aware 
of the institution, though not better informed of the Law. The highest income group 
also had a much higher percentage who had sued the government but the lowest 
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percentage who had studied the Law. It seemed that the newly rich were much more 
ready and had more resources to employ legal aids such as lawyers to protect their 
rights and interests against administrative infringement without themselves having 
to leave their business to attend to the details of litigation. The least wealthy might 
not necessarily be the least common victims of administrative impropriety, but more 
wealth did seem to be associated with a greater chance of having conflict with the 
administration and resolving the conflict through the legal process. The phi 
correlation coefficients showed that income was significantly related with question 4 
about hearing of the Law (see Table 2.1 0 above). 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
Similar to the age difference, the proprietors without Beijing municipal 
residency tended to have better awareness of the administrative litigation institution, 
whereas those with residency were likely to be better informed of the Law. The 
reason behind this might also be that non-residents relied more on social interaction 
for information and therefore learned about the PRe's administrative litigation. 
However, they were either less concerned with the details of the legal stipulations, or 
they tended not to spare the resources to learn them. On the other hand, the residents 
had a more stable environment in which to attend to newspapers and other printed 
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materials as sources of information from which they could keep themselves abreast 
of the Law propagated therein. A moderating factor was education level. From 
cross-tabulation, it was found that a higher percentage of proprietors with residency 
had completed upper secondary school or above than proprietors without residency. 
The opposite was found for lower level education. Education level was another 
personal particular of the proprietors that had a significant relationship to their level 
and pattern of cognitive orientation (see discussion below). 
On the other hand, both residency sub-groups were similar in not having sued 
the government but the residents lagged behind the non-residents by a small margin 
on that. An elaborate analysis by cross-tabulation confirmed that relatively more 
proprietors in the sub-group of 36 who had sued the government were non-residents, 
with 15.3 per cent more than in the entire sample (details of the extensive cross-
tabulation results are not displayed due to space constraints). The reason for that 
might be due to the residents' ties with the locality and hence the greater burden and 
risk in pursuit of litigation against local officials. Indeed, absence of local ties and 
readiness to move was an advantage if the ruled were to sue the rulers. The phi 
correlation coefficients for residency showed significant correlations with responses 
to cognitive orientation questions 1, 2 and 4 (see Table 2.1 0 above). 
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Education level was not associated with a significant difference in the 
proprietors' expenence with sumg the government, but it did correlate with a 
significant difference in their awareness of both the institution and the Law. 
Respondents with a higher level of education were likely to have a better knowledge 
of the institution and the Law. This is understandable, because education can 
increase a person's ability to comprehend information and broaden his public 
awareness. This was clearly demonstrated by the phi correlation coefficients for 
education level, which showed a significant correlation with cognitive orientation 
questions 4 and 5 (see Table 2.10 above). 
In summary, under the general pattern of good initial knowledge but poor in-
depth understanding, education level acted as an instrumental factor and residency 
acted as an environmental factor, causing variations in the general level and pattern 
of the proprietors' cognitive orientation towards administrative litigation. Age as a 
personal factor, political status as a political factor, and income as an economic 
factor also caused additional differences, though to a lesser extent. The correlation 
intensity of these five factors with the proprietors' cognitive orientation was more or 
less the same (phi coefficients between 0.1 to 0.2). Other personal particulars were 
found to have insignificant correlation with the proprietors' cognitive orientation. 
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D. Cognitive Orientation of the Surveyed Government Officials 
Similar to the proprietors, the same five cognitive orientation questions were 
asked of the 152 successfully interviewed government officials to measure how 
much this rulers sample knew about the PRC's administrative litigation, and to 
locate the cognitive basis of their administrative litigation culture. However, 
cognitive orientation question 3, about experience of the respondents with 
administrative litigation, was rephrased from asking whether the proprietors had 
sued the government to asking whether the officials had participated in 
administrative litigation, so as to reflect their different role m litigation. For 
illustration and comparison purposes, the responses of this rulers sample are 
presented below in the same way that responses of their ruled counterparts are 
presented above, but the discussion is more from a comparative perspective. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Officials' Cognitive Orientation 
The cognitive basis of the interviewed officials' administrative litigation culture 
was much more deep-set and in unison, as shown in their responses. An impressive 
92.1 per cent of them had heard of citizens suing the government and knew about 
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the existence of the administrative litigation institution (see Table 2.11 below). A 
striking 96.7 per cent of them had heard of the Law. Cognition of the officials in 
these three aspects exceeded that of the proprietors by about 20 per cent. Likewise, 
as many as 73.7 per cent of the officials had studied the Law, leading the proprietors 
by more than 50 per cent. In addition, nearly 10 per cent of the officials had 
experience with participating in administrative litigation, almost double that of the 
proprietors. The officials' pattern of cognitive orientation was also much less 
contradictory than the proprietors'. Their overall cognitive orientation scores 
resulted in the positive responses being much higher than the negative, i.e. 72.9 to 
27.1 per cent (see Table 2.12 below). 
Table 2.11 Responses of the Officials to the Five Cognitive Orientation Questions 
Yes No s.d. 
1 Have you heard of cases about citizens q 139 12 0.27 
- -- ----------- ----------
suing the government? % 92.1 7.9 
2 Have you heard that citizens can now q 139 12 0.27 
--- ----------- ----------
sue the government? % 92.1 7.9 
3 Have you participated in administrative q 14 136 0.29 
- --
----------- ----------
litigation? % 9.3 90.7 
4 Have you heard of the "Administrative q 147 5 0.18 
--- ----------- ----------
Litigation Law"? % 96.7 3.3 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative q 112 40 0.44 
--- ----------- ----------
Litigation Law"? % 73.7 26.3 
s.d. = Standard deviation; q = Frequency. 
"Missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
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Table 2 .12 Overall Cognitive Orientation Scores of the Officials 
Yes No 
tq 551 205 
- - - - - ---------------- ----------------
Overall Cognitive Orientation aq 110.2 41.0 
- - - -- ---------------- ----------------
% 72.9 27.1 
tq = Total Frequency; aq = Average Frequency. 
The above results were not surprising given the sampled rulers' official 
capacity, task requirements and on-the-job training. It would only be astonishing if 
the officials' administrative litigation cognition was below that of the proprietors, as 
that would signify real problems with the PRe's administrative litigation. From the 
beginning, administrative litigation was put on the agenda by the rulers and the 
institution was largely their creation. Their role in setting up the country's 
administrative litigation gave them the advantage and leading edge in understanding 
the subject. Subsequently, if anyone were to get acquainted with the institution after 
its implementation, it would be the rulers because they needed to know how to 
prevent being sued by the ruled. Understanding the institution and the Law would be 
of interest to the rulers as much as to the ruled, if not more. But of more importance 
were the resources available to acquire knowledge of the subject. 
In the first year after promulgation of the Law but before its becoming effective, 
compulsory training sessions, each of two weeks' duration, were organised for most 
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of the state officials. Using Beijing as an example, a total of 150,000 law 
enforcement officers were trained during that year. 17 The training was delivered not 
only by senior officials of respective departments but also by legal experts from 
major institutes. Besides introducing the newly established administrative litigation 
institution and provisions of the Administrative Litigation Law, the core contents of 
the training were on how to fit in with administrative litigation from the rulers' 
perspective and on how to minimise the risk of being sued in daily operations. 18 
Although effects of the training and the learning of the trainees might vary, such 
organised training and the necessary resources had never been available to the ruled. 
On the other hand, given the much smaller number of the rulers as compared to 
the ruled, the former's chance of experiencing administrative litigation was 
predictably much higher than the latter's. To sum up, although not many of the 
officials had personal experience with administrative litigation, their knowledge of it 
was mostly well secured, and the cognitive basis of their administrative litigation 
culture was much stronger and coherent than that of their proprietor counterparts. 
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2. Internal Relationship of the Officials' Cognitive Orientation 
The situation of the officials in this respect was quite similar to that of the 
individual household proprietors. The officials' answers to the first two questions 
about cognition of the institution proved to be mutually related, like their answers to 
the last two questions about cognition of the Law (see Table 2.13 below). Answers 
to the first two cognitive orientation questions were also significantly related with 
that of the fourth question, but only partially with that of the fifth question, meaning 
that officials who had heard of the institution were also likely to have heard of the 
Law but not as likely to have studied the Law. Their answers to question 3 were not 
related to that of the other questions in this orientation, other than negatively with 
question 4, suggesting that their experience with administrative litigation was not 
necessarily related with their knowledge of the institution or the Law. 
Table 2.13 Phi Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the Officials ' 
Cognitive Orientation 
Q 01 02 03 04 I 05 
i i 01 i .46 .36 i 
.................................. .......... L ................................................................. ..J. ..................... . 
02 .46 I .36 I .38 
03 -.20 I 
I 
Row highest in shade, average phi coefficient = 0.20. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
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Although the officials had a much higher level of administrative litigation 
cognition, their knowledge was not tied with their need to prepare for litigation, but 
rather with their training on how to avoid the rise of litigation. No wonder, then, that 
there was a negative relationship between their answers to cognitive orientation 
questions 3 and 4. After all, administrative litigation cognition remains largely a 
private matter for each individual proprietor but the same becomes an institutional 
concern for the officials as a collective. Whilst cognitive orientation of the ruled can 
be limited and passive, that of the rulers needs to be better ingrained and more 
proactive due to their difference in roles and other practical reasons. 
When compared with answers to questions in the other orientations, the internal 
relationship of answers by the officials to questions in this cognitive orientation was 
also the lowest, but not particularly low and in fact a little bit higher than that of the 
proprietors. The average internal correlation phi coefficient for cognitive orientation 
answers of the officials was 0.20, slightly higher than their proprietor counterparts. 
The main reason for having the lowest level of internal relationship in this cognitive 
orientation was also due to the disproportionately low percentage of government 
officials who had been involved in administrative litigation. This reflects the fact 
that administrative litigation is still not popular for either the ruled or the rulers. 
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3. External Relationship of the Officials' Cognitive Orientation 
Unlike their proprietor counterparts, the officials' cognitive orientation had a 
very weak relationship with all their other administrative litigation orientations (see 
Table 2.14 below). 
Table 2.14 External Relationship of the Officials' Cognitive Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Affective Small 
Jurisdictional Small 
Evaluational Small 
Appraisal Small 
Expectational Small 
Specifically, there is only a marginal relationship between the officials' answers 
to two cognitive orientation questions and their answers to the other administrative 
litigation orientations. Firstly, their answers to cognitive orientation question 2 about 
having heard that the institution existed were marginally related with their answers 
to questions in the affective, jurisdictional, evaluational and appraisal orientations 
(see Table 2.15 below). Secondly, their answers to cognitive orientation question 5 
about having studied the Law were marginally related with their answers to 
questions in the jurisdictional and evaluational orientations. Their answers to 
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cognitive orientation questions 1, 3 and 4 were found not related with their answers 
in the other orientations. This seems to suggest that, unlike the ruled, the rulers do 
not tie their feelings and ideas about administrative litigation with their knowledge 
of it, and that their administrative litigation cognition as a whole is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for their building of the other administrative litigation orientations. The 
official policy and position of the rulers on the setting up and implementation of 
administrative litigation may outweigh individual member's knowledge as a factor 
in configuring those members' overall administrative litigation culture. 
Table 2.15 Phi Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Officials' 
Cognitive Orientation 
Affective Jurisd ictional Evaluational Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
I 31 30 32 25 29 
2 34 29 50 34 33 30 48 28 33 32 42 39 31 33 37 37 
3 32 33 31 30 
4 31 32 
5 34 47 50 37 33 29 30 28 28 35 32 23 
Phi coefficients at 2 decimal points, significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
However, it should be noted that a detailed cross-tabulation analysis on the 
answers of the sub-group of 14 officials who had participated in administrative 
litigation did reveal that such experience was important to the rulers, as much as to 
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the ruled (details of the extensive cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to 
space constraints). The experience was important not in bringing a higher level of 
cognitive orientation but in causing a more positive overall administrative litigation 
culture, especially in respect of the evaluational, appraisal and expectational 
orientations. The 14 officials had significantly more positive answers than both their 
colleagues and the respective proprietors sub-group to questions in these three 
orientations. It is beyond doubt that the rulers, like the ruled, will become more 
convinced of the positive effects and usefulness of administrative litigation after 
they have actual experience with administrative litigation and then will become 
more ready to agree with the need for further development of the institution. 
4. Cognitive Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Officials 
After discussing the cognitive orientation of the interviewed officials as a 
whole, the cognitive orientation of various sub-groups of officials according to their 
personal particulars will be analysed and compared below. Statistical analysis of the 
officials' responses by means of cross-tabulation shows that their personal 
particulars have a varying degree of relationship with their cognitive orientation and 
the results are summarised in Table 2.16 below (details of the extensive cross-
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tabulation results are not displayed due to space constraints). When compared with 
relationships found in the proprietors' sample, gender, working years and working 
district appeared to be more important for the officials' cognitive orientation, age 
and education level were equally important, and political status and income were 
less important. 
Table 2.16 Relationship between the Officials' Cognitive Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Relationship with Personal 
Cognitive Orientation Particulars 
Insignificant Political Status Income 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Gender 
Slightly Significant Age 
Working Years 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Department 
Significant Working District 
Education Level 
Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Political party affiliation and monthly income did not relate with a major 
difference in the officials' cognitive orientation level or pattern. Although phi 
correlation coefficients of the two personal particulars showed a significant 
relationship with answers to cognitive orientation questions 1 and 3 (see Table 2.17 
below), cross-tabulation of these two personal particulars with answers to the five 
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cognitive orientation questions showed a basically random distribution of scores, 
suggesting no particular relationship with the officials' cognitive orientation. The 
only exception is correlation between income and answers to cognitive orientation 
question 3, which suggests that the higher income sub-group, and hence more senior 
officials, tend to have more experience with administrative litigation. 
Table 2.17 Phi Correlation Coefficients for the Officials' Cognitive Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
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Both male and female officials were equally well aware of the litigation 
institution, with an average of over 90 per cent who knew about it. But significantly 
more male officials had participated in litigation and marginally more female 
officials were better informed of the Law. The basic level of cognition did not vary 
too much between the two genders. This was confirmed by the lack of association as 
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indicated by the phi correlation coefficients (see Table 2.17 above). The official 
principle of gender equality ensured equal opportunity and treatment of both genders 
in on-the-job training about relevant administrative litigation knowledge and laws. 
Female officials, being younger and more junior than their male counterparts in the 
sample, appeared to be more diligent in studying the Law. However, it seemed that 
the more mature and senior male officials, as opposed to their female counterparts, 
were more likely to be selected and appointed by the defending departments to 
appear in courts as representatives. 
Officials of different age sub-groups also shared a good basic level of cognition 
of the institution, also with an average of over 90 per cent. However, there was a 
clear tendency for older officials to be more likely to have studied the Law and 
participated in litigation. As many as 90 per cent of those officials between 41-50 
years of age had studied the Law and participated in litigation, as compared to only 
67.9 and 5.4 per cent respectively for those between 18-30. This indicated again the 
preference of the authorities to deploy older and maturer officials to deal with legal 
arbitration. It was not surprising that details of the Law were a matter of concern for 
the older age sub-group. However, the phi correlation coefficients had not indicated 
a significant correlation between age of the officials and their cognitive orientation 
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answers (see Table 2.17 above). 
Seniority in terms of working years slightly correlated with cognition level of 
the officials, particularly for those with over 10 years of service. Significantly more 
of those with 10 or more years of seniority, and hence much older in age, had heard 
of the institution, studied the Law, and participated in administrative litigation. Other 
than that, no major difference was identified across the five sub-groups. The phi 
correlation coefficients also indicated no significant correlation between working 
years of the officials and their answers about cognition of administrative litigation 
(see Table 2.17 above). 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
The general trend of a high cognition level prevailed among officials of 
different departments, but individual variances could still be identified. Public 
Security officials had the highest level of cognition about the institution, followed by 
their colleagues in Industry and Commerce Department, and the Hygiene 
Department. On the other hand, the Hygiene Department was the one with the 
highest percentage of officials who had heard of and studied the Law, followed by 
the Industry and Commerce Department and Fire Services Department. Officials 
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with the lowest level of awareness of both the institution and the Law worked for the 
Department of Environmental Protection, and they were also the least involved in 
administrative litigation. Officials with the Industry and Commerce Department had 
a significantly higher percentage of having participated in litigation, followed by 
their colleagues in the Civil Affairs Department. The different kind and nature of 
work in different departments seemed to have a significantly different relationship 
intensity with administrative litigation, leading to different cognition levels among 
officials performing different administrative functions. The phi correlation 
coefficients for this personal particular did not reveal significant findings on a 
relationship with cognitive orientation (see Table 2.17 above). 
As for their place of work, officials of the Xuan Wu district showed a 
comparatively higher level of cognition in terms of having heard of the institution, 
the Law, and having participated in litigation. Officials of Hai Dian district had the 
lowest level of cognition, except for knowledge about the Law. Yet, these 
differences were not very significant and the phi correlation coefficients for this 
personal particular were not statistically significant (see Table 2.17 above). 
The last personal particular showing a significant correlation with the officials' 
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cognitive orientation towards administrative litigation was education level. However, 
it was found that a higher level of education tended to relate negatively with a lower 
level of cognition, whether that related to awareness of the institution, the Law, or 
experience with litigation. This was probably due to the special condition of the 
Chinese rulers. Many of the present senior officials who, because of age, rank, and 
years of service, were candidates to represent their department in litigation duties, 
tended not to have completed a high level of education since the country was war-
tom during their school years. Following recent reforms of the civil service, more 
graduates were recruited into the government, but these new recruits and junior 
members were not yet ready for such demanding duties. Therefore, although 
education level was significantly correlated with the officials' cognitive orientation, 
important intervening factors had to be taken into consideration. This also explained 
the nil result of phi correlation analysis for this personal particular (see Table 2.17 
above). 
In summary, the result of phi correlation measures did not suggest a significant 
relationship between the officials' personal particulars and cognitive orientation. 
The fact seemed to be that on-the-job training concerning the administrative 
litigation institution and the Law had ensured a common acquaintance with the two 
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areas among the officials. Different personal backgrounds seemed not to be an 
important factor in this connection. However, cross-tabulation studies still revealed 
interesting variances alongside the general consistency, especially in respect of 
participation in litigation. Male officials of greater age and higher seniority were 
much more likely to have participated in administrative litigation, especially those 
working in the Industry and Commerce Department and in the Xuan Wu district. 
Political status and income were not particularly important to the officials' cognitive 
orientation, which statistically related negatively with education level. 
E. Summary 
This chapter reports and discusses the cognitive orientations of the 738 
interviewed individual household proprietors and 152 surveyed government officials. 
By so doing, the cognitive basis of the two parties' administrative litigation culture 
can be established. It began with a brief introduction on the setting up of the PRC's 
administrative litigation and an initial diagnosis of the PRC's Administrative 
Litigation Law. This serves to provide a contextual background to examine how 
much the ruled and rulers know about the PRC's administrative litigation, which is 
the first research question of this thesis. The PRC's administrative litigation was set 
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up in April 1989 by the rulers for the ruled to seek redress in the law courts for 
infringement by the rulers' unlawful specific administrative acts. However confined 
in the design and function of the PRC's administrative litigation, the institution 
signifies a revolutionary change in the PRC's ruled-rulers relationship. 
To comprehend the legal stipulations and actual practice related with the newly 
established administrative litigation is not an easy task for members of both the 
ruled and the rulers. Based on their own needs, situation, and available resources, 
the two parties have established their own respective cognitive orientation about the 
country's administrative litigation, which has been in place for almost a whole 
decade. Not surprisingly, the two parties' cognitive orientations are very different, 
whether in terms of the general level and pattern, specific combination, unique 
features, importance to the overall administrative litigation culture, and relation with 
the personal background of the respondents. 
Cognitive orientation of the ruled sample is more limited, passive and 
incoherent, but is an important foundation for their overall administrative litigation 
culture. Better-educated and non-resident members of the ruled have a better general 
cognitive orientation, and personal experience with suing the government is 
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important for their cognitive orientation formation. Cognitive orientation of the 
rulers sample is more in-depth, proactive and solid, but their overall administrative 
litigation culture is not necessarily tied to their cognitive orientation. More mature 
and senior members of the rulers have a better cognitive orientation, especially 
through participation in actual litigation. 
No major deficiency or problem is identified with the two parties' cognitive 
orientation. The cognitive basis of their administrative litigation culture is found to 
be sufficient for supporting the building of their other administrative litigation 
orientations. The fact that less than five per cent of the proprietors had sued the 
government was not because the sampled ruled were cognitively unprepared, nor 
because there were few cases to file, but largely due to practical reasons like costs 
and difficulties with litigation. It seems that bringing the ruled to the institution is 
much more difficult or much less successful than bringing the institution to the ruled 
in the PRC. It also seems that there are still many obstacles in bringing the 
institution into full swing for soothing the uneasy ruled-rulers relationship in the 
country. The next chapter will report the implementation problems with 
administrative litigation in the PRC and the second administrative litigation 
orientation of the sampled ruled and rulers, i.e. the affective orientation. 
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Chapter 3 Affective Orientation and the Implementation 
of Administrative Litigation in the PRC 
When the PRC's administrative litigation was set up in 1989, it was given a 
worthy mission to fulfill in a hostile environment. The result is high moral consent 
in support of the course of action but serious operational obstructions in the process 
of achieving it. After all, it is easy for both the ruled and rulers to envisage the 
possible benefits of administrative litigation and readily accept its establishment. Yet, 
it is much less easy for the two to recognise the many practical obstacles in the 
course of its implementation. Discordance is found in the mainland where positive 
affective orientation prevails among the ruled and rulers, but the actual 
implementation of administrative litigation is highly problematic and far from 
satisfactory. It seems that a supporting affective orientation is necessary but not 
sufficient for successful implementation of administrative litigation in the mainland. 
In this chapter, the ruled and rulers samples' affective orientations will be presented 
and discussed, together with an investigation on the implementation record of 
administrative litigation in the PRe since 1990. By doing so, we can ascertain not 
just how well the two parties accept the PRC's administrative litigation but also how 
well such a feeling ties in with the latter's implementation. 
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A. The Implementation of Administrative Litigation in the PRe 
Development of the PRC's administrative litigation is found to be even more 
difficult and problematic than gaining its birth. Two thousands years of authoritarian 
imperial rule had produced a highly entrenched ruled-rulers dichotomy and a 
corresponding set of ideologies, norms, structures and practices that served to 
reinforce such a dichotomy. Forty years of socialist rule since 1949 dismantled many 
of the feudal traditions but had, in contrast, further strengthened the ruled-rulers 
dichotomy and the rule of the rulers. Such a cultural and structural macro-
environment has not changed very much before and after establishment of the PRC's 
administrative litigation. The established norms and practices suppress the ruled, 
empower the rulers, and preempt the rule of law now as much as in the past. Many 
of the ruled are still not used to taking legal measures, confronting the rulers, and 
protecting their interests. Many of the rulers are still not used to answering to the 
ruled, examination by the courts, and abiding by the laws. The ruled are still all too 
weak and loosely organised to protect themselves. The rulers are still all too 
powerful and well established to be challenged. The legal system is still not well 
established enough to provide relief. And the age-old ruled-rulers dichotomy is still 
too secure to be shaken. When litigation is to be pursued, there are, indeed, many 
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obstacles to be overcome, high costs to be paid, and great risk to be shouldered. In 
the mainland, it is one thing to accept administrative litigation in principle and quite 
another to pursue it in practice. 
1. A Brief Review of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Implementation 
According to the statistics published by the Chinese authorities, there has been 
continuing and substantial growth in the number of administrative litigation cases 
accepted by the people's courts in the PRC after the formal setting up of 
administrative litigation in 1990. The amount of first hearing administrative cases 
surged by 30 per cent in 1990 and by 97 per cent in 1991 (see Table 3.1 below). In 
particular, 40 per cent of the 1990's annual total, i.e. 5258 out of 13006 cases, were 
received in the last three months from October to December when the Law became 
effective, which represented a 96 per cent increase over the same period in the 
previous year. 1 This indicates that the citizens did have high hopes when 
administrative litigation was set up in 1989 and were eager to make use of it when it 
became effective in 1990. The rise slowed down to five per cent and two per cent in 
the following two years, respectively, suggesting there were indeed operational 
problems that were unrecognised before but that soon manifested when the 
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institution was put into effect. Yet, the annual growth rate picked up again from 25 
per cent in 1994 to 49 per cent in 1995, and 52 per cent in 1996. Although the rise in 
1997 was not as great, the number of first hearing administrative cases had already 
increased by more than nine-fold after eight years of implementation, reaching a 
total of90,557 cases in 1997 as compared to 9,934 cases in 1989. As a matter of fact, 
more and more members of the ruled are using the new institution to protect their 
rights and interests against illegal infringement by the rulers. The PRC's 
administrative litigation has not been left just as a window display but has, indeed, 
opened up a new era in the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship since 1990. 
Table 3.1 First and Second Hearing Administrative Cases in the PRC, 1988-1997 
First!l~lU'in~_~~s_~_~ Secon~ Hearillg. Cases 
~cc~ted Closed -,\ccep!ed Closed 
Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Cases % Rise Cases % Rise Cases % Rise Cases % Rise 
1988 8573 8029 2356 2218 
1989 9934 15.88 9742 21.34 2908 23.43 2888 30.21 
1990 13006 30.92 12040 23.59 3431 17.98 3325 15.13 
1991 25667 97.35 25202 109.32 6930 101.98 6708 101.74 
1992 27125 5.68 27116 7.59 8334 20.26 8273 23.33 
1993 27911 2.90 27958 3.11 7426 -10.90 7584 -8.33 
1994 35083 25.70 34567 23.64 7699 3.68 7672 1.16 
1995 52596 49.92 51370 48.61 9694 25.91 9536 24.30 
1996 79966 52.04 79537 54.83 11454 18.16 11365 19.18 
1997 90557 13.24 88542 11.32 12754 11.35 12684 11.61 
Source: Law Yearbook of China, 1989-1998 (% added) 
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Besides an increase in the number of cases accepted, there has also been a rapid 
expansion in the scope of cases accepted. During the years before and immediately 
after the establishment of the PRe's administrative litigation, administrative cases 
involved mainly administrative sanctions by two administrative agents: Public 
Security and the Lands Departments. During those years, the ruled would use 
administrative litigation only as the last resort and only when the issues involved 
were vital, e.g. birth control, personal liberty, land distribution, and house clearance. 
It was not so much a virtuous fight for the ideal of righteousness or rule of law as it 
was a hard struggle for survival at all costs. However, other kinds of administrative 
cases were soon accepted by the people's courts, which were developing the ability 
to assist members of the ruled who were suffering from various kinds of 
administrative infringement. For example, administrative litigation courts in Beijing 
had already expanded their scope of accepted cases to 45 categories in 1994, 
whereas other provinces and municipalities were not too far behind.2 Among all the 
administrative cases accepted in the PRe in 1990, public security and lands cases 
each contributed to around one-third of the total, but the two had fallen to only 16 
per cent and 14 per cent respectively in 1997 (see Table 3.2 below). On the contrary, 
"other" types of cases had increased substantially from 34 per cent to 61 per cent 
over the same period. It is obvious that the PRe's administrative litigation has 
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developed from serving only two kinds of administrative complaints in the past, to 
offering a wide range of protection to the ruled in the mainland recently. It also 
suggests that the Chinese ruled are becoming more ready to resort to administrative 
litigation on a diverse range of issues involving their personal rights and interests 
apart from sheer survival. 
Table 3.2 Types of Administrative Litigation First Hearing Cases, 1990-1997 
Public City Industry & 
~ecll~!ty Lands Building Commerce Hygiene Others Total 
Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases 
1990 4519 35 4038 31 4449 34 13006 
1991 7720 30 8162 32 9785 38 25667 
1992 7863 29 8330 31 10932 40 27125 
1993 7018 25 8063 29 2038 7 571 2 456 2 9765 35 27911 
1994 8624 25 7962 23 2303 7 886 3 601 2 14707 42 35083 
1995 11633 22 10012 19 3062 6 1556 3 916 2 25417 48 52596 
1996 15090 19 13932 17 4526 6 1486 2 1388 2 43544 54 79966 
1997 14171 16 12986 14 4848 5 1817 2 1334 2 55401 61 90557 
Source: Law Yearbook of China, 1991-1998 (% added) 
However, despite the above growth and development, administrative litigation 
only constitutes a tiny portion of all the cases accepted by the people's courts and an 
even tinier portion of all the administrative acts taking place in the PRC. The major 
type of case accepted by the people's courts is civil procedure (around 60 per cent), 
followed by economic dispute (20-30 per cent) and criminal procedure (around 10 
per cent). By comparison, administrative litigation is almost negligible, amounting 
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to less than one per cent before 1995 and no more than two per cent after (see Table 
3.3 below). In the reality of the mainland, it is unlikely that administrative 
controversies are so much fewer than civil and economic disputes. The more likely 
reason is that the ruled in many instances do not bring administrative controversies 
to the courts. As reported by a Beijing high court official, among the more than ten 
million administrative sanctions undertaken by the 44 administrative agents in the 
capital each year, only less than 0.002 per cent were taken to administrative 
litigation.3 It seems that even when the ruled find certain administrative acts 
unlawful and agree that administrative litigation is the lawful channel for complaint, 
they still may not file the case but instead reluctantly accept those unlawful acts or 
deal with them by some other means. No doubt, administrative litigation is neither 
playing its full part in the Chinese judicial system nor providing the full strength of 
protection to the ruled against administrative infringements in the present-day PRC. 
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Table 3.3 Four Major Types of First Hearing Cases in the PRC, 1988-1997 
Administrative Criminal Civil Economic 
!-itig~!i~n Procedure Procedure Dispute Total 
~. 
-- -
Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases 
1988 8573 0.37 313306 13.68 1455130 63.53 513615 22.42 2290624 
1989 9934 0.34 392564 13.47 1815385 62.31 695632 23.88 2913515 
1990 13006 0.45 459656 15.76 1851897 63.49 592215 20.30 2916774 
1991 25667 0.89 427840 14.74 1880635 64.81 567543 19.56 2901685 
1992 27125 0.89 422991 13.86 1948786 63.88 652255 21.37 3051157 
1993 27911 0.82 403267 11.81 2089257 61.18 894410 26.19 3414845 
1994 35083 0.89 482927 12.21 2383764 60.26 1053701 26.64 3955475 
1995 52596 1.16 495741 10.91 2718533 59.80 1278806 28.13 4545676 
1996 79966 1.50 618826 11.65 3093995 58.24 1519793 28.61 5312580 
1997 90557 1.71 436894 8.26 3277572 61.98 1483356 28.05 5288379 
Source: Law Yearbook of China, 1989-1998 
Finally, among those first hearing administrative cases accepted by the courts, 
the percentage of the ruled eventually winning has been around only 20 per cent 
over the eight years since implementation (see the Recalled and Changed columns in 
Table 3.4 below). The PRC's administrative litigation, despite its growth and 
development over the years, appears to be not particularly helpful to the ruled at the 
end of the day. Besides, despite the very high closing rate of cases by the courts, 
which approaches almost 100 per cent, it is increasingly based on cases being 
withdrawn or rejected. The withdrawal and rejection rates had doubled from 27 and 
seven per cent in 1988 to 54 and 15 per cent in 1997, respectively. There seems to be 
great pressure during the course of litigation or other problems that cause the ruled 
to give up their demands mid-way. In the past, the rulers had a 49 per cent chance of 
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winning over the ruled in first hearing administrative cases. Despite a continuing fall 
in that percentage to only 13 per cent in 1997, the continuing rise in the withdrawal 
rate by the ruled means that the latter is not gaining in the overall struggle whereas 
the rulers' disputed administrative acts remain mostly sustained, either legally or 
practically. More and more of the rulers' filed administrative acts are not given a fair 
trial. It seems that the courts have not been doing very well in resolving conflicts 
between the ruled and the rulers, especially when more than 20 per cent of all appeal 
cases resulted in previous decisions of the courts being not sustainable (see the 
Changed and Rehear columns in Table 3.5 below). 
Table 3.4 Administrative Litigation First Hearing Cases, 1988-1997 
Ac~~<! Closed Breakdown of Closed Cases 
---. ------_. _._------
Affirmed Recalled ~~nged Withdrawn Others· 
------ ----- -----
Cases Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % 
1988 8573 8029 94 3929 49 916 11 422 5 2171 27 591 7 
1989 9934 9742 98 4135 42 1364 14 587 6 2966 30 690 7 
1990 13006 12040 93 4337 36 2012 17 398 3 4346 36 947 8 
1991 25667 25202 98 7969 32 4762 19 592 2 9317 37 2562 10 
1992 27125 27116 100 7628 28 5780 21 480 2 10261 38 2967 11 
1993 27911 27958 100 6587 24 5270 19 430 2 11550 41 4121 15 
1994 35083 34567 99 7128 21 6547 19 369 15317 44 5206 15 
1995 52596 51370 98 8903 17 7733 15 395 25990 51 8349 16 
1996 79966 79537 99 11549 15 11831 15 1214 2 42915 54 12028 15 
1997 90557 88542 98 11230 13 12279 14 717 64316 73 ) .. 
• Others include cases rejected . 
.. Withdrawn, rejected, referred and other cases combined. 
Source: Law Yearbook of China, 1989·1998 (% added) 
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Table 3.5 Administrative Litigation Second Hearing Cases, 1988-1997 
Acc~~ecl Closed Breakdown of Closed Cases 
Affirmed <::hange~ Rehear Withdrawn Others· 
... 
Cases Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % Cases % 
1988 2356 2218 94 1573 71 645 29 
1989 2908 2888 99 1875 65 227 8 229 8 127 4 430 15 
1990 3431 3325 97 2192 66 662 20 258 8 102 3 III 3 
1991 6930 6708 97 4381 65 605 9 543 8 224 3 955 14 
1992 8334 8273 99 5333 64 1332 16 687 8 397 5 524 6 
1993 7426 7584 100 4859 64 1343 18 555 7 370 5 457 6 
1994 7699 7672 100 4974 65 1196 16 573 7 429 6 500 7 
1995 9694 9536 98 6086 64 1408 15 676 7 658 7 708 7 
1996 11454 11365 99 7206 63 1951 17 827 7 702 6 679 6 
1997 12754 12684 99 7603 60 2105 17 937 7 1143 9 896 7 
• Others include cases cancelled. 
Source: Law Yearbook of China, 1989-1998 (% added) 
To sum up, the PRC's administrative litigation does show real growth and 
development during its eight years of implementation in terms of both the number 
and scope of administrative cases accepted. More and more members of the ruled 
are accepting and resorting to the use of administrative litigation to complain against 
illegal administrative acts of the rulers. The PRC's administrative litigation is 
playing a part in remaking the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship. However, there are 
still constraints and problems, which have restricted and prevented the PRC's 
administrative litigation from doing what it could and should. Some of the major 
problems are examined below. 
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2. Implementation Problems of the PRC's Administrative Litigation 
Problems with implementation of the PRC's administrative litigation are wide 
ranging, and concern the ruled, the rulers, the judiciary setup, as well as the larger 
political system.4 In respect of the ruled, many of them suffer from a "three-don't" 
syndrome, i.e. don't know how to sue, don't want to sue, and don't dare to sue.s As 
for the first syndrome, poor promotion after the setting up of the PRC's 
administrative litigation by the rulers is the main reason for the ruled not knowing 
how to sue. 6 As for the second, the Chinese cultural tradition of avoiding the rulers 
and the judiciary, as part of the rulers, are one of the major factors for the ruled not 
wanting to sue.? The adages that "citizens don't fight against the government" (~~ 
A '8" r~) and "don't enter lawcourts when alive; don't enter hell when dead" (1. ~ 
A '8" " , ~~A~~~) are good reflections of that tradition. Other factors include 
high costs, great risk and the low success rate of litigation. As for the last syndrome, 
fear of revenge and retaliatory actions by concerned administrative agents is one of 
the reasons for the ruled not daring to sue.8 The motto of "winning once but losing 
for life" (&. T - *.:r ' ~ T -".:r) clearly reveals the hard fact that litigation 
would only make life more difficult for the ruled because they are still subject to the 
rule of the same rulers after litigation.9 It is not uncommon for members of the ruled 
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to prepare to move out of their business and place of residence for the rest of their 
lives when they do consider suing the government in administrative litigation. 10 
On the other hand, the rulers have a "three-averse" syndrome, i.e. averse to 
being sued, averse to appearing in court, and averse to losing in litigation. II To avoid 
being sued, the rulers have many countermeasures against administrative litigation, 
like turning specific administrative acts into abstract administrative acts by means of 
administrative legislation, exerting pressure on the ruled to refrain from taking 
litigation, and altering their disputed administrative acts before litigation takes 
place. 12 To avoid appearing in court, the rulers will request the courts not to accept 
cases, exert pressure on the courts to reject cases, collaborate with the courts to 
mediate with the plaintiff to withdraw the case, or simply disregard a summons by 
the courtS. 13 To avoid losing in litigation, the rulers may refuse to produce evidence 
and supporting documents necessary for court hearings, interfere with the courts' 
decisions through administrative measures, or even arrest the plaintiffs in open court 
in defiance of the ongoing litigations. 14 Even if the rulers did lose in a case, they 
might simply refuse to accept the ruling, decline to pay compensations and litigation 
costs, and continue with their original administrative acts. IS 
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Besides the ruled and rulers, the Chinese judiciary also has problems of its own 
which inhibit the development of administrative litigation in the mainland. The first 
problem lies in its dependence on the administration. 16 The Chinese judiciary does 
not have its own budget but is controlled by the administration in its financial 
provisions. Besides, the courts are also subject to the rule of the local government in 
many other administrative affairs. In a word, the judiciary has a close relationship 
with and is very much dependent on the administration. As such, it is highly 
unrealistic and difficult to ask the courts to review the acts of the administration in a 
discreet manner. Not many courts have taken up administrative litigation very 
seriously after its establishment because the job is so difficult and would upset their 
relationship with the administration. 17 For those who have, they are soon frustrated 
by delay in reimbursement of funds and non-cooperation of all sorts by the 
administration. This problem is worsened by the present system in which, when a 
particular administrative agent is being sued, it is for the court of the same level and 
location as the administrative agent to hear the case in question. Hence, it is not 
uncommon to see a high-ranking administrative official in the defendant's panel 
paying little respect to or even criticising the presiding judge, who can do nothing 
because of his lower rank. ls 
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Besides the lack of independence, the judiciary also suffers from various kinds 
of deficiencies, particularly among the lower level courts. Out of the over 3,200 
administrative litigation courts established in the mainland since 1989, not all of 
them manage to have sufficient staff to form a collegiate panel of three for the 
hearing of administrative litigation cases. For those who do, their administrative 
litigation staff team is not stable because either the judges are frequently on loan to 
other courts - since administrative litigation cases are infrequent - or the judges 
themselves request a permanent transfer-out because the job is difficult and the 
small number of administrative litigation cases leads to proportional cuts in their 
material rewards. 19 In addition, among the country's over 12,000 administrative 
litigation judges, many are not well enough trained to handle administrative cases, 
e.g. they have little training on the handling of administrative litigation, little 
experience with administrative work, and little knowledge about related 
administrative legislation.20 Finally, administrative litigation work is made difficult 
because case precedence is not employed in the Chinese judicial system, which 
means that each and every case has to be judged by its own circumstances.21 In 
summary, the Chinese jUdiciary was not originally designed for administrative 
litigation, is not structurally fit for doing so, and is not operationally well enough 
prepared to meet the challenges of administrative litigation. 
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Finally, the larger political system also plays a part in jeopardising the 
implementation of the PRC's administrative litigation. The Chinese judiciary is not 
only controlled by the administration, as mentioned, but is also directed by the Party 
in its personnel arrangements and supervised by the people's congresses in its work. 
Hence, the administrative litigation judges are subject to pressure from both the 
Party and the people's congresses. Although the PRC's constitution provides for 
independent exercise of judicial power by the courts, it does not preclude the leading 
and supervisory role of the Party and people's congresses on the jUdiciary. It is not 
uncommon to find Party officials and deputies of people's congresses interfering 
with litigation proceedings and influencing the judges' decisions due to political or 
personal reasons.22 Due to the Party's close involvement in the state's administration, 
political interference in the PRC's administrative litigation is frequent and serious. 
To sum up, when the PRC's administrative litigation was promulgated in 1989, 
people could easily understand the potential value of the new institution in principle, 
but few could anticipate its implementation problems in practice. In fact, practically 
the entire cultural and structural macro-environment is unconducive to the growth 
and development of administrative litigation in the mainland. When put into practice, 
complex and wide-ranging problems emerge. To varying extents, all involved parties, 
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including the ruled, the rulers, the judiciary, and other actors outside the 
administrative litigation institution, were found to be insufficiently prepared to help 
implement the PRC's administrative litigation. 
B. Second Diagnosis of the Administrative Litigation Law 
Administrative litigation starts off with the ruled complaining to the court and 
acquiring the status of a plaintiff by meeting the legally required qualifications, and 
is then followed by the ruler presenting evidence as defendant to support the 
administrative act in question. The PRC's Administrative Litigation Law contains 
provisions on both the issues of administrative litigation participants and evidence in 
its Chapters four and five, respectively. These two chapters will be examined in this 
second diagnosis of the Law, in the hope of providing a better background for 
discussion of the ruled and rulers samples' affective orientation later in this chapter. 
Participants in administrative litigation are carefully and clearly defined in 
Chapter four of the Law so as to prevent unqualified members of the ruled becoming 
the plaintiffs, to avoid unnecessary members of the rulers becoming the defendants, 
and to minimise undeserved efforts of the courts in repeating litigations based on the 
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same or similar administrative acts. The chapter's first four articles define the four 
kinds of participants in administrative litigation, i.e. plaintiffs, defendants, joint 
participants, and third parties, respectively, whereas the remaining three lay down 
the rules for legal agents and lawyers to follow when acting as representatives of the 
participants in administrative litigation. 
In brief, there can be only three kinds of plaintiffs - citizens, legal persons and 
"other organisations" (Article 24). Citizens refer to nationals of the PRC and non-
nationals pursuing administrative litigation in the PRe's territory. Legal persons 
include economic enterprises, public utilities, social organisations, administrative 
agents, etc. They form the second large group of plaintiffs but they must possess the 
legal status of an independent entity with full civil rights and responsibilities before 
they are qualified to initiate litigation. Hence, unrecognised and non-sanctioned 
social and political organisations are all denied the right to sue the rulers. "Other 
organisations" are those not possessing the status of legal persons but approved by 
concerned state authorities to engage in certain activities, like partnership 
organisations, business associates and subsidiaries of legal persons, local 
subsidiaries of banking and insurance institutes, and many rural and township 
enterprises. In a word, organised bodies other than individual citizens are given the 
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chance to sue the rulers only when they are recognised and controlled by the latter. 
Administrative litigation plaintiffs can only be of the above three kinds, but not 
all three can become plaintiffs. Before they can fight for their substantive rights and 
interests in open courts, fights which mayor may not succeed, they must first pass 
through a procedural validation, because they have to "bring administrative 
proceedings in accordance with this Law" (Article 24). For example, they must be 
able to show sufficient factual support for a specific claim that his lawful right or 
interest has been infringed upon by a specific administrative act of a definite 
administrative agent (Article 41). Failing to do so, the court will not accept his case. 
Requirements like this not only prevent abuse of the right to litigate by the ruled but 
also protect the exercise of administrative authority by the rulers. In short, not 
everyone can sue the government under the PRe's administrative litigation: he must 
be within the approved categories and fulfill the litigation requirements before he 
can acquire the status and exercise the rights of a plaintiff. 
In more specific terms, the defendant in administrative litigation is limited to 
the administrative agent (not the individual official) that is directly responsible for 
the administrative act under question (Article 25). Normally, it is the government 
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department (not the individual official) that performed the act. If two or more 
departments performed the act, all departments responsible shall become co-
defendants. But if only one department finally authorised the act by signature or 
others, then only that department shall be the defendant, despite other departments' 
involvement. If administrative reconsideration has been conducted, the 
reconsidering authority will become the defendant only if it modifies the original 
administrative act. The original department will still be the defendant if the 
reconsidering authority upholds the act or does not give a decision.23 After all, only 
administrative agents can be defendants in administrative litigation; this includes 
legally authorised organisations but not entrusted ones where responsibility still lies 
with the entrusting administrative agents. Non-administrative organisations can only 
be third parties if they are liable to compensation for administrative acts jointly 
performed with administrative agents.24 In case administrative authorities are closed, 
those that continue with the functions shall be the defendants. In short, the Law has 
specified no less and no more than those necessarily accountable administrative 
agents to be answerable in administrative litigation as the defendants under all 
foreseeable situations. 
Joint participants and third parties are allowed to join in the same proceeding if 
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they are involved in the same or similar administrative act under question or if they 
have legally established interests in the act (Articles 26 and 27). Joint proceedings 
can avoid the waste of time and effort by the courts as well as other participants in 
repeating proceedings based on the same or similar administrative acts, and can also 
avoid the making of conflicting decisions by the courts concerning the same or 
similar administrative acts. 
In case the litigants do not have the competence to perform procedural acts, like 
dependents and mental patients, they can be represented by their legal agents such as 
parents, adult family members, or lawful guardians (Article 28). By written 
authorisation, participants in litigation can also assign a maximum of two legal 
representatives, e.g. lawyers, social organisations, close relatives, working 
colleagues or other citizens approved by the courts, to proceed on their behalf 
(Article 29). This can ensure that no parties in the course of litigation will be 
jeopardised because of certain limitations, like communication problems, physical 
inconvenience, or lack of relevant legal knowledge. By approval of the courts, both 
the plaintiffs and the defendants, as well as their representatives, can consult related 
case materials, except confidential materials like those involving state secrets or 
individual privacy, which can only be consulted by their lawyers. The representing 
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lawyers can also investigate concerned parties and collect evidence to support their 
claims, but they must do so in accordance with provisions contained in chapter 5 of 
the Law on evidence, which will be discussed below (Article 30). 
Chapter five of the Law contains six articles (Articles 31-36) which expound 
the rules of evidence in administrative litigation, including the type of evidence, the 
burden of proof, the collection, verification, and preservation of evidence. To start 
with, the Law lists seven types of evidence, including documentary evidence, real 
evidence, audio-visual materials, testimony, statements, expert evaluations, and 
inspection records, which must be verified in open courts as being true, relevant and 
lawful before they are accepted as a basis for establishing a case (Article 31). As for 
the burden of proof in administrative litigation, the same principle applies as in other 
kinds of proceedings, i.e. it rests with those parties who have a claim to make or a 
fact to establish. The only difference in administrative litigation concerns the burden 
of proof for the questioned administrative acts (not including inactions). Because the 
latter are, by nature, claims and facts made and established by the administrative 
agents concerned, the Law specifically requires the defending administrative agents 
to bear the burden of proof in respect of the factual and legal evidence for the 
administrative acts in question (Article 32). This in fact tallies with the actual reality 
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that evidence for those administrative acts are mostly unavailable to the complaining 
members of the ruled, but are controlled by the administrative agents coming under 
complaint. In case the administrative agents fail to prove their administrative acts, 
the courts shall render ajudgment to revoke those acts.25 
In addition, the Law specifies that the defending administrative agents and their 
lawyers cannot collect further evidence from the plaintiffs or witnesses during the 
course of proceedings (Article 33).26 This is because the evidence that the agents are 
required to provide about the questioned administrative acts should already be 
established and made available at the time of the acts. This serves the aim of 
supervising the administrative authorities' exercise of authority (Article 1) and can 
help promote rule according to the laws. Besides the above burden of proof, the 
defending administrative agents are not obliged to provide other evidence unless 
they want to disprove the claims of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in 
administrative litigation also need to submit supporting evidence if they have claims 
to make, e.g. claims for compensations and complaints against inactions of 
administrative agents, or if they want to refute the claims of the defendants. 
As for the courts, they have the right to request the defendants and the plaintiffs 
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to supply supplementary evidence if those provided are insufficient. The courts can 
take the initiative to collect evidence when the two parties are unable to provide 
evidence, when there are contradictions in one or both parties' evidence, or when the 
evidence cannot be brought to the courts (Articles 34 and 35). When the needs arise, 
the courts can also take measures to preserve evidence that might be lost or 
destroyed or difficult to obtain later, upon application by the case participants or by 
its own initiative (Article 36). 
To reiterate, not all members of the Chinese ruling group can be sued under the 
PRC's administrative litigation and not every act of the rulers can be sued (see the 
first diagnosis). In addition, not everyone can sue the rulers and it is not at all easy to 
do so (see above). Although the Law shifts the burden of proof from the ruled 
(plaintiffs) to the rulers (defendants) in proving the legality of the latter's 
administrative acts, it does not mean the ruled can win their cases easily. The 
implementation records of the PRC's administrative litigation over the past eight 
years show an arduous progress plagued with problems of all sorts. It has indeed 
gone through a difficult and zigzag path of development, and so far has not been 
able to do what it could and should. Under these circumstances, how do the ruled 
and the rulers feel about the new institution? Do they in fact accept and support it? 
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Let us find the answers by taking a look at the ruled and rulers samples' affective 
orientation towards the PRC's administrative litigation. 
C. Affective Orientation of the Surveyed Individual Household Proprietors 
Six questions were asked of the 738 interviewed proprietors to measure how 
well they accepted administrative litigation in the PRC and to ascertain the affective 
bearing of their administrative litigation culture (see Table 3.7 for the questions). To 
avoid the respondents overstating their actual affective orientation and to ensure 
accurate responses, the six questions are posed as negative expressions so that the 
respondents had to disagree with the statements in the questions if they did have 
positive affective orientation towards administrative litigation. Their answers are 
presented and discussed below in similar way as discussion on the cognitive 
orientation in the last chapter. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Proprietors' Affective Orientation 
Based on the responses to the first three affective orientation questions, it was 
found that as many as two-thirds of the interviewed proprietors manifested a positive 
132 
feeling towards the newly established administrative litigation, as opposed to one-
tenth who indicated a negative feeling. The rest, about one quarter, were either 
neutral or uncertain. Starting with the first question, 71.1 per cent of the proprietors 
accepted administrative litigation as an appropriate channel for resolving conflicts 
between the ruled and rulers (see Table 3.6 below). In particular, 23.3 per cent 
"totally agreed" with the use of that method (see Appendix 5). Only 12.3 per cent 
objected to its use. In response to the second question, up to 64.4 per cent regarded 
administrative litigation as suitable to China. Only 8.3 per cent regarded it as alien 
and not suitable. When asked the third question, more than two-thirds of the 
proprietors (69.8 per cent) stated that they supported establishing administrative 
litigation in the country. Only one-tenth voted against it. In view of the above, it is 
clear that a majority of the ruled sample do accept and endorse administrative 
litigation as appropriate for both the people and the country, whether in principle, in 
nature, or by vote. A hostile affective environment is not obvious and perhaps exists 
only among a small minority of the ruled sample. 
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Table 3.6 R esponses of the Proprietors to the Six Affective Orientation Questions 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other q 
- -
methods should be used to solve the problem. % 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our q 
--
country. % 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. q 
--
% 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out q 
- -
illegal action. % 
10 I don't care about implementation of the q 
--
institution. % 
11 I know very little about the present institution. q 
--
% 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
90 
-- --- -
12.3 
60 
------
8.3 
75 
- - ----
10.3 
39 
- - ----
5.4 
101 
- - ----
14.0 
486 
------
66.S 
N 0 ? s.d. 
96 521 26 1.00 
- - - -- -----
------
13.1 71.1 3.5 
71 468 127 0.90 
---- -
.... .... - ------
9.8 64.4 17.5 
86 508 59 0.95 
.... _ .... 
.......... 
------]J.8 69.8 8.1 
60 532 96 0.89 
.... - .. - .. .. ...... ------
8.3 73.1 13.2 
146 396 78 0.91 
.. .... .... .......... 
------
20.3 54.9 10.8 
85 63 97 0.81 
.......... .. ........ 
------
11.6 8.6 13.3 
o = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
In addition, many of the respondents shared sympathy with the need fo r 
administrative litigation; in answering the fourth question, as many as 73 .1 per cent 
accused the rulers of illegal actions (see Table 3.6 above). In particular, 26.5 per cent 
felt absolutely certain on that accusation (see Appendix 5). Only 5.4 per cent felt 
confident that the rulers were acting legally and hence, administrative litigation was 
probably not required. However, the sample's concern for the institution in practice 
was not as high as their acceptance of it in nature and support of it in principle. 
When asked the fifth question, relatively less of them (54.9 per cent) showed 
continuous enthusiasm about its implementation. It may be true that the 
establishment of administrative litigation IS everyone's business and all can 
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comment on its appropriateness, but the implementation of the institution becomes 
someone else's business and one has little concern for it unless he has to use it. At 
the end of the day, no more than one-tenth of the proprietors replied to the last 
question, saying they had made effort to get acquainted with the new institution. Up 
to 66.5 per cent admitted that they knew very little about it. Undeniably, their 
support and concern were not strong enough to push them to actually attend to the 
institution and make the effort to get acquainted with it. 
The above tends to suggest that the ruled perceive the PRC's administrative 
litigation not as an end in itself but largely a means to counteract illegal actions of 
the rulers. The most immediate reason for the ruled to endorse and support the 
establishment and use of the PRC's administrative litigation is because of the serious 
and endemic illegal acts among the rulers, which threaten not only their own 
interests but those of the country in general. To the ruled, administrative litigation as 
a procedural remedy does not exist by itself in the abstract but is valued for the 
purpose it serves. But then, although they give their consent to and have clear 
support of the institution, their affective orientation stays mostly in the moral and 
rational domains, not personal. Personal concern arises only when the use of the 
institution becomes a personal issue. 
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Variance in the responses of the interviewed proprietors was low, with standard 
deviations from only 0.81 to 1.00. The overall affective orientation scores of the 
proprietors sample showed that more than half of them had a positive affective 
orientation towards the institution, with slightly over 10 per cent being neutral, 
another 10 per cent not sure, and less than 20 per cent feeling negatively about the 
institution (see Table 3.7 below). To sum up, the affective orientation of the ruled 
sample towards the PRC's administrative litigation was largely positive. The 
majority did accept and support the new institution in principle, and most, basically, 
agree there was a real need for it. But their enthusiasm was not as strong in respect 
of the institution in practice and clearly not strong enough to motivate them to 
expend the effort to learn about it. In a word, their affective orientation was largely 
positive but not particularly intense, and was mostly in the moral domain rather than 
being a personal concern. 
Table 3.7 Overall Affective Orientation Scores of the Proprietors 
Overall Affective Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don't know; 
A 
tq 851 
- - - --
------. 
aq 141.8 
- -- -- -------
% 19.5 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
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N D ? 
544 2488 483 
------- --- -- -- -------
90.7 414.7 80.5 
------- ------- -------
12.5 56.9 11.1 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Proprietors' Affective Orientation 
Significant correlation was found in the interviewed proprietors' answers to 
five of the six affective orientation questions, suggesting that the internal 
relationship of the proprietors' affective orientation was rather close and extensive. 
For the first three affective orientation questions, the proprietors' answers were all 
mutually correlated with a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient of above 0.20 (see 
Table 3.8 below), suggesting that those proprietors who accepted administrative 
litigation as an appropriate redress mechanism would also tend to regard it as 
suitable to the country and support its establishment. Moreover, their answers to the 
first three affective orientation questions were also mutually correlated with their 
answers to the fourth and fifth questions, although the rho coefficient might not 
reach 0.20. Those proprietors who accused the government of illegal actions also 
tended to accept and support administrative litigation, as well as care for its 
implementation, though to a lesser extent (rho coefficient being only 0.15). In 
particular, answers to the third question had the strongest correlation with answers to 
the other four questions, with rho coefficients all over 0.20, suggesting that support 
for the institution was most strongly tied with other aspects of the proprietors' 
affective orientation. 
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Table 3.8 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Proprietors' Affective Orientation 
Q 06 07 08 09 10 II 
06 .21 .27 .19 I .15 I 
........... , ........... , ........................•........... ....... .. ..... , ... ...... .. .............. ,.· ....................... i ............ ·········· .. ·1········ .. ······ .. ···· .. · 
07 .21 I I .24 I .17 I .20 I 
···· .. ···0·8··· .. .. ·· .. ··· .. ·~2·7 .... ···r···· .. :·24·······T .. ··· .. .. ···· ..· .. ···· .. r .. ····:·23 .. ···· .. r··· .. :·24·· .. ····r····· .. ··· .. ·· .. ····· .. 
................... ..... ............. " ......... ~ ........................ ~ ........ · .. ····· .. ·······!··· .... · .. ·· ·· ···········f .... ·· ··········· ........ , ........................ . 
09 .19 ! .17 ! .23 I i .15 I 
........................ ························r···· .. ········ ···· ······i· .. ·· .. ,· ...... ·· .. ···· .. j···· .. ·· .. ·· .. ··· .. ·· ·· .. r·· ··· ·· ··················1 ··· ·· ··········· .. ··· .. ·· 
10 .15 i .20 i .24 ! .15 i 1 ·17 
.................................... .... ··· .. .. ·t .......... · ..· ..·· ...... 1· .. .. ·· ........ ··· .. .. ···! ...... · ............ · .... ·t .. .. ·· .. .. ·· .. ·· .. .. · .... ! ........ · ..· ..· ...... .. .. 
11 ! ii i .17 I' 
I : I 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.15 . 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
The last affective orientation question on enthusiasm to get acquainted with the 
institution was the only question whose answers were not associated with answers to 
the other affective orientation questions, except for the fifth one. The internal 
relationship for answers to this last question was the lowest. Only those proprietors 
who cared about implementation of the institution would also care to learn about it. 
This reconfirms the above observation that rational support and moral consent do 
not necessarily lead to actual acquaintance. Affective orientation of the ruled sample 
towards the PRC's administrative litigation might be high on the level of principle, 
but it is still quite low on the level of practice. In the end, few of them would reject 
the institution but not many would regard it as an immediate concern. To conclude, 
the sampled ruled have a positive and consistent affective bearing in their 
administrative litigation culture, although their affective appreciation of the 
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institution is not particularly strong. 
3. External Relationship of the Proprietors' Affective Orientation 
The external relationship of the proprietors' affective orientation, calculated by 
the phi and Spearman's rho correlation measures, is summarised in Table 3.9 below. 
Table 3.9 External Relationship of the Proprietors' Affective Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Very Strong 
Jurisdictional Small 
Evaluational Slight 
Appraisal Fairly Strong 
Expectational Small 
Among all other orientations, the proprietors' affective orientation was most 
closely correlated with their cognitive orientation. In particular, their answers to all 
six affective orientation questions correlated quite strongly with their answers to 
cognitive orientation questions 1, 2, 4, and 5, with fairly high phi correlation 
coefficients of 0.13 to 0.34 (see Table 3.1 0 below). The only exception was 
cognitive orientation question 3 about experience with suing the government, where 
the answers were not correlated with any of the affective orientation answers. This 
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suggests that the ruled sample's affective orientation towards the PRe 's 
administrative litigation is tied with their cognitive orientation towards the same. A 
general and positive basic cognition of the institution and the Law, not necessarily 
actual experience with litigation proceedings, is associated with and can help 
develop a positive and supporting affective orientation towards the institution. 
Table 3.10 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Proprietors' 
Affective Orientation 
Cogni tive Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal ExpecUltiollul 
Orientation Orientation OrienUltion Orientat ion Orientat ion 
Q I 2 3 4 5 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
6 22 24 13 12 09 09 08 
7 20 30 24 14 09 10 10 14 18 17 18 22 15 08 
8 14 17 18 13 13 08 08 10 07 08 10 08 10 
9 16 16 15 10 09 09 
10 14 18 19 15 11 10 11 08 08 09 10 11 08 08 08 08 
11 14 30 34 11 12 10 09 08 07 13 15 12 11 11 11 12 10 II 
Phi correlation for QI-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Fairly strong correlation was also found with the appraisal orientation. The 
proprietors' answers to affective orientation questions 7, 10 and 11 were quite 
strongly correlated with their answers to the appraisal orientation questions, with 
significant Spearman's rho correlation coefficients of 0.1 0 to 0.22, 0.08 to 0.11, and 
0.11 to 0.15, respectively (see Table 3.10 above). Proprietors who accepted 
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administrative litigation as suitable for the country, cared for its implementation and 
cared to get acquainted with the institution, also tended to have a favourable 
appraisal of the institution. But the same appraisal was not necessarily shared by 
those who accused the government of illegal actions and supported the use and 
establishment of administrative litigation in the country. 
The relationship between the proprietors' affective and evaluational 
orientations was slight. Only their answers to affective orientation questions 8 and 
10 were significantly correlated with their evaluational orientation answers and such 
relationships were not very strong (see Table 3.10 above). The relationship between 
the two orientations was negative because those affective orientation questions were 
negatively expressed while the evaluational orientation questions were positively 
phrased. The findings suggest that members of the ruled, who support establishing 
the institution and care about its implementation, are also likely to have an 
affirmative evaluation of the institution's consequences, like protecting citizens' 
legal rights, promoting the rule of law and preventing abuse of power by 
government officials. On the contrary, those who endorse administrative litigation as 
an appropriate redress mechanism and accuse the rulers of illegal actions may not 
share the same positive evaluation of the institution. 
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Correlations of the proprietors' affective orientation with their jurisdictional 
and expectational orientations were not statistically significant. Very little significant 
Speannan's rho correlation coefficients were recorded between answers of the 
affective and the other two orientations. 
Through cross-tabulation, the answers of those sub-groups of proprietors who 
held positive affective orientation in each of the six affective orientation questions 
(i.e. sub-groups in the disagree column of Table 3.6), were compared with the 
overall results of the entire sample (details of the extensive cross-tabulation results 
are not displayed due to space constraints). It was found that in each and every 
affective orientation question, those who held positive affective orientation 
invariably had an overall better administrative litigation culture, i.e. higher cognitive 
orientation, more positive affective orientation, stronger jurisdictional orientation, 
more favourable evaluational orientation, more positive appraisal orientation, and 
more optimistic expectational orientation. This suggests that positive affective 
orientation is, indeed, contributive to a better overall administrative litigation culture 
for the ruled. Efforts to increase the acceptance and support of administrative 
litigation among the ruled may also help to establish a better overall administrative 
litigation culture. 
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To sum up, affective orientation is not very strongly related with the other 
orientations in the sampled ruled's overall administrative litigation culture, but a 
positive affective orientation is conducive to a better administrative litigation culture 
among members of the ruled. 
4. Affective Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Proprietors 
Relationship between the proprietors' affective orientation and personal 
particulars based on cross-tabulation analysis is summarised in Table 3.11 below 
(details of the extensive cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space 
constraints). 
Table 3.11 Relationship between the Proprietors' Affective Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Relationship with Personal 
Affective Orientation Particulars 
Gender 
Insignificant Political Status Residency 
Working District 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Slightly Significant Working Years Income 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Age 
Significant Kind of Business 
Education Level 
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Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Affective orientation of the proprietors was found to have an insignificant 
relationship with their gender, political status, residency, and working districts. No 
major difference was found in the cross-tabulation results of various sub-groups 
under these four personal particulars. Proprietors of either sex, belonging or not to 
political groups, with or without Beijing local residency, and working in no matter 
which districts, all displayed a similar level and pattern of affective orientation, i.e. 
the majority were supportive, sympathetic, and positive towards the institution, by 
more or less the same proportion. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Under the general norm of positive feelings, seniority in terms of working years 
m the profession seemed to have a negative relationship with the proprietors' 
affective orientation towards the institution, especially for those with over ten years 
of work. For this group, they appeared to be the most conservative and least ready to 
accept administrative litigation. They had the highest percentage who regarded 
administrative litigation as an alien institution, who did not support its establishment, 
and who denied illegal actions by the government, plus the second highest 
percentage who showed little care about implementation of the institution and who 
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proposed the use of other methods instead. In view of the fact that this group tended 
to be the older age group (see appendix 7), age - which was found to be 
significantly related with the proprietors' affective orientation - might be an 
important intervening factor. This could be demonstrated by their having the highest 
percentage who had acquaintance with the institution, which was consistent with the 
close relation between age and cognitive orientation discussed in the last chapter. 
At the other extreme, those newcomers with less than one year in business were 
relatively more inclined to accept the institution. They had the highest percentage 
who were prepared to use such a legal process and were convinced that it suited 
China, plus the second highest percentage who claimed support of its establishment. 
Yet, they were the group least acquainted with the institution. Again, age could have 
been an important intervening factor. For those proprietors between these two 
extremes, they showed a generally warm affective feeling towards the institution, 
rendering support and care to it. 
Similar to the above personal particular, income also appeared to have a 
negative relationship with the proprietors' affective orientation towards the 
institution, but mainly for the highest income group, i.e. such a negative effect was 
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not proportional to rising income. Proprietors with a monthly income of over 
RMB4,000 appeared to be least attracted to the institution. They had the highest 
percentage who preferred other methods to administrative litigation, who did not 
support its establishment, and who denied illegal action with the government, plus 
the second highest percentage who regarded administrative litigation as an alien 
institution and admitted low acquaintance with it. But they had the highest 
percentage who claimed to care about its implementation. Those of the lower 
income groups, especially those earning from RMB301 to 1,500 per month, had the 
best overall affective orientation towards the institution, though were still not well 
acquainted with it. 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
Age of the proprietors had a negative and almost proportional relationship with 
their affective orientation, i.e. the higher the age, the less positive the proprietors in 
their affective orientation towards administrative litigation. The highest age group of 
over 60 had the highest percentage who regarded administrative litigation as an alien 
institution, who did not supporting its establishment, who preferred other methods to 
litigation, and who had little acquaintance with the institution, plus the second 
highest percentage who denied illegal action with the government and had little care 
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about the implementation of administrative litigation. This was In line with the 
above discussion on working years. Years of age and years of work were both 
negatively related with affective orientation, but such a negative pattern was much 
clearer for age, suggesting that age was a much stronger factor in affecting the 
proprietors' affective orientation when compared with working years. Spearman's 
rho correlation coefficients for this personal particular also affirmed a negative 
relationship with the answers to four of the affective orientation questions, with 
coefficients from -0.10 to -0.17 (see Table 3.12 below). 
Table 3.12 Correlation Coefficients for the Proprietors' Affective Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
c:: >. Q ~ .~ Q 
-; OIl '- ~ u OIl 0 .~ S .5l .... ] c:: ~ .~ ~ .&;: ~ U III o ~ ~ E C<j-U c:: 'Vi '0 :-92 III '0 .9 '0 U ~ .... .... 
'Vi 0 ~ . ~ ~ Q ~ ~~ ~~ ~ OIl oS ~~ ~ ~c5 u <00' 0 < ~r/l 0::: .9 
6 .17 .12 . 11 
7 .17 .16 .13 .17 
8 .11 
9 .10 .08 .15 .1 2 .09 
to .13 .11 
11 
Phi for gender & residency, Spearman's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, kind of business & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
On the contrary, the younger the proprietors, the more enthusiasm they had for 
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administrative litigation. The youngest age group of between 18 to 30 had the 
highest percentage who were prepared to resort to such legal process and supportive 
of its establishment, who cared for its implementation and accused the government 
of illegal actions. In addition, they tended to have concurring responses of positive 
feelings towards administrative litigation, and hence, very low responses of negative 
feelings. Such a clear tendency in answers was not found among the other age 
groups. 
Despite the general norm of positive feelings, proprietors in different kinds of 
businesses indeed felt differently about administrative litigation. Proprietors in the 
repairing business were least enchanted with the institution. They stood out from the 
other groups significantly with negative feelings in all six affective orientation 
aspects. Age and education level could have been important intervening factors here 
because proprietors in the repairing business tended to be older and less educated. 
On the other hand, proprietors in the servicing business had the most positive overall 
affective orientation. Proprietors in the catering business were most likely to have 
neutral comments whereas those in the retailing business were most likely to give no 
comments. The Cramer's V correlation measure indicated that the kind of business 
was positively related by a coefficient of 0.13 with the answers to affective 
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orientation question 7, about the suitability of administrative litigation to China (see 
Table 3.12 above). 
Last but not the least, the proprietors' education level was positively correlated 
with their affective orientation, i.e. the higher their education level, the more 
positive their feelings became. Specifically, proprietors with only primary education 
had the highest percentage who regarded administrative litigation as an alien 
institution, who did not support its establishment, who had little acquaintance with it, 
who denied illegal action with the government, and who preferred other methods to 
solve the problem, plus the second highest percentage who declined support of and 
care for the institution. Proprietors with post-secondary, undergraduate or further 
education held the opposite view, showing much greater sympathy with the 
institution. The Spearman's rho correlation coefficients showed that education level 
was related with the answers to affective orientation question 6 by 0.11 and 9 by 
0.09 (see Table 3.12 above). 
In summary, the two personal particulars of age and education level had the 
strongest influence on the ruled sample's affective orientation, though in opposite 
ways. Those younger and better-educated proprietors were more likely to have better 
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affective feelings for administrative litigation. The veteran and less educated group 
had the least positive feeling towards the institution. 
D. Affective Orientation of the Surveyed Government Officials 
The same six affective orientation questions were asked of the 152 successfully 
interviewed government officials to measure how well this rulers sample accepted 
administrative litigation in the PRC and to identify the affective bearing of their 
administrative litigation culture. Their responses are presented and discussed below 
in the same way that the responses of their ruled counterparts are presented above, 
with the addition of a comparison between the two. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Officials' Affective Orientation 
Most of the interviewed government officials responded positively to all six 
affective orientation questions, and an even greater percentage of them than their 
proprietor counterparts indicated acceptance and support of, sympathy and 
acquaintance with the PRC's administrative litigation. Despite the risk of being sued, 
still 84.8 per cent of the officials agreed in principle with the use of administrative 
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litigation as a redress mechanism for the ruled against the rulers, 13.7 per cent more 
than their proprietor counterparts (see Table 3.13 below). About 90 per cent of them 
accepted the institution in nature as being suitable for the country and supported its 
establishment in spirit (25.7 per cent and 21.6 per cent more than the proprietors, 
respectively). As high as 92.1 per cent of the officials indicated sympathy with the 
need for administrative litigation when admitting that government bureaus did 
perform illegal acts (19 per cent more than the proprietors). A comparable 82.6 per 
cent of them said they cared about the implementation of administrative litigation in 
practice and over half of them claimed they also cared about getting acquainted with 
the institution (27.7 per cent and 43.0 per cent more than the proprietors, 
respectively). On the contrary, the percentage of officials giving negative affective 
orientation answers was lower than that of the proprietors, 3.3 per cent to 32.5 per 
cent for the former and 5.4 per cent to 66.5 per cent for the latter, and this happened 
in all affective orientation questions (compare Table 3.13 with 3.6). As a whole, 
much more of the rulers sample had a positive affective orientation, and 
comparatively less had a negative feeling, towards the PRe's administrative 
litigation when compared with the ruled sample. The standard deviations for the 
officials' affective orientation answers were pretty low, only 0.67 to 1.04, reflecting 
a strong common tendency towards a positive feeling among this group. 
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Table 3.13 Responses of the Officials to the Six Affective Orientation Questions 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other q 
- -
methods should be used to solve the problem. % 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our q 
--
country. % 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. q 
- -
% 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out q 
- -
illegal action. % 
10 I don't care about implementation of the q 
- -
institution. % 
11 I know very little about the present institution. q 
--
% 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
II 
------
7.3 
7 
------
4.6 
9 
------
6.0 
5 
--- -- -
3.3 
9 
------
6.0 
49 
------
32.5 
N D ? s.d. 
II 129 I 0.82 
- - - -- - ---- --- - - -7.2 84.8 0.7 
7 137 I 0.68 
- - - -- ----- -- - -- -4.6 90.1 0.7 
4 138 0 0.78 
----- -----
-- - .- -
2.6 91.4 0.0 
2 140 5 0.67 
- - - -- ----- ----- -1.3 92.1 3.3 
16 124 1 0.72 
- - - -- ----- ------
10.7 82.6 0.7 
22 78 2 1.04 
- - - -- ----- ------14.6 51.6 1.3 
o = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
In addition, the officials' positive feelings were more affirmed and intense than 
the proprietors '. The fonner had relatively less neutral and unknown answers to the 
affective orientation questions than the latter. Besides, the percentage of officials 
who chose "totally disagree" in response to the six negatively phrased affective 
orientation questions ranged from 2.6 per cent to 30.9 per cent, higher than that of 
the proprietors' 1.9 per cent to 26.5 per cent (see Appendix 5 and 6). Not 
surprisingly, the overall affective orientation scores of the officials leaned 
favourably towards administrative litigation, with over 80 per cent showing support 
and less than 10 per cent claiming the opposite (see Table 3.14 below). In short, a 
positive affective orientation towards administrative litigation is also found among 
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the rulers sample, and it is even more common and intense than that of the ruled 
sample. 
Table 3.14 Overall Affective Orientation Scores of the Officials 
Overall Affective Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don't know; 
A 
tq 90 
--- -- -------
aq 15 
- - --- -------
% 9.9 
N = Neutral ; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
N D ? 
62 746 10 
----- -- ------- -------
10.3 124.3 1.7 
------- ------- -------
6.8 82.2 1.1 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
The above is believed to reflect the officials' genu me feelings towards the 
PRe's administrative litigation, given their frankness in admitting illegal acts among 
themselves. However, their affective orientation responses may arise from quite 
different considerations distinct from those of the proprietors because of the 
different impacts of administrative litigation on the two parties. Members of the 
ruled value the PRC's administrative litigation for the purposes it serves and hence 
readily support the use of the institution (response with the second highest 
percentage). Members of the rulers may not feel the same but recognise the 
institution largely as a state program and an official policy that they have to accept 
and comply with. As a matter of fact, establishment of the institution was endorsed 
by the second highest percentage of the rulers sample, but the use of the institution 
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was supported by fewer members of the rulers. Furthermore, existence of the many 
operational problems mentioned above means a very constrained administrative 
litigation in practice, hence the threat of the institution to the officials is largely 
reduced, which helps them to endorse the institution in principle with lesser 
resistance. 
On the contrary, members of the ruled mostly do not see administrative 
litigation as a personal concern, hence do not care very much about its 
implementation nor feel the need to get acquainted with its details. But due to the 
pressure of administrative litigation on all members of the rulers who must now act 
to avoid being sued, it is understandable that the institution becomes a closer and 
more personal concern for this group, who would be more prepared to pay attention 
to its implementation and make the effort to get acquainted with its operational 
details. In a word, the officials displayed a high level of acceptance and support 
towards the PRe's administrative litigation, but such expression could be little more 
than an echo of the official promise whereas their care for and acquaintance with the 
institution is more likely to be based on personal considerations. 
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2. Internal Relationship of the Officials' Affective Orientation 
Significant correlation was also found among the interviewed officials' answers 
to all the six affective orientation questions, and, in fact, the internal relationship of 
the officials' affective orientation was even stronger and more extensive than that of 
the proprietors. Strong association was found among the officials' answers to the 
first three affective orientation questions, with Spearman's rho coefficients of 0.34 
to 0.54 (see Table 3.15 below), meaning that those members of the rulers who 
accepted administrative litigation as suitable for the country would also support its 
use and establishment. The three questions' answers were also closely related with 
answers to the fourth and fifth questions, though to a lesser extent, meaning that the 
same group of members would also admit illegal actions by the government and care 
about the implementation of administrative litigation. Finally, like the proprietors, 
those officials who cared about implementation of the institution would also tend to 
care about getting acquainted with the same, with a rho coefficient as high as 0.41. 
However, as mentioned, a causal relation may not exist among the officials' answers 
to these questions because there are likely to be external reasons, like their official 
capacity and operational problems with administrative litigation, that lead to 
consistency in their affective orientation answers. In fact, those who admitted illegal 
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actions with the government did not necessarily care about the implementation of 
administrative litigation or about expending the effort to get acquainted with the 
institution (correlation did not exist among the three in the officials' answers). In 
addition, there was no association between support for establishing the institution 
and acquaintance with it in the affective orientation of the officials. To conclude, 
correlation among the officials' answers to the six affective orientation questions 
was common and extensive, more so than the proprietors, but it was not particularly 
strong and was quite dependent on external factors. 
Table 3.15 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the lntemal Relationship of the 
Officials' Affective Orientation 
Q 06 07 08 09 10 II 
~ I Iii 06 : .42 : .34 ! .27 I .27 ! .21 
... ...... ....................................... , ........................ '; ......................... , ............ ...... ..... .. . ......................... , ........................ . 
07 ,42 i ! .54 i .36 i .29 .19 
....... .................... ..................... + ............. , ... ..... .. ~ ..... ,······· .. ····· .. ···I········ .. ··,·········· .. ~· .. ·· ············ .. ·· ·· .. 1·· .. ··· .. ······ .. ········ 
08 .34 I .54 i i ,41 i .36 I 
...................... .. ························t········· .. · .. ··········1····· .. ··· ·· ·· .... ···· .. ·!········· .. ·········· .. ···t······ .. ···· .. ···········1······· .. ·· .. ············ 
09 .27 i .36 i ,41 ! I i 
... ............ ........................... + ...................... + ............. ·· .. · .. ···+ .. ·····················t···················· .. · .. \ ....................... .. 
10 .27 ! .29 ! .36 ! I I Al 
" ""''''' '''''' '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''T''''''''''''''''''''''''i''' '''''''''''''''''''''"""" """"'''''''''''+''''''''''' '' '''' ' '''' '''1'''''''''''''''''''''' ' ''' 
11 .21 ! .19 ! i i .41 
iii i I 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.27. 
Significance level at .05 , 2-tailed. 
3. External Relationship of the Officials' Affective Orientation 
The external relationship of the officials' affective orientation, calculated by the 
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phi and Speannan's rho correlation measures, is summarised in Table 3.16 below. 
Table 3.16 External Relationship of the Officials' Affective Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Small 
Jurisdictional Small 
Evaluational Fairly Strong 
Appraisal Fairly Strong 
Expectational Fairly Strong 
The officials' affective orientation was found to have small relationship with 
their cognitive and jurisdictional orientations. There was no significant findings 
except that the officials' answers to cognitive orientation question 2 about having 
heard of the administrative litigation institution were significantly related with their 
answers to affective orientation questions 6, 10 and 11 (see Table 3.17 below). In 
addition, the officials' answers to affective orientation questions 6 and 8 were quite 
strongly correlated with their answers to six and four jurisdictional orientation 
questions, respectively. This tends to suggest that an in-depth understanding of 
administrative litigation is not important or relevant to the officials' affective 
orientation towards the institution, but if they do support the use and establishment 
of administrative litigation in the country, they will tend to have a better and stronger 
jurisdictional idea about the proper grounds for litigation. 
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Table 3.17 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Officials' 
Affective Orientation 
Cognitive Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal Expcctational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
6 34 20 25 27 25 20 18 37 36 34 35 35 25 27 26 26 24 23 17 
7 32 20 22 16 17 23 21 18 23 24 
8 17 17 16 27 17 17 16 20 21 19 20 19 30 33 26 22 
9 17 28 22 24 
10 29 34 17 33 30 25 20 24 21 17 28 23 35 28 33 
II 50 47 17 19 36 33 28 37 38 25 20 19 
Phi correlation for QI-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Compared with the other orientations, affective orientation of the officials was 
most strongly correlated with their evaluational orientation. But not all their answers 
to the affective and evaluational orientation questions were significantly correlated. 
The strongest correlation was found in the officials' answers to affective orientation 
question 6, followed by 7, 10 and 8 in descending order. As a whole, officials who 
agreed with the use of administrative litigation, accepted it as suitable for China, 
cared about its implementation and supported its establishment, were also likely to 
have a higher and better evaluation of the institution, particularly in respect of 
protecting the citizens' rights, expediting the government to follow the law, reducing 
abuse of power by officials, and improving the legitimacy of the government. 
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To a lesser extent, affective orientation of the officials was also fairly strongly 
correlated with their appraisal orientation towards the institution, but in a quite 
different way. Their answers to affective orientation question 11 about acquaintance 
with the institution, surpassed the rest this time by correlating with answers to all 
appraisal orientation questions, with the highest rho coefficients from 0.19 to 0.38 
(see Table 3.17 above). Answers to questions 10, 8, 9, 7, and then 6 followed in 
descending order. Acquaintance with and caring about the institution seemed to be 
more closely related with the officials' appraisal orientation rather than support of, 
acceptance of, and readiness to use the institution. It was indeed true that appraisal 
was more likely to be grounded on practical understanding instead of pure feelings, 
especially when cognition level was higher for the rulers sample. 
As for the relationship with expectational orientation, answers to affective 
orientation questions 6, 8 and 10 correlated significantly in ascending order with 
answers to all expectational orientation questions, except question 36. Officials who 
cared about the implementation of administrative litigation, supported its 
establishment, and agreed with its use, were also likely to cast a vote of confidence 
m the institution, especially in respect of protecting citizens' legal rights and 
promoting further economic reform and opemng up. Answers to expectationai 
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orientation question 36 concerning judicial independence as a condition for further 
development of the institution was not found to be correlated with the officials' 
affective orientation answers, nor indeed cognitive and appraisal orientation answers. 
This might be due to their established official capacity and relationship with the 
judiciary in the past. 
4. Affective Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Officials 
Relationship between the officials' affective orientation and personal 
particulars based on cross-tabulation analysis is summarised in Table 3.18 below 
(details of the extensive cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space 
constraints). 
Table 3.18 Relationship between the Officials' Affective Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Relationship with Personal 
Affective Orientation Particulars 
Insignificant Department Working District 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Gender 
Slightly Significant Political Status 
Education Level 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Age 
Significant Working Years 
Income 
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Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Affective orientation of the officials was found to have an insignificant 
relationship with their department and working district. Cross-tabulation between 
the two personal particulars and answers to the six affective orientation questions 
revealed a basically random distribution of scores. Cramer's V correlation 
coefficients for both personal particulars also produced nil significant results (see 
Table 3.19 below). 
Table 3.19 Correlation Coefficients for the Officials ' Affective Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
d 15 d 
0 .9 d 
0 
~ 01) ~ 01) 0 ·f rg ,9 .. ] til ~ ,~ 0 '': 0 U til e "'-U d ti '0 :E 2 u 0 ~ 0 0 d 0 ~~ fr 8 ;::l > ' t:: ;::l 0 01) oS ~6 ii3~ ~oO' 0 ~ j;l..,C/) Cl .5 
6 .17 
7 .31 .20 
8 .30 .18 .20 
9 .18 
10 
11 
Phi for gender, Spearman's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, department & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Cross-tabulation of the officials' gender with their affective orientation answers 
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signified that male officials had less favourable affective feeling towards 
administrative litigation than their female colleagues. A significantly higher 
percentage of the male officials preferred the use of other methods, labelled 
administrative litigation as alien and not suitable for China, and denied both support 
for its establishment and care about its implementation. Female officials excelled the 
males in all six affective orientation measures with a fine edge, representing a 
marginally better affective orientation towards the institution. 
Political affiliation also appears to have a negative relationship with affective 
orientation among the rulers sample. Officials without party membership had more 
positive affective orientation, surpassing the other three groups in all six affective 
orientation measures, whereas Communist Party officials were relatively less 
accommodating with the institution in most of the measures. The only democratic 
party official was again not included in the comparison because of his lack of 
representativeness. 
Officials with different education levels tended to have a slightly different 
affective orientation towards administrative litigation, but a direct positive 
relationship was not obvious. Generally speaking, officials with a higher level of 
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education were more likely to have better feelings about the institution. Officials 
with only upper secondary education had a significantly higher percentage who 
preferred not to use the institution given other alternatives, who felt it not suitable 
for China, and who showed no support for its establishment. Their colleagues with 
higher level of education had more positive scores in all affective orientation 
questions except the last one about acquaintance with the institution. 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
Age of the officials was found to have a negative relationship with their 
affective orientation, though a directly proportionate relationship was not obvious. 
When comparing the three age groups of 18-30, 31-40 and 41-50, the last group had 
much lower scores than the other two younger age groups in all affective orientation 
questions. They had a much higher percentage who rejected the use of 
administrative litigation gIven other alternatives, who regarded it as an alien 
institution and not suitable for China, who gave no support for its establishment, nor 
cared about its implementation. However, the youngest age group only excelled in 
affective orientation question 7, about the suitability of the institution for China. The 
middle age group of 31-40, in fact, led by a slight margin in three other affective 
orientation questions. As such, a clear distinction in the officials' affective 
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orientation was only obvious for age groups below and above 40. Speannan's rho 
correlation coefficients also indicated that age was negatively related with the 
officials' answers to the first four affective orientation questions by -0.17, -0.31, 
-0.30, and -0.18, respectively (see Table 3.19 above). 
Cross-tabulation of the officials' working years and affective orientation 
answers showed a significant relationship. Though inconsistent, such a relationship 
appeared to be quite special and complicated. New recruits with less than one year 
of service had the strongest opposite view, resulting in an overall poorer affective 
orientation towards the institution of administrative litigation. They had the highest 
percentage who disagreed with citizens suing the government, who referred to 
administrative litigation as alien and not suitable for China, who did not support its 
establishment, and who denied illegal actions by the government. They also tended 
to have a high percentage of neutral answers. Besides concluding that they had less 
favourable affective orientation towards the institution, it could be said that they 
were also the most outspoken, daring to express opposite views to existing policies. 
Those more mature officials with longer years of service had more homogeneous 
answers in line with the official policy, producing a result of better overall affective 
orientation towards the officially endorsed institution. This was particularly true for 
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officials with 7-10 years of service. They rendered 100 per cent support to three of 
the affective orientation questions, interestingly including the one about government 
committing illegal actions. However, such a tendency of homogeneous answers 
disappeared from the group with over 10 years of service, where opposite views re-
emerged. It seemed that the veterans were less bound by the official policy and more 
outspoken, like the new recruits, though probably for different reasons. Spearman's 
rho correlation coefficients for this personal particular had significant negative 
scores for affective orientation questions 7 and 8 (see Table 3.19 above). 
Among the three major income groups, the highest income group ofRMBIOOI-
1500 per month had the least favourable affective orientation towards administrative 
litigation. They had the highest percentage who objected to citizens suing the 
government when other options were open, who regarded administrative litigation as 
an alien institution not suitable for China, who did not support its establishment, and 
who did not care about its implementation, plus the lowest percentage who claimed 
acquaintance with the institution. On the contrary, the lowest income group of 
RMB301-600 per month had the highest percentage who supported citizens suing 
the government and who cared about implementation of the institution. The group 
in-between had the highest percentage who provided positive answers to the other 
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three affective orientation questions, namely regarding administrative litigation as 
suitable for China, supporting its establishment, and knowing about it. In view of the 
above, it seemed that a low income was not associated with a difference in the 
officials' affective orientation, but a higher income did relate with poorer feelings 
for the institution, perhaps because it then brought along a significant vested interest 
in terms of both income and seniority. 
In summary, the difference between the ruled and rulers samples became more 
obvious in the discussion of their affective orientation. While age, kind of business 
and education level were important to the proprietors' affective orientation, age, 
working years and income were more important to the officials'. The nature and 
place of work were not important. Political and education backgrounds were only of 
slight significance. Of ultimate impact to the officials' affective orientation was, in 
the end, their years on the job, followed by the training they received, the politics 
they faced, the career development they had to consider, the vested interests they 
accumulated, and the number of years they served. The relationship between 
working years and affective orientation of the officials might be too complicated for 
a simple discussion. But at least, their highly unanimous positive scores on affective 
orientation towards administrative litigation should not be taken for granted and the 
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variance in their feelings about the institution should not be ignored. 
E. Summary 
Having discussed in the last chapter the cognitive orientation of the ruled and 
rulers samples, as well as the setting up of administrative litigation in the PRC and 
the first chapter of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law, this chapter examines 
the two sample groups' affective orientation, as well as the implementation of the 
PRC's administrative litigation and the fourth and fifth chapters of the Law. The 
affective orientation of the interviewed proprietors and officials are compared and 
analysed above to locate the affective bearing of their administrative litigation 
culture in general, and to find out how well the two parties accept the PRC's 
administrative litigation in particular, which is the second research question of this 
thesis. 
Implementation of the new institution and the two chapters of the Law are 
reviewed and examined here, not just for their own sake but for a more important 
purpose of supporting and complementing discussion on the affective orientation of 
the Chinese ruled and rulers. It has been shown that administrative litigation in the 
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PRC has experienced real growth and development since its establishment in 1989, 
but there are substantial problems as well in its course of implementation. It has also 
been shown how the provisions of the Law on participants and evidence help fulfill 
the purpose of the Law in defining a practicable but restricted administrative 
litigation in the country. Against this larger background, the affective orientation of 
the Chinese ruled and rulers towards administrative litigation is reported. 
According to the survey results, most members of the ruled share strong 
sympathy with the need for the redress institution because there are obvious illegal 
actions by the rulers. As such, administrative litigation, as a legal means to correct 
administrative improprieties, is readily accepted and positively supported by the 
ruled in nature and in principle. However, it is not at all easy to sue the rulers. Many 
problems exist which not only impede the implementation of administrative 
litigation in the mainland but also deter the ruled from suing the rulers. Hence, not 
all members of the ruled can maintain their enthusiasm for the justified but 
problematic institution. Their caring about the institution's implementation in 
practice is not as high as their moral consent and rational endorsement of the 
institution. Indeed, most of them do not care to get acquainted with its operational 
details. As for members of the rulers, their response is even more positive and 
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consistent, so positive and consistent, in fact, that it may not entirely reflect their 
affective orientation towards the institution but may also be affected by 
considerations like diplomatic recapitulation of the official attitude. Be that as it may, 
they equally express sympathy for the need of administrative litigation because they 
also realise the problem of illegal administrative acts. But their acceptance and 
support of the institution may not be based solely upon the merits of the institution, 
but may be due to wanting to comply with the established policy as well. On the 
other hand, difficulties with the new institution in practice do not appear to be a 
major concern for the rulers except perhaps in reducing their resistance to the 
institution. In fact, members of the rulers are more concerned with implementation 
of the institution than the ruled because their interests are directly affected. Out of 
personal consideration and as a precautionary measure, they are more enthusiastic 
about keeping abreast of details and developments of the institution. 
A close relationship is found among the six examined aspects of both samples' 
affective orientation, suggesting a coherent overall affective bearing in the two 
parties' administrative litigation culture. However, the external relationship of their 
affective orientation is not particularly strong, implying that their feelings towards 
the redress institution is quite separated from their other orientations, like 
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jurisdictional, evaluational and appraisal orientations. It seems that not only is both 
samples' affective orientation affected by outside factors, but their overall 
administrative litigation culture is also not very much dependent upon that affective 
bearing. At the end of the day, not all members in each sample group equally accept 
and support the institution of administrative litigation. By comparing the 
background of different sub-groups, it is found that education can help members of 
the ruled to develop a more positive and receptive feeling towards administrative 
litigation, but accumulation of vested interests will cause the opposite to members of 
the rulers. 
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Chapter 4 Jurisdictional Orientation and Scope of Protection 
under the PRC's Administrative Litigation 
Jurisdictional orientation is not one of the measures used in earlier cultural 
studies but it is indispensable in this cultural study of administrative litigation in the 
PRe. The conventional approach of defining political culture in tenns of cognitive, 
affective, and evaluational orientations is not sufficient in a legal culture study 
because an important aspect of the latter concerns the legal question of jurisdiction 
in its broad sense. In its narrow sense, jurisdiction refers to the power or enforcing 
boundary of a court but the word is used in a broader sense in this paper to refer to 
the power relationship between the plaintiff, defendant and the court. Jurisdictional 
orientation to administrative litigation culture is as important as jurisdiction to 
administrative litigation. Just as administrative litigation cannot be wholly 
established without defining its corresponding jurisdiction, administrative litigation 
culture cannot be fully ascertained without identifying its constituent jurisdictional 
orientation. In this chapter, the jurisdiction of the PRe's administrative litigation as 
provided by the PRe's Administrative Litigation Law will be identified and then the 
ruled and rulers samples' jurisdictional orientations will be reported and discussed, 
so as to understand that unique component of their administrative litigation culture. 
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A. Defining the Scope of Protection for the PRe's Administrative Litigation 
How far does administrative litigation cover? What administrative acts should 
be entertained in litigation? How far can the courts adjudicate upon administrative 
acts under question? What should be the scope of judicial power for administrative 
litigation courts? How far can the ruled sue the rulers? What should be the scope of 
protection for the ruled? How far should the rulers be answerable for their 
administrative acts in judicial review? What should be the scope of review on 
administrative acts of the rulers? These are questions about the jurisdiction of 
administrative litigation in the broad sense and the opinions of concerned parties on 
these jurisdiction questions constitute the jurisdictional orientation of their 
administrative litigation culture. 
The above jurisdiction questions manifest the three interrelated dimensions of 
administrative litigation jurisdiction and the three parties of an administrative 
litigation power relation - the scope of protection for the ruled, the scope of review 
on the rulers, and the scope of judicial power for the courts. Due to different 
considerations and contrasting interests, the three parties will tend to have diverse 
preferences on their respective dimensions, resulting in unequal jurisdictional 
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orientations among the three towards administrative litigation. The ruled would most 
likely prefer a maximum scope of protection that can protect their full range of 
rights and interests. The rulers would probably prefer a minimum scope of review 
that would affect as little as possible their daily administrative work. The courts 
would tend to prefer a well-defined scope of judicial power with the least ambiguity 
so that they can effectively adjudicate administrative cases. But these different and 
somehow conflicting preferences and orientations can hardly be accommodated all 
at the same time. The final decision rests with the decision-maker. Since the PRe's 
administrative litigation is provided and designed by the rulers, it is based on the 
will and needs of the rulers. In the end, the above jurisdiction questions are mostly 
very narrowly answered, resulting in a restricted scope of protection for the ruled, a 
tight scope of review on the rulers, a constrained scope of judicial power for the 
courts, and as a whole an undersized administrative litigation for the PRe. 
In fact, the scope of protection (including the scope of review and scope of 
judicial power, same in below) had been one of the most hotly debated issues during 
the two years of preparation and consultation before promulgation of the PRe's 
administrative litigation in 1989: Different suggestions on the scope of protection 
had been proposed and discussed.2 Some argued for a wide scope of protection so as 
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to better protect the rights and interests of the citizens. Some insisted on a narrow 
one based on worry that the institution might be overused and overburdened. Some 
proposed using a general description to allow for flexibility whereas some suggested 
specific listing to provide clarity. In the end, the issue seems too difficult to be 
completely resolved and the resulting PRC's Administrative Litigation Law of April 
4, 1989 is found to be confusing and unscientific in its definition of the scope of 
protection. 3 Ensuing explanatory notes by the Supreme People's Court are also 
criticised as creating more confusion.4 The Chinese judiciary, academics, members 
of the ruled and rulers all appear to be equally confused by related stipulations of the 
Law and concerned explanatory notes. Consequently, a common understanding on 
the scope of protection is lacking.s 
Difficulties with defining the scope of protection start with the Law.6 Judicial 
officials and law experts in the mainland commonly refer to six articles in the Law 
when trying to explain the scope of protection under the PRC's administrative 
litigation. They include Articles 2, 4 and 5 of Chapter one "General Provisions", 
Articles 11 and 12 of Chapter two "Scope of Acceptance of Cases", and Article 54 
of Chapter seven "Hearings and Judgments". However, there are plenty of confusion 
and contradictions among these articles, leading to a number of queries about the 
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exact definition of the scope of protection. 
For example, Article 2 of the Law promises that specific administrative acts are 
subject to judicial review under the PRC's administrative litigation, but Article 11 
lists only eight types of specific administrative acts as what will be accepted in 
administrative litigation and Article 12 specifically exempted four kinds of specific 
administrative acts from judicial review. Likewise, Article 5 stipulates that the 
courts shall only examine the legality of specific administrative acts, but Article 
54(4) empowers the courts to modify clearly unjust administrative penalties, which 
is clearly not a matter of legality but an issue of reasonableness. Ensuing 
explanatory notes by the Supreme People's Court are no better than the Law and are 
no more than a task-oriented piecemeal manual for troubleshooting problems arising 
in the course of practice, e.g. listing more specific administrative acts to be subject 
to judicial review or expanding the list of exemptions. 7 
In summary, there seems to be no clear and definite principle to help define a 
precise and accurate scope of protection for the PRC's administrative litigation but 
only a collection of confusing and contradictory guidelines based on political and 
contingent needs. The only obvious indication from the provisions of the Law and 
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subsequent explanatory notes is that the scope of protection is never meant to be 
wide but is about how narrow. 
Without clear specification, judicial officials, law experts, academics, and even 
members of the ruled and rulers cannot agree on the scope of protection under the 
PRe's administrative litigation but each maintains very different interpretation 
based on different rationales. For example, a court may extend or constrict its scope 
of acceptance of cases based on its ability to adjudicate individual administrative act, 
interference and pressure from the administration, or simply the attitude of the 
court's leadership.s This not only affects satisfactory protection of citizens' rights 
and interests but also impedes effective supervision of administrative agents' 
exercise of administrative authority. In the end, implementation of the PRe's 
administrative litigation is hampered. 
B. Third Diagnosis of the Administrative Litigation Law 
In fact, the above-mentioned confusion and contradictions can be reduced and 
the scope of protection under the PRe's administrative litigation can be ascertained 
if related articles of the Law are diagnosed in a holistic approach with careful 
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examination of the contents of the articles, honest acknowledgement of the original 
intentions of the Law and truthful admission of the Law's limitations. Based on such 
a diagnosis, it is found that the proposed use of Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Law to 
help define the scope of protection is wrong and misleading. Although they have 
implications for the scope of protection, they are no more than "general provisions" 
that lay down the principles for the conduct of administrative litigation. They do not 
serve to define the scope of protection and have not done so. After all, it is Articles 
11 and 12 that define the width of protection and Article 54 that defines the depth. 
Article 11 of the Law delimits the width of protection by citing eight types of 
specific administrative acts as what will be accepted in administrative litigation. 
They include five types of specific administrative acts, i.e. administrative penalties, 
coercive administrative measures, infringement of operational autonomy, unlawful 
requirement for performance of obligations, and infringement on other personal or 
property rights, plus three types of specific administrative in-actions, i.e. rejection or 
no reply to application for permits and licenses, rejection or no reply to application 
for performance of legal responsibility to protect personal and property rights, and 
failure to pay pensions. In essence, Article 11 confines the width of protection to 
covering no more than the personal and property rights of the ruled against 
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infringement by the rulers' specific administrative acts or in-actions. These rights 
cover life and health, personal reputation, residences, private ownership of 
properties, etc. Subsections one to seven of the article quote seven kinds of such 
infringement as examples of acceptable cases in administrative litigation. Subsection 
eight of the article inclusively states that infringement upon all other personal and 
property rights of the ruled by specific administrative acts of the rulers are subject to 
review by administrative litigation. As such, the width of protection is clear: 
personal and property rights of a legally sanctioned group of the ruled infringed by 
specific administrative acts of a legally defined group of the rulers (not all members 
of the ruled and rulers, see first and second diagnoses in the last two chapters). 
It should be noted that as a result of the above restrictive stipulations, 
administrative litigation cannot protect even personal and property rights of the 
ruled if infringed by abstract administrative acts or political moves of the rulers. 
Furthermore, social and political rights of the ruled, such as the right to work, to 
education, to vote and to stand for election, the freedom of speech, of the press, of 
association, of assembly, of procession, of demonstration, and of religious belief, 
despite being guaranteed in the PRC's constitution, are not protected under the 
PRC's administrative litigation, even if infringed by specific administrative acts. As 
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such, the scope of protection in fact does not depend on what kinds of administrative 
acts, whether specific or abstract, by the rulers but on what kinds of rights of the 
ruled are in question. Nature of the rulers' administrative acts is just an additional 
qualification, as stated in Article 2 of the Law and repeated in Article 11. The kind 
of rights of the ruled ultimately determines the width of the scope of protection. 
Having demarcated the width of protection, Article 12 of the Law inserts 
another exemption clause that constitutes an additional protection shield for the state 
and administration. The article reflects no scientific principle but strategic 
consideration of pragmatic needs which cuts across the boundary of specific and 
abstract administrative acts. It excludes four types of administrative acts (three 
specific and one abstract) from the scope of protection - acts of state, administrative 
rules and regulations, internal administrative personnel decisions, and specific 
administrative acts designated as final by the laws. Loosely defined, acts of state 
include such matters as national defense, diplomatic relations, declaration of curfew 
and other prerogatives of the Party and state. Any damage to the rights and interests 
of individuals or parties resulting from these acts cannot be remedied through 
administrative litigation. Administrative rules and regulations, commonly referred to 
as abstract administrative acts, is the underpinning of the rulers' rule over the ruled. 
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Whether legally enacted or not, reasonable or not, by the State Council or by local 
agents, these rules and regulations are carefully protected from challenge by 
administrative litigation courts because the opposite would shake the base of the 
rulers' rule. Internal personnel decisions of the administration on matters such as 
reward and punishment and appointment and dismissal of personnel are part of the 
nomenclatura system to maintain the Party's control of the state and administration. 
Based on political considerations, civil servants are required to give up their rights to 
protection by administrative litigation when they take up the job. Finally, specific 
administrative acts will not be within the scope of protection if the laws say so. 
There are presently four pieces of legislation which have preempted intervention by 
administrative litigation, and the exempted acts include issuance of certain kinds of 
patent, rejection of trade mark applications, decisions on public assembly and 
demonstration applications, fines and detention of aliens and nationals during 
entrance into and exit from the country.9 
The depth of protection is the scope of judgment defined in Article 54 of the 
Law. The depth of protection refers to how far the courts shall adjudicate on the 
disputed specific administrative acts in accepted cases, whether it is about the facts 
of the cases, reasonableness of the administrative acts, or legality of the acts. 
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Knowing what kind of cases or administrative acts will be accepted in administrative 
litigation is not enough for defining the scope of protection if not knowing how far 
the courts shall adjudicate the cases and what remedies shall be provided. It is not 
protection (review or jurisdiction) at all if the court accepts a case but will not 
consider its substance and provides no judgment in the end. The depth of protection 
is as important as the width and it requires both the two if the scope of protection is 
to be fully described. By clarifying the range for the measure of legality, Article 54 
of the Law outlines the depth of protection and the scope of judicial power of the 
courts. 
Article 54 stipulates that in respect of the administrative acts under question, 
the courts will check whether there are insufficient principal evidences, incorrect 
application of laws, violation of legal procedures, exceeding limit of authorities, and 
abuse of authorities. These are the five aspects to be examined in a measure of 
legality and the criteria to be met for an administrative act to be accepted as legal. 
An administrative act is legal and shall be upheld only when all these five aspects 
are clear. If anyone is not, the court can order the act to be revoked. In other words, 
infringement on the personal and property rights of the ruled by specific 
administrative acts of the rulers will be corrected and the rights protected by 
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administrative litigation in so far as the acts are illegal in anyone or more of the five 
aspects. 
Having defined the measure of legality, Article 54 expands the depth of 
protection to include one particular measure on the reasonableness of administrative 
acts. In view of the serious problem with arbitrary and unreasonable administrative 
penalties in the mainland, subsection 4 of Article 54 allows the PRC's 
administrative litigation to provide help in case of clearly unjust administrative 
penalties. This is an individual allowance for the courts to review the reasonableness 
of one particular type of specific administrative acts. Administrative penalties are 
"clearly unjust" if they are disproportional to the accused wrongdoing of the ruled or 
in conflict with the purposes of the applied laws and administrative regulations. The 
courts will not intervene in any other unreasonable but lawful administrative acts of 
the rulers nor in unreasonable administrative penalties if lawful and not amounting 
to clearly unjust. 
The scope of protection under the PRC's present administrative litigation as 
defined by the Law and explained in the above diagnosis is summed up in Figure 4.1 
below. 
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Figure 4.1 The Scope of Protection under the PRe's Administrative Litigation 
Scope of Protection 
I 
Article 2 
no Yes 
Abstract administrative acts Specific administrative acts 
Exempted specific administrative acts - no -------1 
Article 12 
Article 11 
no no yes yes 
I I 
Social rights Political rights Personal rights Property rights 
Article 5 
no 
Reasonableness of acts 
except 
Clearly 
unjust 
penalties 
Article 54(4) 
Insufficient 
principal 
evidence 
Incorrect 
application 
of law 
Actions In-actions 
yes 
I 
Legality of acts 
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Article 54(2) 
Violating 
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Width of 
Protection 
Depth of 
Protection 
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of 
authority 
C. Jurisdictional Orientation of the Surveyed Individual Household 
Proprietors 
With reference to the above defined scope of protection (review as well as 
judicial power), seven questions were asked of the 738 interviewed proprietors to 
explore their expected scope of protection and to identify the jurisdictional 
orientation of their administrative litigation culture (see Table 4.1 for the questions). 
The first five questions are about the depth of protection and the five aspects of 
illegality. The respondents were asked whether they would agree that insufficient 
principal evidence, incorrect application of law, violating legal procedure, exceeding 
limit of authority, and abuse of authority in specific administrative acts were 
sufficient grounds for litigation and should be subject to review. Administrative 
penalty is chosen as the specific administrative act in question because it is the most 
common type of administrative acts found in the state and faced by the proprietors. 
The last two questions are about the width of protection and ask the respondents 
whether they would place abstract and specific administrative acts under the scope 
of protection of administrative litigation. Unreasonable regulation on registration 
fees is quoted as the abstract administrative act due to its relevance to the proprietors 
and overcharging registration fees (unlawful requirement of performance of 
obligation) is listed as the specific administrative act. 
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1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation 
The interviewed proprietors' jurisdictional orientation was clear and consistent, 
with their majority agreeing that all seven listed items should be within the scope of 
protection. In respect of the depth of protection, the proprietors were most concerned 
and certain with inappropriate use of power as requiring judicial review hut they 
were a bit less assured with protection for due process. As many as 73.1 per cent and 
68.8 per cent of the proprietors agreed that government officials' infringement upon 
citizens' rights by abuse of power and ultra vires were legitimate and sufficient 
causes to initiate administrative litigation, respectively (see Table 4.1 below). In 
particular, 30.0 per cent and 26.0 per cent "totally agreed" with litigation against 
those two aspects of illegality, respectively (see appendix 5). However, still 20.9 per 
cent and 21.2 per cent disagreed in the two cases. Slightly less of the proprietors 
believed illegality in the form of undue process deserved to be sued: 64.2 per cent 
for violating legal procedure, 61.5 per cent for insufficient principal evidence, and 
60.9 per cent for incorrect application oflaw, against 20.4 per cent, 22.1 per cent and 
17.1 per cent who stated the opposite views, respectively. 
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Table 4 .1 Responses of the Proprietors to the Seven Jurisdictional Orienta tion Questions 
12 Officials abuse their authority in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
13 Officials exceed the limit of their lega l 
authority in awarding penalties to citizens . 
14 Officials use the wrong regulation in 
awarding penalties to citizens. 
IS Officials violate the legally prescribed 
procedure in awarding penalties to citizens. 
16 Officials have insufficient essential 
evidence in awarding penalties to citizens. 
17 Registration fees regulation made by 
government is unreasonable. 
18 The Industry and Commerce Bureau 
collects registration fees in excess of the 
amount stipulated in the regulation. 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don' t know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
q 534 
-- ----- -
% 73.1 
q 503 
- -------
% 68.8 
q 441 
--------
% 60.9 
q 464 
- - ------
% 64.2 
q 443 
- - ------
% 61.5 
q 437 
- - ------
% 60.2 
q 456 
--------
% 62.8 
N 0 ? s.d. 
30 153 14 1.32 
----- - -- -- ------
4.1 20.9 1.9 
41 155 32 1.30 
- - - -- - - - -- ------5.6 21.2 4.4 
86 124 73 1.1 5 
- ---- - ---- ------
11.9 17.1 10.1 
48 147 63 1.22 
- - - -- -- - -- ----- -6.7 20.4 8.7 
62 159 56 1. 24 
----- -----
------
8.6 22.1 7.8 
81 126 81 1.17 
--- -- - - - --
------
11.2 17.4 11.2 
59 141 70 1.25 
-- - -- - ---- ------
8.1 19.5 9.6 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation . 
As for the width of protection, the proprietors' degree of certainty was not as 
high as with inappropriate use of power but more or less the same with undue 
process. The unlawful specific administrative act of overcharging registration fees 
was deemed by 62.8 per cent of the proprietors as a legitimate ground for 
administrative litigation whereas 19.5 per cent deemed not. The unreasonable 
abstract administrative act of unjust regulation on registration fees was also 
considered as in need of and appropriate for judicial review by 60.2 per cent of the 
proprietors, but 17.4 per cent disagreed and there were over one-tenth who were 
neutral and another one-tenth who gave no answer. In short, the ruled sample 
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protested most strongly against inappropriate use of power and proclaimed most 
strongly their wish to have it controlled under administrative litigation, but their 
majority also wanted all kinds of illegal administrative acts, whether abstract or 
specific, to be corrected as well by administrative litigation. 
Nevertheless, an observable divergence of view is found among the proprietors 
in respect of their jurisdictional orientation as reflected by the highest level of 
standard deviations in their above answers from 1.15 to 1.32 when compared with 
that in the other orientations. The proprietors appear to be divided into two sub-
groups with opposing jurisdictional ideas - around three-fifth with positive views 
and around one-fifth with negative ones. Cross-tabulation of the proprietors' 
jurisdictional orientation answers confirms that there is strong consistency in the two 
sub-groups' orientation, e.g. those who agreed with one item to be within the scope 
of protection will have 75.6 per cent to 95.9 per cent among them who also agreed 
with the other six items to the same effect (details of the cross-tabulation results are 
l 
not displayed due to space constraints). Such a level and pattern of jurisdictional 
... 
orientation is summed up in the overall jurisdictional orientation scores of the 
. 
. 
sampled proprietors. Slightly over 60 per cent of the proprietors had a positive 
jurisdictional orientation, regarding the listed specific and abstract administrative 
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acts as sufficient and legitimate grounds for administrative litigation, whereas almost 
20 per cent presented a negative jurisdictional orientation (see Table 4.2 below). 
Table 4.2 Overall Jurisdictional Orientation Scores ofthe Proprietors 
Overall Jurisdictional Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don't know; 
A 
tq 3278 
- - - -- -------
aq 468.3 
- - - - --------
% 64.S 
N = Neutral ; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
N D ? 
407 1005 389 
------- ------ - ---- ---
58.1 143.6 55.6 
------- ------- - ------
8.0 19.8 7.7 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
To sum up, different members of the ruled may have different jurisdictional 
orientations but the different aspects of illegality and different types of 
administrative acts do not make much difference in their jurisdictional orientation . 
Over 60 per cent of the proprietors agreed that all five aspects of illegality and both 
types of administrative acts should be subject to judicial review, i.e. infringement of 
citizens' rights by illegal administrative acts, whether abstract or specific, should be 
controlled and corrected. The present PRe's administrative litigation is in line with 
the jurisdictional orientation of the majority of the ruled sample except in the case of 
abstract administrative acts. Precluding the latter from the existing scope of 
protection is obviously against the will of the majority of the ruled sample. 
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2. Internal Relationship of the Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation 
According to the Spearman's rho correlation measure, the proprietors' answers 
to the seven jurisdictional orientation questions were found to be mutually correlated 
with a perfect internal relationship and the overall level of correlation was very high, 
from 0.54 to 0.77 (see Table 4.3 below). In particular, three sets of answers had a 
significantly closer mutual relationship with rho coefficients from 0.69 to 0.77. One 
set was answers to the first two questions about misuse of power, another set was 
answers to the following three questions about undue process, and the last set was 
answers to the last two questions concerning abstract and specific administrative 
acts about the width of protection. Proprietors who agreed with abuse of power as 
sufficient ground for administrative litigation were also likely to agree with ultra 
vires as more than enough. Proprietors who found one kind of undue process as 
justifying administrative litigation would also found the others equally justifying. As 
for those who found illegal specific administrative acts satisfying the requirement 
for suing the government would also be likely to find abstract administrative acts 
equally satisfying. 
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Table 4.3 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation 
Q 12 13 14 15 16 17 I 18 
iii I 
12 ! .77 .62 i .65 i .62 .54 I .56 
.. .. ........................................ f .................... .. .. .. ................... : ............... ........ j................................. ............ jL ........ .. .. ..... .. 
13 .77 i .65 i .68 , .64 .58 .62 
; :! 
14 .62 i .65 i .72 i .69 .54 I .56 
.. ......................... · ............ · ..f· .......................................... + ........ · .... .... · .. + ............................. .. .... .. ..... + ....................  
15 .65 i .68 .72 1 i .74 .55 I .61 
...................... ······················t······················ ....................... \ ....................... \ ......... .. ............ ................ , .......................... . 
16 .62 ! .64 69 ! .74 ! .56 .63 
i 1: 
i i: I 
17 .54 : .58 .54 : .55 : .56 I .70 
................... ....... · ........ ·· ...... ·f ...... ··· .... ·· ...... · · .... ·· .. .. · .. · .. ··· .. ·1 .. ··· .. · .. ···· .. ···· .. +· ..· .... ·· ·· .. ····· .. · .... · .. · .... ··· ...... ·r .... · ........ · ..· .. · ..
18 .56 i .62 .56 : .61 : .63 .70 I 
! :! 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.63 . 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
To a lesser extent, answers to the first two questions were also closely related 
with answers to the following three, with rho coefficients from 0.62 to 0.68. Perhaps 
it is because they refer to the same kind of specific administrative actions, i.e. 
administrative penalties, and that all five questions concern the depth of protection. 
Together, their relationship with answers to the last two questions about the width of 
protection was a bit lower, with rho coefficients from 0.54 to 0.63. 
When compared with the results in other orientations, the internal relationship 
of answers by the proprietors in this jurisdictional orientation was the highest, with 
an average internal correlation coefficient of 0.63. Such high level of internal 
consistency reflects the coherent nature of the questions on a precise issue, i.e. the 
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scope of protection, and the consistent though to certain extent opposing answers of 
the proprietors to these questions as mentioned above. Beyond doubt, the sampled 
ruled had a highly consistent and mostly positive jurisdictional orientation in their 
administrative litigation culture. 
3. External Relationship of the Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation 
The proprietors' jurisdictional orientation was found to have a very strong 
relationship with their other administrative litigation orientations, except the 
affective orientation (see Table 4.4 below). In fact, this orientation had the highest 
overall external relationship than the other five orientations as shown by the 
correlation coefficients (see Table 4.5), indicating that jurisdictional orientation is an 
important integral part of and has important significance to the proprietors' overall 
administrative litigation culture. 
Table 4.4 External Relationship of the Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Fairly Strong 
Affective Small 
Evaluational Very Strong 
Appraisal Very Strong 
Expectational Perfect 
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As for the relationship with cognitive orientation, the proprietors' jurisdictional 
orientation answers related quite closely with their answers to cognitive orientation 
questions 1 and 2 about awareness of the litigation institution, but less closely with 4 
and 5 about knowledge of the Law, and poorly with 3 on experience with suing the 
government. Proprietors having heard of the institution were likely to have a 
stronger and more affirmative jurisdictional orientation. Knowledge of the Law and 
experience with suing the government seemed to have a smaller association with the 
proprietors' jurisdictional idea about administrative litigation. In view of the poor in-
depth knowledge of the proprietors about administrative litigation and the 
relationship pattern between their jurisdictional and cognitive orientations, it seems 
that the proprietors' jurisdictional idea about administrative litigation is mainly 
based on what they have heard of the institution (together with perhaps their 
experience with officialdom in their daily business) and not on what they really 
know about it. Even so, they appear to have a very mature and well-developed 
jurisdictional orientation, despite their weak cognitive basis. Overall phi correlation 
coefficients for the two orientations were not particularly high, ranging from 0.12 to 
0.18 (see Table 4.5 below). 
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Table 4 .5 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Proprietors' 
Jurisdictional Orientation 
Cognitive AtTective Evaluationsl Appraisal Expectationn l 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
12 14 12 14 II 17 15 10 12 08 09 20 20 20 20 22 19 30 23 22 27 16 18 
13 14 13 12 II 12 13 13 13 08 16 16 20 21 20 17 25 22 20 26 22 22 
14 15 16 14 09 10 10 09 09 13 12 12 20 12 14 12 19 19 22 12 26 24 21 27 24 20 
15 12 14 18 16 09 15 14 17 16 09 19 12 18 14 21 22 20 13 27 22 22 26 23 25 
16 13 15 15 14 16 10 10 18 II 12 II 20 19 16 13 26 19 16 21 27 17 
17 14 15 09 08 08 II 14 10 14 09 14 15 20 20 22 12 26 18 14 19 16 17 
18 14 07 08 08 16 13 13 13 15 22 19 15 16 22 18 14 20 20 16 
Phi correlation for Q 1-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05 , 2-tailed. 
A limited correlation was found between the proprietors' jurisdictional and 
affective orientations, except for affective orientation question lIon acquaintance 
with the institution. This can be partly explained by the stronger correlation between 
their jurisdictional and cognitive orientations just mentioned. It indicated that the 
proprietors' affective orientation towards administrative litigation tended not to have 
a strong association with what they perceived as sufficient grounds for litigation. 
Affective orientation is more an emotional intuition whereas jurisdictional 
orientation is more a hard fact of life, and there may well be some distance between 
the two when they are put together. A detailed cross-tabulation analysis (results not 
displayed due to space constraints) of the proprietors' jurisdictional and affective 
orientation answers also revealed no significant relationship between the two. 
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What are conceived by the proprietors as appropriate grounds for litigation 
reflect the scope of protection they intend for administrative litigation, this will 
affect the likely effects that they expect from the institution and the likely 
controversy they envisage for it. It is thus not surprising to find that their 
jurisdictional orientation is closely related with their evaluation and appraisal 
orientations. The proprietors' jurisdictional orientation answers were entirely 
correlated with their answers to three of the six evaluational orientation questions 
and seven of the eight affective orientation questions. Correlations with the rest were 
also quite high. Spearman's rho correlation coefficients of the proprietors' 
jurisdictional orientation with their evaluational orientation ranged from 0.08 to 0.20, 
and from 0.08 to 0.30 with their appraisal orientation (see Table 4.5 above). 
Lastly, a perfect relationship was found between the proprietors' jurisdictional 
and expectational orientations. The way they envisage the scope of protection 
provided by the institution is found to tie with and contribute to the way they 
calculate the prospects of the institution, especially when the likely benefits are 
taken into consideration. Change in the former would likely be associated with 
change in the latter. Given a mostly affirmative jurisdictional idea, the proprietors 
were mostly optimistic with the future of administrative litigation and were prepared 
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to support its further development. The rho correlation coefficients for this external 
relationship were pretty high, from 0.14 to 0.27 (see Table 4.5 above). 
4. Jurisdictional Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Proprietors 
According to the results of cross-tabulation analysis summarised in Table 4.6 
below, the proprietors' jurisdictional orientation was found to have strong 
relationship with six of their nine personal particulars, suggesting significant 
variations in the jurisdictional orientation of different sub-groups of the sample ruled 
based on their personal background (details of the extensive cross-tabulation results 
are not displayed due to space constraints). 
Table 4.6 Relationship between the Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Insigni ficant Gender 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Slightly Significant Kind of Business Income 
-------------- ---------- -- --------------------------
Age 
Political Status 
Significant Working Years Residency 
Working District 
Education Level 
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Sub-Group with Insignificant Relationship 
Similar to the results of the cognitive and affective orientations, gender did not 
have much association with the proprietors' jurisdictional orientation towards 
administrative litigation. Both gender sub-groups shared a similar jurisdictional idea. 
However, male proprietors tended to be slightly more definite in their answers, 
whether agreeing or disagreeing whereas the females had slightly more neutral and 
"don't know" answers. The phi correlation measure also could not find a significant 
relationship between gender and jurisdictional orientation of the proprietors (see 
Table 4.7 below). 
Table 4.7 
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Correlation Coefficients for the Proprietors' Jurisdictional Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
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.10 .13 .15 
.11 .08 .16 
.16 .14 .17 .14 
.14 .13 .16 .16 
.17 .13 .16 .12 
.10 .16 .12 
.10 .16 
.09 
Phi for gender & residency, Spearman's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, kind of business & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
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Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Proprietors in different kind of business perfonned quite similarly in their 
jurisdictional orientation, except for those in the repairing industry. Proprietors in the 
three kinds of retailing, catering and servicing industries had a jurisdictional 
orientation similar to the group nonn, whereas those in the repairing business were 
much more jurisdictionally prepared than the other three sub-groups to accept a fulI-
fledged administrative litigation. The repairing sub-group had the highest percentage 
of affirmative answers, above or around 80 per cent, and the lowest percentage of 
objections in all seven jurisdictional orientation questions. Political status and 
working years may be two intervening factors for the repairing sub-group's positive 
jurisdictional orientation since the sub-group tended to have Party membership and 
long years of service, which were found related with a positive jurisdictional 
orientation (see discussion below). The Cramer's V correlation measure on this 
personal particular with the proprietors' jurisdictional orientation did not have 
significant findings (see Table 4.7 above). 
Similar to the results of the cognitive and affective orientations, the proprietors' 
income was found to have a slightly significant relationship with their jurisdictional 
orientation in that there was no direct relationship between the two but a fairly 
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consistent up-down relationship was noticeable. That might be due to influence of 
intervening factors that were found to have significant relationship with the 
proprietors' administrative litigation orientations. The Spearman's rho correlation 
analysis also could not provide significant findings (see Table 4.7 above). 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
Age was found to have a significantly positive relationship with the 
proprietors' jurisdictional orientation, i.e. the higher the age, the stronger the 
jurisdictional idea. The youngest age sub-group of 18-30 had the most negative 
overall jurisdictional orientation, with the highest percentage disagreeing with the 
listed grounds for litigation in all seven jurisdictional orientation questions. The next 
youngest age sub-group of 31-40 followed with the second highest percentage of 
opposing views in most of the questions. As for the more mature proprietors, 
especially for those between 41 and 60, they shared quite similar jurisdictional ideas, 
mostly agreeing with the listed grounds for litigation, with a very low percentage 
taking the opposite views. Yet, those over 60 were more fluctuating, with answers 
more at the two extremes. Similar to the affective orientation, the age of 40 appeared 
to be an important turning point correlating with a difference in the proprietors' 
affective feelings and jurisdictional ideas about administrative litigation. The two 
generations who were born before and after China's socialist transformation in the 
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late 1950s seemed to have quite different orientations towards administrative 
litigation. The Spearman's rho correlation coefficients showed that age of the 
proprietors was significantly correlated with their answers to all the seven 
jurisdictional orientation questions by -0.1 0 to -0.17 (see Table 4.7 above), 
confirming the above significant positive relationship. 
Discarding the two democratic parties proprietors because of their lack of 
statistical representativeness, distinct pattern of jurisdictional orientation was found 
among the other three political status sub-groups. A significantly stronger and more 
positive jurisdictional orientation was found among proprietors with Communist 
Party membership. They had the highest percentage who agreed with the 
circumstances in all seven jurisdictional orientation questions as sufficient grounds 
for litigation. On the contrary, proprietors belonging to the Communist Youth 
League had the least positive jurisdictional orientation, with the highest percentage 
who disagreed with all seven listed circumstances as sufficient grounds for litigation. 
Age might be an important intervening factor here because proprietors belonging to 
the Communist Youth League were mostly the younger age sub-group of the sample 
whereas proprietors with Communist Party membership were mostly the older age 
sub-group (see Appendix 7). The independent proprietors were situated in-between 
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the two. It is obvious that different political sub-groups had different jurisdictional 
orientations towards administrative litigation. However, the Cramer's V correlation 
measure could not generate significant findings for this personal particular (see 
Table 4.7 above). 
Similar to the situation with age, there is a basically positive relationship 
between the proprietors' years of work in the job and their jurisdictional orientation. 
For those who had just entered the industry for less than a year, their jurisdictional 
idea was neither too well established nor too positive. They had the highest 
percentage of neutral answers for most of the jurisdictional orientation questions and 
quite a lot of them disagreed with the circumstances as grounds for litigation. For 
the next senior sub-group with 1-3 years in the job, they had the least positive 
jurisdictional orientation, as they had the highest percentage who disagreed with the 
circumstances as grounds for litigation in six of the seven questions. For those who 
had longer working years in the profession and more experience in dealing with the 
government, their jurisdictional idea became more and more affirmative. The sub-
group with 7-10 years as proprietors had the highest percentage agreeing with the 
causes for litigation in six of the seven questions, and the lowest percentage 
disagreeing in five. This trend reversed a bit for those with over ten years as 
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proprietors but they still had a much more positive jurisdictional idea than those 
with less than three years. These all indicated a significantly positive relationship 
between the proprietors' years of work and their jurisdictional orientation. 
Speannan's rho correlation measure also confirmed a significant relationship of 
-0.07 to -0.14 between the proprietors' age and their answers to the five 
jurisdictional orientation questions about the depth of protection (see Table 4.7 
above). 
Residency did bear a significant relationship with the proprietors' jurisdictional 
orientation towards administrative litigation, but age, working years and political 
status might be important intervening factors here. Proprietors with Beijing 
residency, who tended to be senior in age and working years and belong to the 
Communist Party, consistently had a higher percentage who agreed with the 
circumstances in all seven jurisdictional orientation questions as sufficient for 
initiating litigation. By way of contrast, proprietors without residency, who tended to 
be junior in age and working years and belong to the Communist Youth League, 
consistently had a higher percentage who disagreed with the circumstances in all 
seven questions as sufficient. The difference was on average up to 8 per cent. The 
phi correlation coefficients also indicated a significant relationship between 
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residency and answers to jurisdictional orientation questions 14-17 by 0.16-0.17 (see 
Table 4.7 above). 
Proprietors working in different districts had quite polarised jurisdictional 
orientations towards administrative litigation, but again age, working years and 
political status might be important intervening factors here. Those in Hai Dian 
district, who tended to be younger, with shorter years of work and Communist Youth 
League membership, were much more reserved. They had the least percentage of 
agreeing answers to the jurisdictional questions and had a significantly higher 
percentage of objection to all seven jurisdictional orientation questions than those in 
the other two districts. At the opposite pole were proprietors working in Xuan Wu 
district, who tended to be older, with longer years of work and Communist Party 
membership. This sub-group was overwhelmingly affinnative in their jurisdictional 
orientation, with a significantly higher percentage who agreed with the 
circumstances for litigation in all seven questions than the other two sub-groups. 
Those in Xi Cheng were almost mid-way between the two poles. The Cramer's V 
correlation coefficients also showed that the proprietors' place of work was 
significantly correlated with their answers to all seven jurisdictional orientation 
questions by 0.12 to 0.16 (see Table 4.7 above). 
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In general, jurisdictional orientation of the proprietors tended to be positively 
related with their education level, except that the lowest education sub-group with 
only primary education performed very differently. The percentage of affirmative 
answers to all five questions concerning the depth of protection increased gradually 
from secondary level of education onward, reaching the highest at undergraduate 
and above level, the opposite applied for negative answers. This suggested that 
higher education tended to make the respondents more aware of and concerned with 
illegality of administrative acts. However, it should be noted that for the lowest 
education sub-group of primary only, they had the second highest percentage of 
affirmative answer to all the five questions, suggesting that though they were less 
educated, they still had a very affirmative jurisdictional idea about the depth of 
protection, not much inferior to that of the highest educated sub-group. On the other 
hand, answers to the two questions about the width of protection were more 
inconsistent. The distribution of scores was more random except that the lower 
secondary sub-group had the highest percentage of negative answers and the 
undergraduate and above sub-group had the highest percentage of neutral answers. 
The Spearman's rho correlation coefficients of this personal particular did not reveal 
a significant correlation except with answers to the last jurisdictional orientation 
question (see Table 4.7 above). 
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In summary, when compared with the cognitive and affective orientations, the 
proprietors' jurisdictional orientation was much more closely related with and hence 
tied to their personal particulars, six of which were found to have close association 
with their jurisdictional ideas. Age and education level were found to be two 
common personal particulars significantly related to not only the proprietors' 
cognitive and affective orientations but also to their jurisdictional orientation. While 
working years and political status only had a slightly significant relationship with 
the proprietors' cognitive and affective orientations, they had a more significant 
relationship with the proprietors' jurisdictional orientation. Residency and working 
district were also found to have a close relationship with the proprietors' 
jurisdictional orientation, but age, working years and political status might be 
important intervening factors affecting the nature and degree of those relationships. 
On the whole, maturity and seniority in the form of experience in life and experience 
with officialdom seem to be two basic factors causing difference in the proprietors' 
jurisdictional ideas about administrative litigation. Other situational factors like 
residency and place of work, and to a lesser extent the political factor of party 
membership, the economic factor of monthly income and the academic factor of 
education level, also bring in variation to the ultimate jurisdictional orientation of 
the sampled ruled's administrative litigation culture. 
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D. Jurisdictional Orientation of the Surveyed Government Officials 
The same seven jurisdictional orientation questions were asked of the 152 
interviewed officials to unravel their conceded scope of review for administrative 
litigation and to locate the jurisdictional orientation of their administrative litigation 
culture. Their responses are presented and discussed below in the same way that the 
responses of their ruled counterparts are presented above, together with a 
comparison between the two. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern ofthe Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation 
In terms of both the overall level and pattern of orientation, jurisdictional ideas 
of the interviewed officials differ quite significantly from that of the proprietors and 
between the width and depth of judicial review. The officials had a much higher 
level and a much more affirmative pattern of jurisdictional orientation in respect of 
the depth of review for administrative litigation than that of the proprietors as well 
as the width of review. 
Like the proprietors, inappropriate use of authority was regarded by the highest 
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percentage of officials as deserving judicial review. But the percentage among the 
officials was much higher, reaching 92.8 per cent for abuse of power and 92.1 per 
cent for ultra vires which were 19.7 per cent and 23.3 per cent higher than that of the 
proprietors, respectively (compare Table 4.8 below with Table 4.1 above). The 
opposite view of objecting to the two as demanding judicial review added up to only 
3.9 per cent and 2.7 per cent of the officials which were 17.0 per cent and 18.5 per 
cent lower than that of the proprietors, respectively. To a lesser extent, such an 
overwhelmingly affirmative pattern of results was also recorded for the other three 
aspects of illegality - 86.8 per cent as opposed to 5.3 per cent for violating legal 
procedure, 80.3 per cent to 7.9 per cent for incorrect application oflaw, and 79.5 per 
cent to 8.0 per cent for insufficient principal evidence. When compared with the 
proprietors, the level of endorsing versus opposing responses of the officials for 
these three aspects of illegality were 18.0 per cent to 23.9 per cent higher and 9.2 per 
cent to 15.1 per cent lower than that of the proprietors, respectively. In a word, the 
officials displayed an overwhelmingly affirmative jurisdictional orientation in 
support of the depth of judicial review with a high level of consensus (standard 
deviations as low as 0.66 to 0.84) and the percentage of officials holding such an 
idea was much greater than that of the proprietors. 
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Table 4.8 Responses of the Officials to the Seven Jurisdictional Orientation Questions 
A 
12 Officials abuse their authority in awarding q 141 
-- ------
penalties to citizens. % 92.8 
13 Officials exceed the limit of their legal q 140 
--
------
authority in awarding penalties to citizens. % 92.1 
14 Officials use the wrong regulation in q 122 
--
------
awarding penalties to citizens. % 80.3 
15 Officials violate the legally prescribed q 132 
- - ------
procedure in awarding penalties to citizens. % 86.8 
16 Officials have insufficient essential q 120 
-- --------
evidence in awarding penalties to citizens. % 
17 Registration fees regulation made by q 
- -
government is unreasonable. % 
18 The Industry and Commerce Bureau q 
--
collects registration fees in excess of the % 
amount stipulated in the regulation. 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutra l; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
79.5 
72 
------
47.4 
104 
------
68.4 
N 0 ? s.d. 
4 6 I 0.74 
- - - -- - - - -- ---- - -
2.6 3.9 0.7 
6 4 2 0.66 
- - - -- - - -- - -- ----
3.9 2.7 1.3 
14 12 4 0.84 
--- -- - - - - - ------9.2 7.9 2.6 
9 8 3 0.77 
- - - -- - - - -- - - -- - -
5.9 5.3 2.0 
15 12 4 0.84 
-- --- -- --
----- ----
------ --
9.9 8.0 2.6 
28 43 9 1.11 
--- -- - - --- ----- -18.4 28.3 5.9 
19 26 3 1.02 
- ---- -- - -- -- - ---12.5 17.1 2.0 
o = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing va lue" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
The officials ' jurisdictional idea about the width of review was significant ly 
less affinnative than their idea about the depth of review, more comparable to that of 
the proprietors, and more 10 line with the present practice of the PRC's 
administrative litigation. Comparable to the proprietors, only 68.4 per cent of the 
officials agreed that an illegal specific administrative act should be subject to 
judicial review, just 5.6 per cent higher than that of the proprietors, and a substantial 
17.1 per cent disagreed with that, just 2.4 per cent lower than that of the proprietors. 
In line with the present practice of administrative litigation, as low as 47.4 per cent 
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of the officials agreed to include unreasonable abstract administrative acts in the 
scope of judicial review which was 12.8 per cent lesser than that of the proprietors, 
and as many as 28.3 per cent objected to do so which was 10.9 per cent higher than 
that of the proprietors. Due to more disagreeing answers, the standard deviations for 
the officials' responses to these two jurisdictional orientation questions about the 
width of review were slightly greater than that about the depth of review, reaching 
1.11 and 1.02, respectively. 
Given a much higher level of cognition among the officials and that 73.7 per 
cent of them had studied the law, it is not surprising to find that they had a higher 
level and more affinnative pattern of jurisdictional orientation towards 
administrative litigation than the proprietors in respect of the depth of protection and 
that significantly more of them could distinguish between abstract and specific 
administrative acts. However, if they had internalised the Law and responded 
accordingly, there should not be as much as a 13.3 per cent difference in agreeing 
with the five aspects of illegality as sufficient grounds for litigation. Also, there 
should not be as many as 31.6 per cent of them not agreeing with an illegal specific 
administrative act as liable to litigation and as many as 47.4 per cent agreeing with 
unreasonable abstract administrative act as sufficient. It suggests that the officials' 
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answers to a certain extent reflect their intrinsic response and personal conception 
about the scope of review, not just a simple repetition of the official standpoint. On 
the other hand, it appears that the officials' awareness of due process is relatively 
weaker than their recognition of the need for proper execution of authority. It also 
suggests that restricting the present administrative litigation to specific 
administrative acts is against the will of not just over half of the interviewed 
proprietors but also nearly half ofthe sampled officials. 
From the above findings, it is obvious that the officials' jurisdictional ideas 
about the width and depth of review are very different. They overwhelmingly agree 
that administrative litigation is to review the legality of administrative acts but they 
are not as sure about where should administrative litigation apply. Much less of them 
are prepared to accept litigation against illegal specific administrative acts and even 
less in respect of unreasonable abstract administrative acts. As a whole, 78.2 per 
cent of the officials agreed with the seven listed circumstances as sufficient grounds 
for litigation whereas only 10.4 per cent held the opposite view (see Table 4.9 
below). These compare favourably to that of the proprietors' 64.5 per cent and 19.8 
per cent, respectively. However, the jurisdictional orientation of the officials should 
not be taken as significantly stronger and much more affinnative than that of the 
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proprietors on the base of these numerical calculations. If not matched by an equally 
wide conception about the width of review, only an overwhelming affirmative idea 
on the depth of review is not sufficient to form an ultimate open and broad 
jurisdictional orientation towards administrative litigation. 
Table 4.9 Overall Jurisdictional Orientation Scores of the Officials 
A N D ? 
tq 83 1 95 111 26 
---- -
------ - -- -- -- - - - --- -- -------
Overall Jurisdictional Orientation aq 118.7 13.6 15.9 3.7 
- - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - -- - ------ -------
% 7S.2 8.9 lOA 2.5 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don ' t know; 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship ofthe Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation 
A perfect correlation in the officials' answers to all seven jurisdictional 
orientation questions was also found as in the case of the proprietors but the overall 
level of correlation was not as high, with Spearn1an' s rho correlation coe ffi cients 
only between 0.33 and 0.76, obviously lower than the proprietors' 0.54 and 0.77 
(compare Table 4.10 below and Table 4.3 above). Like the proprietors, the same 
pattern of three sets of more closely related answers was found for the officials. The 
sampled rulers' answers to the first two questions about misuse of power were 
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closely related with a rho coefficient of 0.72. Their answers to the next three 
questions about the other three aspects ofiJIegality had a similar correlation with rho 
coefficients between 0.60 and 0.76. Their answers to the last two questions about the 
width of review were also correlated by rho coefficient of 0.65. Again, correlations 
among answers to the first five questions on the depth of protection (rho 0.53-0.76) 
were higher than their correlations as a whole with answers to the last two questions 
on the width of protection (rho 0.33-0.60). 
Table 4.10 Speannan's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation 
Q 12 13 14 I 15 16 17 I 18 
! iii 14 .56 ! .64 ! .76 i .69 .38 i .52 
............ ......... ···· .. ····· .... .. .. ··+ .. .. ···· .. · .. · .. ··· .... ··· .. · .. · .. · .. ··· .. ·1 ........ ·""'"'''''''1'''''''''''''''''''' ' '' .. .. •·· .. · .. · .. · .... ··t .. ··· .... · ...... ··· .. · 
- ~~- - ~: + ~:::: 1 6o-I-~? -- :: -I- :: -
17 .33 1 .43 .38 I .42 I .40 I .65 
...................... "·"""""""""+·" """"·"··"·""""""""""""i""""·"·,,,,,,"· .. i .. "" ...................................... -!" .................. .. 
18 .59 I .60 .52 ! .56 i .55 .65 ! 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.56. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
When compared with the results in other orientations, the intemal relationship 
of the officials' jurisdictional orientation answers was only the second highest, next 
to evaluational orientation, and was lower than that of the proprietors. The average 
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internal correlation coefficient was 0.56. Because of the specific focus in the 
jurisdictional orientation questions, i.e. scope of review or protection for 
administrative litigation, the nature of the questions is much more alike, hence a 
close relationship among the answers to the questions can be expected. However, the 
internal consistency of the officials' jurisdictional orientation answers was not as 
high as that of the proprietors because the officials had a very different jurisdictional 
idea between the width and depth of review under administrative litigation. 
3. External Relationship of the Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation 
Unlike the proprietors, the officials' jurisdictional orientation did not have a 
very strong external relationship with their other orientations. Besides a strong 
relationship with their evaluational orientation, their jurisdictional orientation was 
only fairly strongly related with their expectational orientation. Other than that, there 
was no significant relationship with the other three cognitive, affective and appraisal 
orientations (see Table 4.11 below). 
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Table 4.11 External Relationship of the Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Small 
Affective Small 
Evaluational Very Strong 
Appraisal Small 
Expectational Fairly Strong 
The officials' answers to six of the seven jurisdictional orientation questions 
had perfect positive correlation with their answers to all six evaluational orientation 
questions, with Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between 0.16-0.50, which 
were significantly higher than the proprietors' 0.08-0.20 (see Table 4.12 below). The 
exception was jurisdictional orientation question 17 about unreasonable abstract 
administrative acts as a cause for litigation. The strong relationship between the two 
orientations suggests that those officials who agree with those listed circumstances, 
except abstract administrative act, as sufficient grounds for litigation by the citizens, 
will also tend to believe in the potential benefits that the institution of litigation can 
bring, especially in reducing the abuse of power by government officials and 
promoting the idea of rule of law in the society. 
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Table 4.12 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Officials' 
Jurisdictional Orientation 
Cognitive Affective Evaluational Appraisal Expectationul 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orienta tion 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
12 34 31 20 17 39 33 40 43 28 29 24 29 33 37 26 
13 31 25 17 35 37 43 50 29 32 18 23 28 33 32 
14 50 27 17 28 30 37 41 24 30 20 19 17 20 24 21 26 
15 37 25 36 32 37 37 27 38 17 17 34 31 3J 17 22 
16 30 33 33 20 16 25 23 37 28 30 21 16 21 21 18 19 
17 32 33 16 17 19 18 
18 30 31 18 27 26 29 31 39 29 29 16 18 24 27 29 23 
Phi correlation for Q 1-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05 , 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Based on a particular jurisdictional idea about the scope of undertaking for 
administrative litigation, the benefits of the latter can then be estimated and so as its 
prospects. The officials' jurisdictional and expectational orientations towards 
administrative litigation had indeed a fairly strong relationship, with Spearman's rho 
correlation coefficients from 0.17 to 0.37, which are slightly higher than the 
proprietors' 0.14-0.27 (see Table 4.12 above). Same as for the proprietors, an 
affirmed jurisdictional idea about the scope of review (protection) for administrative 
litigation is associated with a strong wish in support of the latter's development in 
the administrative litigation culture of the officials, especially when taking into 
account the benefits that the institution will bring. The only exception was answers 
to expectational orientation question 39 about judicial independence as a condition 
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for developing administrative litigation, which did not have a strong relationship 
with the jurisdictional orientation answers of the officials. It seems that even when 
the officials are ready to accept a large scope of review for administrative litigation, 
they may not be equally ready to accept judicial independence as tied with the 
development of administrative litigation. 
4. Jurisdictional Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Officials 
The jurisdictional orientation of specific officials' sub-groups according to their 
personal particulars is analysed by means of cross-tabulation and the results are 
summarised in Table 4.13 below. 
Table 4.13 Relationship between the Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Insigni ficant Department 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Slightly Significant Gender 1ncome 
.------------------------- ---------------------- - ---
Age 
Political Status 
Significant Working Years 
Working District 
Education Level 
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Sub-Group with Insignificant Relationship 
There were six major departments where over 90 per cent of the interviewed 
officials came from, but this factor alone did not manifest a significant relationship 
with the officials' jurisdictional orientation. The Cramer's V correlation analysis 
also revealed that there was no significant relationship between the two (see Table 
4.14 below). 
Table 4.14 Correlation Coefficients for the Officials' Jurisdictional Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q) 
00 
< 
.18 
.24 .25 
o 
8 
8 
.9 
Phi for gender, Speannan's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, department & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
As in the cases of cognitive and affective orientations, the gender of officials 
once agam was found to have only a slightly significant relationship with their 
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jurisdictional orientation. While male officials had the highest percentage who 
agreed with five of the seven listed circumstances as legitimate grounds for litigation, 
female officials had the highest percentage who disagreed with all seven. While 
male officials gave more neutral answers, female officials admitted more 'don't 
know' answers. This suggested that female officials had more reservations and 
objecting views in their jurisdictional orientation whereas male officials had 
relatively more affirmative jurisdictional orientation towards administrative 
litigation. 
Cross-tabulation of the officials' income with their jurisdictional orientation 
showed a random distribution of scores but a slight difference was still discernible 
among the various income sub-groups. Taken as a whole, more officials of the 
lowest income sub-group of RMB301-600 regarded the listed circumstances as 
legitimate causes for litigation. On the contrary, more officials of the highest income 
sub-group of RMB 1 00 1-1500 disputed their legitimacy. The intermediate sub-group 
did not show a strong tendency. It can be roughly concluded that income of the 
officials has a slightly significant relationship with their jurisdictional orientation, 
which is negative in the sense that higher income tends to associate with a less 
positive jurisdictional orientation. 
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Sub-Groups with Significant Correlation 
The youngest sub-group of officials between the age of 18-30 was relatively 
less mature in their jurisdictional orientation. They were the sub-group most 
concerned with misuse of power, but least insistent on correct application of law and 
sufficient evidence. The next older sub-group of 31-40 was jurisdictionally most 
receptive of administrative litigation. When compared with their juniors, they were 
more concerned with due process and enough evidence, while not much less with 
misuse of power. They were also most ready to accept litigation based on both 
abstract and specific administrative acts. On the other hand, the eldest sub-group of 
41-50 was most resistant to administrative litigation. They had the highest 
percentage who disagreed with all the five aspects of illegality and the two types of 
administrative acts as sufficient grounds for litigation. Taken together, age as a 
variable in the officials' jurisdictional orientation seems to have repeated the same 
characteristic as in the case of cognitive and affective orientations. Younger officers 
have more similar scores and difference becomes more tangible after the age of 40. 
Once beyond 40, officials tend to have more reservations about and resistance to 
administrative litigation. Their jurisdictional orientation becomes less affirmative 
despite the endorsing provisions in the Law. The Spearman's rho correlation 
analysis identified significant relationship between the officials' age and their 
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answers to jurisdictional orientation question 18 about illegal specific administrative 
acts, but the coefficient was not very high, only 0.18 (see Table 4.14 above). 
All officials, with or without party membership, overwhelmingly conceived 
that citizens should be allowed to sue the government if the latter misused its power. 
However, party membership did associate with an observable difference in the 
officials' jurisdictional idea in respect of the other causes for litigation. Officials 
with affiliation to the Communist Party or Communist Youth League conceded less 
to administrative litigation, with a significantly higher percentage who rejected the 
other causes for litigation when compared with officials without political affiliation. 
The latter concurred more with the institution, with a significantly higher percentage 
ready to support the citizens' right to go to court in those causes besides misuse of 
power as well as in respect of abstract administrative acts. As such, political 
affiliation seems to have a negative relationship with the officials' jurisdictional 
orientation towards administrative litigation. However, the Cramer's V correlation 
analysis did not have much significant findings except one for this personal 
particulars (see Table 4.14 above). 
As in the case of affective orientation, working years is found to have a zigzag 
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relationship with the officials' jurisdictional orientation. But the overall trend is that 
their jurisdictional orientation gradually changes in a positive direction over their 
years of work. For those new recruits with less than one year in the job, they were 
most defensive and out of tune with the official line. They had the highest 
percentage who objected to all five aspects of illegality as qualifying the citizens to 
sue the government but agreeing with litigation against unreasonable policy. For 
those with longer service, they became less defensive and defiant, with significantly 
more neutral answers in all jurisdictional orientation questions. For those reaching 7-
10 years of service, they had the highest overall support for the institution, though 
not necessarily for the Law. They had the highest percentage who agreed with all 
five aspects of illegality as causes for litigation, mostly without opposing view, and 
many of them also approved litigation based on the two types of abstract and 
specific administrative acts. Those with over ten years in the job appeared to have 
fewer agreeing jurisdictional answers than those next junior to them, but the 
difference was not very significant. 
Working district as a personal particular correlated quite consistently with the 
officials' jurisdictional orientation and officials of different district had quite 
different jurisdictional orientation. Hai Dian district officials tended to have a higher 
220 
percentage of neutral answers especially in respect of the width of judicial review, 
Xi Cheng district officials tended to have a higher percentage of objection to the 
circumstances as grounds for litigation, whereas officials of Xuan Wu district tended 
to have a higher percentage of approval. Age and working years might be important 
intervening factors here because Hai Dian officials tended to be younger in their age 
and service whereas Xuan Wu district officials tended to be older in both. The 
Cramer's V correlation analysis turned out no significant findings except one for this 
personal particulars (see Table 4.14 above). 
Education level as the last personal particular was found to have a positive 
relationship with jurisdictional orientation of the officials. Officials with a lower 
level of education tended to have a higher level of disagreement with the proposed 
scope of judicial review, whereas those with a higher level of education tended to 
have a higher level of assent. That relationship was not particularly strong but still 
obvious. However, the Spearman's rho correlation analysis produced no significant 
findings (see Table 4.14 above). 
In summary, departmental difference was not detected in the officials' 
jurisdictional orientation towards administrative litigation but five other personal 
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particulars were found to have a significant relationship with the level and pattern of 
their jurisdictional orientation. In simple terms, officials who were between 31-40 
years of age and 7-10 years of service, had no political affiliation, but had higher 
level of education, were more likely to endorse the listed circumstances as sufficient 
grounds for administrative litigation and hence, present a wider and stronger 
jurisdictional orientation than their colleagues. 
E. Summary 
Jurisdictional orientation, not included in previous political culture studies, is 
specifically added in this study of administrative litigation culture in the PRe and is 
used here to refer to the ruled's opinion about the scope of protection and the rulers' 
opinion about the scope of review for administrative litigation. When the scope of 
protection and review, or jurisdiction, of the PRe's administrative litigation is 
examined based on relevant provisions of the PRe's Administrative Litigation Law, 
it is obvious that the two are highly restricted. The width of protection and review, 
stated in Article 11 of the Law, is confined to cases where the personal and property 
rights of the legally recognised citizens, legal persons and other organisations are 
infringed by specific administrative acts of administrative agents. The depth of 
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protection and review, found in Article 54 of the Law, tenninates at correcting illegal 
specific administrative acts in tenns of insufficient principal evidence, incorrect 
application of law, violating legal procedure, ultra vires, and abuse of power, plus 
modifying clearly unjust administrative penalties. Such width and depth are 
certainly wider and more in-depth than during the earlier period when administrative 
litigation was conducted under the 1982 Civil Procedure Law. However, they are 
certainly not enough for establishing a full-fledged administrative litigation for the 
country and are found not sufficient in certain respects according to the opinions of 
the interviewed members of the ruled and rulers, not to mention the criticisms by 
many mainland judicial officials and law experts. 
Interviewed members of the ruled fall into two opposing groups with divergent 
opinions. The majority group of more than 60 per cent shows a positive 
jurisdictional orientation, agreeing with the five listed aspects of illegality and both 
types of abstract and specific administrative acts as legitimate causes for litigation. 
In particular, they protested most strongly against inappropriate use of power by 
government officials but they would like to have all kinds of illegal administrative 
acts, whether abstract or specific, to be corrected by administrative litigation. 
Precluding abstract administrative acts from the existing scope of protection is 
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obviously against the will of this majority group. On the other hand, there is a 
minority group of around 20 per cent who holds a negative jurisdictional orientation, 
disagreeing with the seven suggested items as good grounds for litigation. This 
seems to confirm the observation that the idea of rule of law is still not yet prevalent 
in the mainland, especially among the ruled. Quite a lot of the latter would not just 
tend not to use legal action as an alternative for resolving disputes but even reject 
the idea of doing so. 
Jurisdictional idea of the interviewed members of the rulers is more affinnative 
than that of their ruled counterparts in terms of what constitutes illegal 
administrative acts but less so in what constitutes the width of review for 
administrative litigation. Despite the fact that lack of due process is of less common 
concern than inappropriate use of power, still around 80 to 90 per cent of them have 
no objection to the statement that the five listed aspects of illegality are wrong and 
should be grounds for the ruled to sue the rulers. However, significantly more of 
them distinguish between abstract and specific administrative acts, not conceding 
the former for review by administrative litigation. To a certain extent, their 
responses reflect their acceptance of the scope of review under the present PRe's 
administrative litigation but certain personal opinions away from the official 
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standpoint are also found. In particular, nearly half of them agree with the sampled 
ruled that abstract administrative acts should also be subject to judicial review. 
A perfect internal relationship is found in the jurisdictional orientation answers 
of both the ruled and rulers samples, indicating a high level of internal consistency 
in their jurisdictional ideas especially for the ruled sample. As for the latter, their 
jurisdictional orientation also has the highest level of external relationship in their 
overall administrative litigation culture, having a very strong association with their 
other evaluational, appraisal, and expectational orientations. It is obvious that 
members of the ruled not only possess a clear and coherent idea about what should 
or should not be the scope of protection for administrative litigation, but such an 
idea also forms an integral part of their overall administrative litigation culture. 
affecting or being affected by their evaluation, appraisal and expectation of the 
institution. As for the rulers sample, their jurisdictional orientation is not just less 
consistent than that of their ruled counterparts, but is also much less related with 
their other orientations, suggesting that it is more independent in their overall 
administrative litigation culture. 
Finally, jurisdictional orientation is quite significantly related to the personal 
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background of both the ruled and rulers. Older and more experienced members of 
the ruled who are more mature or have more interaction with officialdom, have local 
residency, serve in the repairing business, work in Xuan Wu district, or have more 
educated are likely to have more positive and stronger jurisdictional ideas. On the 
other hand, members of the rulers who have been in the job for a sufficient but not 
too long period of time, with 31-40 years of age, 7-10 years of service, without 
political obligation, but higher level of education, and particularly those working in 
Xuan Wu district and belonging to the male gender, are likely to have more positive 
and more affirmative jurisdictional ideas. In retrospect, jurisdictional orientation of 
both the ruled an rulers seems to vary more with their individual background, e.g. 
age and experience with officialdom, than with their affective bearing towards 
administrative litigation like support for and caring about the institution. 
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Chapter 5 Evaluational Orientation and Consequences 
of Administrative Litigation in the PRC 
In the last three chapters, we have reviewed the top-down establishment, 
problematic implementation and confined jurisdiction of the PRe's administrative 
litigation, related articles of the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law, as well as the 
cognitive, affective, and jurisdictional orientations of the ruled and rulers samples, 
respectively. We shall now tum to examine the consequences of the PRe's 
administrative litigation and the evaluational orientation of the ruled and rulers 
samples in this chapter. Four related chapters of the Law will also be diagnosed to 
reveal how their rigid stipulations, among others, affect the latitude and gravity for 
the accomplishment of those consequences. 
A. Consequences of Administrative Litigation in the PRC 
Unlike the earlier discussed issues of setting-up, implementation and scope of 
jurisdiction, the consequences of administrative litigation in the PRe are much less 
seriously disputed but more commonly acclaimed by most· p~id ... ~~cluding the 
" . 
. ~ 
ruled and rulers. But that does not mean that the consequenc~s of adqtinistrative 
~ . ~ 
~ ; ~ 
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litigation are distinct and not related with the latter's setting-up, implementation and 
scope of jurisdiction. Top-down establishment of the institution has cushioned many 
of its potential constraints on the rulers. Problematic implementation has deprived 
many of its potential relief for the ruled. Confined scope of jurisdiction has 
undermined the accomplishment of the full range of potential consequences of 
administrative litigation in the mainland. These suggest once again that the PRC's 
administrative litigation is not doing its best, but what it has been doing so far is 
mostly positive and applauded. 
The consequences of the PRe's administrative litigation are readily observable, 
however restricted, not only in respect of the ruled and rulers in particular, but also in 
the wider context of the society and country at large.! In fact, this diverse range of 
consequences has been restated many times in different ways by the Chinese 
authority to justify its effort in establishing the institution, to trumpet the 
successfulness in improving its legal establishment and governance, and to recapture 
the legitimacy to continue its rule. For others, like the mainland scholars or 
individual members of the ruled, those consequences are equally affirmed but usually 
to demand further improvement of the implementation of administrative litigation 
and expanding the latter's scope of protection. 
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To members of the ruled, the most direct and immediate consequence of 
administrative litigation is the protection of their lawful rights and interests.2 Despite 
a not very high success rate of around 20 per cent winning in litigation for members 
of the ruled, there were an accumulated 60,809 first hearing administrative cases 
over the past eight years of implementation from 1990 to 1997 where members of the 
ruled had their personal and property rights and interests protected against illegal 
infringement by administrative agents (see Table 3.5). A specific example quoted by 
a judicial official of the Supreme People's Administrative Litigation Court reported 
that over four thousand peasant households were relieved of RMB 667.8 millions of 
financial burden through 211 administrative cases in Sichuan province alone in 
1993.3 The benefit of administrative litigation for individual members of the ruled 
may not be very great but that for their aggregate is obviously substantial. 
In respect of the rulers, administrative litigation has direct and indirect 
consequences. Direct consequences refer to the immediate effects of administrative 
litigation during its process, i.e. correcting the rulers' illegal administrative acts and 
confirming those lawful ones. This is straightforward and needs no further 
elaboration. Indirect consequences refer to the preventive responses of the rulers to 
administrative litigation when they try to avoid being sued or losing in litigation. 
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Such indirect consequences are more subtle and less certain, but can be summed up 
mainly in four aspects. 
Firstly, administrative litigation pushes the rulers to abide by and rule according 
to the laws both in terms of following the stipulations of substantive laws and 
observing the requirements of procedural codes.4 Failing in either one may result in 
their administrative acts being challenged and defeated on the ground of illegality in 
litigations. This helps reduce the endemic problems of "not following the laws; not 
enforcing the laws", "rule according to administrative orders", and "rule by man" in 
the PRC's public administration.s 
Secondly, administrative litigation enhances the rulers' efficiency at work 
because their in-actions can be challenged under the Law (Article 11). With 
administrative litigation in place, the rulers will less likely delay, whether with 
purpose or by negligence, payment of pensions, issuance of permits and licenses, and 
performance of legal responsibility to protect personal and property rights of the 
citizens. This helps reduce the prevailing problems of red-type, slackness, corruption, 
and furthering private ends with public office among the Chinese administrative 
agents.6 
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Thirdly, administrative litigation helps improve the quality of the rulers' 
administration. To meet the challenge of administrative litigation, many individual 
members of the rulers have developed their own legal work teams to review and 
refine their respective administrative legislation work so as to consolidate the legal 
basis of their administration. Those work teams also serve to educate their 
operational colleagues on how to improve every day work so as to avoid unnecessary 
administrative disputes. On the other hand, the courts' verdicts and legal advice to 
concerned administrative agents during and after litigations also help the agents to 
improve their administrative legislation, law enforcement procedure and work 
system, thereby correcting weaknesses in their overall administration work. 7 
Fourthly, administrative litigation can also help strengthen the rulers' status. 
Administrative litigation is like a mirror and the kind of image projected, whether 
good or bad, depends on the object presented and not on the mirror. In many cases 
where the rulers had acted in accordance with the laws and regulations, and 
litigations were due to misunderstanding or misconception of the ruled, the results of 
litigations were the clarification of misunderstanding, affirmation of the lawful 
administrative acts, and strengthening of the rulers' governing status.8 From 1990 to 
1997, there were an accumulated 65,331 first hearing administrative cases where the 
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rulers' administrative acts were affirmed (see Table 3.5). This was indeed more than 
the number of cases where the rulers lost their cases to the ruled and probably their 
"face" as well. 
In terms of the society at large, administrative litigation helps promote social 
stability.9 Incidences of instability have occurred due to administrative disputes 
between the ruled and the rulers. Hundreds of peasants attacked local government 
offices because of the latter's excessive demands and collections. Large groups of 
urban dwellers surrounded the Lands Department in petition for local resettlement 
and more reasonable compensations on the eve of seeing their homes being pulled 
down. Thousands of deceived public debts holders flocked the streets demanding for 
return of their funds by responsible administrative agents. In the first five years of 
implementation, the PRe's administrative litigation had entertained and resolved 
nearly a thousand administrative cases involving multitudinous plaintiffs and group 
actions.lo In 1993, over 600 administrative cases concerning excessive demands and 
collections on rural peasants were heard in Hunan province alone. 1 1 Resolving these 
cases through an institutionalised procedure has helped resolve the conflicts between 
the ruled and rulers in an orderly manner, thereby avoided unnecessary violent 
confrontation as well as public demonstration in those circumstances, and in the end, 
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promoted social stability. 
For the country as a whole, administrative litigation has also contributed to the 
overall economic, constitutional, legal, and political development in the PRC, not by 
offering substantive guarantees but by providing procedural remedies. 12 
Economically, administrative litigation helps correct and normalise vast areas of 
activity involving the state, like taxation, price regulation, development of the 
financial market, control of foreign exchange, management of numerous industrial 
and commercial businesses, protection and exploitation of natural resources, major 
construction and investment projects. It also helps promote the growth of economic 
enterprises by protecting their operational autonomy. Taken together, administrative 
litigation has contributed to the progress of economic reform, transformation of the 
economic structure, development of a market economy, and promotion of a better 
investment environment in the country.13 
Constitutionally, administrative litigation further fulfills the promIse of the 
PRC's constitution in Article 41, which allows the citizens to complain against state 
organs for violation of the law and dereliction of duty. In the past, the citizens can 
only do so through petitioning to the People's Congresses or higher levels state 
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bureaus. Now, a third alternative through the judiciary is provided. Thus, 
implementation of the constitution is further strengthened. Legally, administrative 
litigation represents a major progress in the legal system of the mainland. It not only 
completes the procedural set-up of the Chinese legal system but also enhances the 
awareness about rule of law in the society and promotes the practice of rule of law in 
the country.14 Politically, administrative litigation is an exemplification of the 
principle of people's dictatorship in terms of enhancing the people's scrutiny of the 
administrative authorities. It is an illustration of socialist democracy in the sense of 
requiring the rulers to respect the lawful rights of the ruled. On a more practical level, 
it is a reform of the previous ruled-rulers relationship by shifting the balance of 
power more away from the rulers towards the ruled, and a change in the power 
relationship between the state judiciary and administration by strengthening the 
former's supervision of the latter. ls 
The above wide range of consequences in respect of the ruled, the rulers, the 
society, and the country, are not separated but often inter-related. In many cases, they 
can be accomplished simultaneously, e.g. protecting citizens' rights, improving 
government's administration, harmonising the two's relationship, and promoting the 
idea of rule of law. However, some of the consequences are more immediate and 
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short-term, e.g. lawful rights of the ruled are protected and illegal acts of the rulers 
are corrected on a case by case basis. Whereas some others are more continuous and 
long-term, e.g. the idea of rule of law needs to be cultivated through the accumulated 
effects of many individual cases over a long period of time. Even so, the above 
consequences may not be realised or properly realised if administrative litigations are 
poorly handled and the courts' decisions are not fully enforced. In the end, the extent 
to which those consequences are achieved varies among cases and depends on many 
factors like the latitude and gravity for their accomplishment set by the provisions of 
the PRe's Administrative Litigation Law. 
B. Fourth Diagnosis of the Administrative Litigation Law 
Provisions in the Law is one of the sources where we can explore why and how 
the consequences of administrative litigation are affected. For example, we have seen 
earlier that setting multiple purposes for administrative litigation has spread the 
latter's benefits over both the ruled and rulers (see first diagnosis). Requiring the 
rulers to prove the legality of their administrative acts has reduced the burden of 
administrative litigation on the ruled (see second diagnosis). But restricting the width 
and depth of protection under administrative litigation has limited the latter's benefits 
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to the ruled (see third diagnosis). Indeed, the consequences of administrative 
litigation are confined and biased not only by these provisions but also by others like 
the last four chapters, i.e. chapter eight to eleven, of the Law. They do so by 
stipulating how and what members of the ruled and rulers are to be affected in 
administrative litigation. The related articles are diagnosed in the following. 
Chapter eight of the Law, "Enforcement", stipulates in two articles how the 
courts' decisions are to be enforced on members of the ruled and rulers, but the 
provisions benefit and help the rulers more than the ruled. While both parties are 
required under the first article to perform the courts' judgments and rulings, the 
victorious rulers are given the power to compel enforcement on the beaten ruled by 
themselves in accordance with the law without having to go through the courts 
(Article 65). On the contrary, victorious members of the ruled are not given that 
power but must apply to the courts for enforcement action if the defeated rulers 
refuse to comply. In case of any such application, it must be made no later than three 
months of the judgment unless the ruled has good reason for delay. 16 
The above may be explained as in accordance with the different positions of the 
ruled and rulers in the control of compelling authorities but the second article is 
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obviously inserted into the Law to provide extra benefits to the rulers. According to 
the article, if members of the ruled fail to perform certain administrative acts and fail 
to bring proceedings against those acts within the stated period, the concerned 
administrative agents not only can compel enforcement of those acts by themselves 
in accordance with the law but also can apply to the courts for compulsory 
enforcement (Article 66). By comparing the amount of first hearing administrative 
cases closed by the courts with the volume of enforcement application from 
administrative agents enforced by the courts, the latter had increased from slightly 
more than the former in 1990 when administrative litigation became effective to 
around three-times of the former in 1997 (see Table 5.1 below). 
Table 5.1 First Hearing Administrative Cases and Applications for Enforcement by 
Administrative Authorities Handled by the People's Courts of PRC, 1990-1997 
First Hearing Administrative Case~ ~lications for Enf~rcel!!e!!i Ratio 
Received Closed b's Annual Received Enforced d's Annual d 
---- --- -~-.----
b (a) (b) Increase (c) (d) Increase 
----
----"--
Cases Cases % Cases Cases % 
1990 13006 12040 18052* 15125* 1.26 
1991 25667 25202 109.32 40863 37148 145.61 1.47 
1992 27125 27116 7.59 65156* 62308* 67.73 2.30 
1993 27911 27958 3.11 88971 88147 41.47 3.15 
1994 35083 34567 23.64 136795 135355 53.56 3.92 
1995 52596 51370 48.61 191258 188584 39.33 3.67 
1996 79966 79537 54.83 256897 252545 33.92 3.18 
1997 90557 88542 11.32 270133 264936 4.91 2.99 
Source: Quoted and calculated* from statistics in Law Yearbook of China and Annual Work Report 
of the PRC Supreme People's Courts, 1992-98 
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By virtue of the provision, the court has become more like an executive ann of 
the administration than being the guardian of citizens' rights and interests. In practice, 
the article is most commonly employed by the administration to solicit the courts' 
assistance in enforcing laws and regulations that have the greatest oppositions and 
difficulties in enforcement like the one-child policy.17 Strictly speaking, this article 
should not be included in the Law because it is outside the legal boundary of 
administrative litigation. But by extending the effect of the Law from enforcing the 
courts' rulings after litigation to enforcing the administration's decisions in the 
absence oflitigation, it gives the rulers additional benefits not available to the ruled. 
Chapter nine of the Law specifies in three articles the liability of the rulers to 
compensate for their infringement of the rights and interests of the ruled, but such 
liability is very much confined, whether in tenns of the concerned government 
departments or the responsible government officials. By rigid stipulations, 
compensations are only payable when actual damage are caused to members of the 
ruled by illegal specific administrative acts of the rulers with intent or by fault and 
the amount payable only covers the direct and occurred damage (Article 67). Under 
such specification, compensations will not be payable in any of the following cases: 
if infringed rights or interests are not legally recognised; if damage is not or has not 
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been caused; if damage is caused by abstract administrative acts or by exempted or 
legal specific administrative acts; or if damage is not caused with intent or by fault. 18 
Not to mention the difficulty with establishing the responsible officials' intent or 
fault, infringed citizens even cannot apply directly to the courts for compensations 
but are required by the same article to approach the concerned government 
departments first for disposition. Litigation is allowed only when the latter's 
disposition of the request is found unacceptable or there is a parallel request for 
adjudicating the legality of the concerned specific administrative act. Such provision 
is certainly not to maximise the protection of administrative litigation to the ruled but 
to minimise the liability of the rulers under administrative litigation. 
The above liability to compensate, in a very restricted extent, rests with the 
concerned government departments and not with the government officials 
responsible for perfonning the concerned administrative acts. Payments are made 
centrally through the respective finance departments, which will then reclaim the 
money from the concerned departments (Article 69). The responsible officials are 
liable to repay the departments part or all of the incurred compensations only if the 
officials have caused the damage with intent or gross negligence when perfonning 
the illegal specific administrative acts. In addition, the officials' liability is restricted 
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to cash payment and not other kind of punishment under the Law (Article 68). Such 
provision is quoted as an useful mechanism to achieve one of the consequences of 
administrative litigation, i.e. to improve the quality of administration work of 
government officials by requiring the latter to share the responsibility for their 
administrative acts. 19 However, the effectiveness of such a mechanism IS 
questionable because according to the Law, the responsible officials will not be 
punished for unintended or simple (as compared to gross) negligent acts, they are not 
required to bear the legal responsibilities for their intended or gross negligent acts, 
and in any case, their performance appraisal and career advancement may not be 
affected. 20 
Chapter ten of the Law contains four articles which stipulate that foreigners, 
stateless persons and foreign organisations pursuing litigation in the PRC are 
basically treated as the same as their local Chinese counterparts and hence are subject 
to the same restrictions, except with two peculiarities. In general, they are equally 
governed by the Law under the principle of territoriality, unless otherwise stated in 
the law, e.g. diplomatic exemption (Article 70). They have to follow the same rigid 
procedure, enjoy the same confined rights, and shoulder the same harsh obligations 
stipulated in the Law (Article 71). They have to employ local PRC's registered 
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lawyers and not foreign ones if they need representation (Article 73). They have to 
employ and pay for translation if they do not understand Chinese, because litigations 
will be conducted in Chinese. The first peculiarity is that they are subject to the 
principle of reciprocity in treatment, i.e. the same limitations or benefits that their 
home countries, if any, impose on Chinese citizens and organisations will be equally 
applied on them. The second peCUliarity is that they can claim the protection of those 
international treaties that are recognised or adhered to by the PRC (Article 72). 
Finally, the last chapter of the Law contains two supplementary provisions on 
how and when administrative litigation under the Law will become effective. 
According to the first article, complaining members of the ruled are required to pay 
the appropriate amounts of case acceptance fee before their cases can be accepted 
and their requests for relief processed. There are three categories of fee based on 
nature of the cases: RMB 5-30 for cases belonging to the category of public security, 
RMB 50-400 for cases on monopoly right, and RMB 30-100 (about 2.25-7.48 
pounds) for the others.21 If they win the cases, such fees can be reclaimed from the 
defeated rulers. In the end, the losing party or parties bear the litigation costs 
including the case acceptance fee, case document photocopying charges, evaluation 
and inspection fees, and compensations to witnesses, etc (Article 74). According to 
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the second article, the ruled can only seek redress under the Law on or after October 
1, 1990. As for specific details concerning the process of litigation where insufficient 
or no provision is given in the Law, e.g. calculation of some of the legally prescribed 
time period and delivery methods of legal documents, respective provisions in the 
PRC's Civil Procedure Law will apply.22 
To sum up, the last four chapters of the Law contain vivid examples of how the 
provisions of the Law can affect the latitude and gravity for the accomplishment of 
the consequences of administrative litigation. By clear specifications, the rulers' 
interests are fully protected, their liabilities are very much confined, whereas benefits 
to the ruled, whether Chinese or foreigners, are not particularly honoured. Indeed, the 
overall tendency of the stipulations in the Law is to reduce the adverse effects of 
administrative litigation on the rulers as far as possible while trying to provide relief 
to the ruled. 
c. Evaluational Orientation of the Surveyed Individual Household 
Proprietors 
In respect of the above discussed consequences, six questions were asked of the 
738 individual household proprietors to explore how they evaluate the consequences 
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of the PRe's administrative litigation and to identify the evaluational orientation of 
their administrative litigation culture (see Table 5.2 for the questions). The results are 
presented and discussed below in the same way as that for the previous three 
orientations. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Proprietors' EvaluationalOrientation 
The overwhelming majority of the proprietors concurred that establishing 
administrative litigation would bring positive consequences, especially for the 
society at large and individual citizens in particular. As many as 95.1 per cent of 
them agreed that setting up administrative litigation could help strengthen the 
protection of citizens' legal rights and interests and a comparable 94.4 per cent 
believed that the idea of rule of law in the society would be strengthened (see Table 
5.2 below). The proprietors were relatively less affirmative concerning the effects of 
administrative litigation on the government but still, 93.2 per cent of them perceived 
that with administrative litigation in place, the government would be pressurised to 
act according to the laws, 88.5 per cent thought that the cases of abusing authority by 
the government and its officials would be reduced, 82.7 per cent reckoned the 
government would operate more efficiently, and 71.8 per cent expected that the 
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government's status would be strengthened. 
Table 5.2 Responses of the Proprietors to the Six Evaluational Orientation Questions 
A 
19 Strengthen the protection of legal q 695 
- -------
rights and interests of citizens. % 95.1 
20 Push the government to work q 678 
- - ------
according to the laws. % 93.2 
21 Strengthen the idea of rule of law q 686 
--------
in the society. % 94.4 
22 Reduce the cases of abusing authority q 643 
-- --------
by government and its officials. % 
23 Increase the government' s efficiency q 
- -
at work. % 
24 Strengthen the government's status. q 
- -
% 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral ; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
88.5 
602 
---- --
82.7 
522 
------
71.8 
N D ? s.d. 
16 11 9 0.65 
- - --- - - --- ------
2.2 I.S 1.2 
29 12 9 0.66 
- - --- - - - -- ------
4.0 1.6 1.2 
28 7 6 0.61 
----- - - - --
------
3.9 0.9 0.8 
38 27 19 0.78 
----- --- -
--- - ---- -------. 
5.2 3.7 2.6 
63 21 42 0.75 
- - - -- - ---- - --- - -8.6 2.9 5.8 
80 78 47 0.98 
----- -----
------
11.0 10.7 6.5 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don' t know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
As a redress institution, administrative litigation IS largely remedial and 
correctional by nature. Its immediate effects centre on correcting administrative 
impropriety and protecting citizens' rights and interests. Other consequences 
suggested in the questions are certainly possible and related but would be more 
indirect and may involve other intervening factors. The above results seem to reflect 
on one hand such a de Jacto difference among the various consequences and on the 
other hand a ruled-oriented perspective in the proprietors' evaluational orientation. 
They were most prepared to speak for themselves and in a broader sense, for the 
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society that they made up. When asked to comment on the institution's impact on the 
government, they became more disagreeing and uncertain. The reason might be that 
they were not in the position to judge or might as well be the inherent limitation of 
administrative litigation just mentioned. As a correctional measure, the institution at 
most can only restrict the rulers to abide by the laws, hopefully with less misuse of 
power, but by itself may not be enough to tum them into good Samaritans. It is 
reasonable to find lower levels of concurrence among the proprietors on the less 
certain positive effects of administrative litigation on the rulers. 
As a whole, the evaluational orientations of the proprietors were very much 
alike, with a very low standard deviations of 0.61 to 0.98 and their overall evaluation 
of administrative litigation was very positive and certain, with an average of 87.6 per 
cent endorsing the consequences and only 3.6 per cent holding the opposite view (see 
Table 5.3 below). 
Table 5.3 Overall Evaluational Orientation Scores of the Proprietors 
Overall Evaluational Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don't know; 
A 
tq 3826 
- - --- -------
aq 637.7 
- - - - - -------
% 87.6 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
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N D ? 
254 156 132 
------- ------- -------
42 .3 26.0 22.0 
------- ------- -------
5.8 3.6 3.0 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Proprietors ' Evaluational Orientation 
According to the results of Spearman's rho correlation analysis, the proprietors' 
evaluational orientation was the second one to have a perfect internal correlation 
with answers to the six evaluational orientation questions all mutually correlated. 
This indicated that the proprietors had a highly consistent and cohesive evaluational 
orientation in their administrative litigation culture. However, the overall level of 
correlation was not as high in this orientation as in the jurisdictional orientation, 
average evaluational orientation rho coefficient was 0.60 whereas average 
jurisdictional orientation rho coefficient was 0.63 (see Table 5.4 below). 
Table 5.4 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Proprietors' Evaluational Orientation 
Q 19 20 21 22 23 24 
19 : .77 .68 .63 .52 .35 
·········20···· .. ·· ........ ~7·7·· ...... t ..·  ................ ·· .. r···· ..  ·7·6····· .. ·I .. ··· .. ··:7·i·· .. · .... r·····:·63' .. ······,· .. ······:4·2········ 
21 .72 .49 
22 .63 .71 .68 .47 
23 .52 .63 .66 .57 
24 .35 .42 .49 .47 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.60. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
In addition, the correlation coefficients decreased consecutively from the first to 
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the last evaluational orientation question, reflecting the decreasing confidence of the 
proprietors towards consequences listed further down the list. Answers to the first 
two questions about strengthening protection of citizens' rights and pressurising the 
government to follow the laws had the highest rho correlation coefficients of 0.77 
whereas answers to the last question on strengthening the government's status had 
the lowest rho correlation coefficients of 0.35 with answers to the first question. 
3. External Relationship of the Proprietors' EvaluationalOrientation 
As discussed in the last three chapters, the evaluational orientation of the 
proprietors was slightly correlated with their cognitive orientation, affective 
orientation, and very strongly with their jurisdictional orientation. On the other hand, 
little correlation was found with their appraisal orientation, but a perfect relationship 
was found with their expectational orientation (see Table 5.5 below). 
Table 5.5 External Relationship of the Proprietors' Evaluational Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Slight 
Affective Slight 
Jurisdictional Very strong 
Appraisal Small 
Expectational Perfect 
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To reiterate, the proprietors' evaluational orientation answers were significantly 
related with their answers to cognitive orientation questions 4 and 5, and affective 
orientation questions 8 and 10 (see Table 5.6 below). Knowledge about the Law, 
support for establishing administrative litigation and care about the latters' 
implementation could all be relevant to and a basis for the proprietors to develop a 
clearer and more affinnative evaluation of the institution. However, the overall 
evaluational orientation of the proprietors did not correlate with all or most of their 
cognitive and affective orientations answers, thereby restricting their overall 
relationship. 
Table 5.6 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Proprietors' 
Evaluational Orientation 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
19 15 13 14 10 13 11 17 11 09 15 08 42 40 38 08 23 
20 15 13 08 \0 15 12 09 14 08 40 41 38 II 29 
21 19 16 08 11 10 13 13 17 13 II 08 10 43 41 42 16 29 
22 17 10 08 12 13 12 16 10 14 16 10 40 39 37 14 24 
23 14 16 08 08 12 09 10 10 13 08 08 08 39 36 39 19 24 
24 IS 09 16 20 19 18 14 13 10 10 08 17 10 13 33 29 37 27 27 
Phi correlation for Ql-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
The proprietors' evaluational and jurisdictional orientations towards 
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administrative litigation were very strongly correlated. Although the level of 
correlation was not very strong, with rho coefficients from only 0.08 to 0.20, 
statistically significant correlations were found between answers to most questions of 
the two orientations (see Table 5.6 above). In particular, answers to three evaluational 
orientation questions were entirely correlated with answers to all seven jurisdictional 
orientation questions and the other three with at least five. The proprietors' judgment 
on the effects of administrative litigation was found to be tied with their 
jurisdictional idea about the scope of protection for the institution. 
Little correlation was found between the proprietors' answers to the 
evaluational and appraisal orientations questions, except for appraisal orientation 
question 30. It appears that their evaluation of the institution's effect is not very 
much related with their assessment of the institution's usefulness. 
Last but not the least, a perfect relationship was found between the proprietors' 
evaluational and expectational orientations with quite strong Spearman's rho 
correlation coefficients from 0.08 to 0.42. As mentioned in the last chapter, 
jurisdictional idea, evaluation and expectation in respect of the institution were 
related, probably in consequential order, and that relationship could be very strong or 
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at times reaching a perfect correlation. There seemed to be a sequence from 
conceived scope of jurisdiction, to projected resulting effects, and then to estimated 
likely prospects. Although there might be other factors as well affecting the 
proprietors' evaluation and then expectation, that consequential relationship should 
not be overlooked. An additional point to mention, answers to expectational 
orientation question 36 about the condition for further development rather than likely 
prospects of the institution was least correlated with the proprietors' evaluational 
orientation answers, with rho coefficients of only 0.08-0.27. 
4. Evaluational Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Proprietors 
Different personal particulars of the proprietors were found to have different 
level of relationship with the proprietors' evaluational orientation based on cross-
tabulation analysis (see Table 5.7 below, details of the extensive cross-tabulation 
results are not displayed due to space constraints). 
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Table 5.7 Relationship between the Proprietors' Evaluational Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Gender 
Insignificant Kind of Business Residency 
Working District 
--------------------------- ---------------------------
Age 
Slightly Significant Working Years 
Income 
--------------------------- ---------------------------
Significant Political Status Education Level 
Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
With very similar cross-tabulation findings, the four personal particulars of 
gender, kind of business, residency, and working district were all found to have little 
relationship with the proprietors' evaluational orientation towards administrative 
litigation. Different sub-groups under all four personal particulars tended to share the 
above-mentioned general level and pattern of evaluational orientation in very much 
the same way with no significant deviation. Percentage differences in answers of 
various sub-groups under the four personal particulars were very low, especially for 
the first three evaluational orientation questions (from less than one per cent to three 
per cent), and only became higher for the last question about strengthening 
government's status (6-13 per cent). Similarity in answers was highest under the 
personal particular of gender, followed by working district, then residency, and lastly 
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kind of business. The average percentage difference in agreemg and disagreeing 
answers together in all six evaluational orientation questions for the four personal 
particulars was 3.9 per cent, 5.1 per cent, 6.6 per cent and 7.3 per cent, respectively. 
Such cross-tabulation findings of little relationships were supported by the 
corresponding phi and Cramer' s V correlation analyses, where only the personal 
particular of working district had slightly significant correlation coefficients of 0.11 
to 0.13 (see Table 5.8 below). 
Table 5.8 
c; Q Q 0 
·il ·,:;:: Q 
«S S .!2 
;:l Q ti 
c; . ~ ~ &so 0' 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Correlation Coefficients for the Proprietors' Evaluational Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
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... 
Q) 
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Q) 
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Q) ~ ·S -0 
. iii 
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e 
o ] 
.11 
.09 .11 
.12 
.09 .11 
.10 .11 .15 .09 
.16 .17 .16 .13 .08 
Phi for gender & residency, Spearman's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, kind of business & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
By means of cross-tabulation, an overall direct and positive relationship was 
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discernible between the proprietors' age and evaluation of administrative litigation, 
especially in respect of the last two evaluational orientation questions on positive 
effects of the institution on the government. However, that relationship was not very 
strong. As a whole, proprietors of higher age were more likely to evaluate the 
institution more favourably. This was particularly true for the age sub-group of over 
60, which had the highest percentage of affirmative answers in all evaluational 
orientation questions and in fact 100 per cent in four. Older proprietors also had 
greater confidence in the institution's positive effects on the government than 
younger ones. Correlation analysis by Spearman's rho showed slightly significant 
association between age and answers to the last two evaluational orientation 
questions with rho coefficients of -0.10 and -0.16 (see Table 5.8 above). 
By the same token, working years, a personal particular closely tied with age, 
was also found to have a slightly significant relationship with the proprietors' 
evaluational orientation towards administrative litigation, only that the relationship 
was less direct but more detectable. Spearman's rho correlation coefficients revealed 
a significant correlation of -0.09 to -0.17 between this personal particular and 
answers to all evaluational orientation questions except the first one (see Table 5.8 
above). Evaluational orientation towards administrative litigation generally became 
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more favourable for proprietors with more years in the job, but a small U-turn was 
observed for the sub-group with 7-10 working years in the first four evaluational 
orientation questions about the direct correctional effects of administrative litigation. 
That modest zigzag relationship was not found in the last two questions about the 
positive effects of the institution on the government. This was in line with the above 
discussion on age that older proprietors would more likely say yes to the last two 
evaluational orientation questions. 
The majority of the proprietors had income below RMB 1 ,000. Among this 
majority group of proprietors, their evaluational orientation tended to become more 
positive with more income. Those with the lowest income of below RMB301 had the 
least positive evaluation and most unknown answers. Evaluational orientation 
became more positive for the next sub-group ofRMB301-600, and further more for 
those ofRMB601-1,000. Those with income higher than RMB1,000 belonged to the 
minority whose limited sub-group size might contain the risk of scores being affected 
by special cases. Probably so, it was found that their evaluational orientation scores 
were more fluctuating, going down first for the next two income sub-groups of 
RMB1,001-1,500 and 1,501-2,500, then rebounding for those with RMB2,501-4,000 
to a level even higher than the majority sub-group, and finally retreated for the 
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highest income sub-group of over RMB4,OOO though still higher than the lowest 
income sub-group in most cases. To conclude, there was a basically positive 
relationship between income and evaluational orientation for the majority of 
proprietors but a parallel relationship was not obvious for those who could earn 
significantly higher income but were much smaller in number. The Spearman's rho 
correlation failed to identify a significant association (see Table 5.8 above). 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
Different political sub-groups were found to have their own distinct evaluational 
orientation not like the others. For those with Communist Party membership, they 
had the most certain and consistent response plus the most favourable evaluational 
orientation. They had the highest percentage of affirmative answers in all 
evaluational orientation questions. Affiliation with the ruling political party seems to 
be associated with support and endorsement of the rulers' policy even among 
members of the ruled. On the contrary, proprietors belonging to the Communist 
Youth League were most uncertain in their response, with relatively more neutral and 
unknown answers, and least favourable in their evaluational orientation, as shown in 
their relatively higher percentage of opposing answers. Age may be an important 
intervening factor for this group since they tend to be much younger and younger 
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proprietors tend to have more opposing answers as mentioned above. Independent 
proprietors were more middle-of-the-road, with evaluational orientation scores 
mostly between the two extremes. Hence, the absence of affiliation with the ruling 
party does not necessarily mean more opposing view on the effects of administrative 
litigation, only perhaps more freedom in the holding of views. Democratic parties 
proprietors were not compared because there were not sufficient cases for 
comparison. 
A consistent zigzag relationship was found between the proprietors' education 
level and their evaluational orientation. Evaluational orientation scores started off 
fairly high with the first sub-group of primary education only. then went down a bit 
when moving onto the next sub-group with lower secondary education, but increased 
with each higher level thereafter from upper secondary to post-secondary until for 
the last sub-group of undergraduate and above where scores slid down to the lowest 
among all sub-groups. It seemed that those with little education would rather easily 
agree with the suggested effects of administrative litigation though they also had 
relatively higher percentage of unknown answers. At the opposite end, elite 
education seemed to produce a more skeptical mind among the respondents, leading 
them to have much more reservation about the impacts of the institution. Yet, if the 
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two extremes were taken away, a basically positive relationship could be found 
between education and evaluational orientation among the proprietors. Spearman's 
rho correlation analysis confirmed the significant association between education and 
answers to three of the six evaluational orientation questions with rho coefficients 
between -0.08 to -0.09 (see Table 5.8 above). 
In summary, given the overall level and pattern of evaluational orientation 
among the sampled ruled were very consistent and positive, especially for the first 
four evaluational orientation question on the correctional effects of administrative 
litigation, variation among their sub-groups according to their personal particulars 
was uncommon. In fact, gender difference was almost non-existent and the kind of 
business, residency and working district all possessed little bearing on their 
evaluational orientation though a distinct orientation pattern could still be found 
under each of these personal particulars. Seniority in terms of both age and working 
years did have a slightly positive relationship with the proprietors' evaluational 
orientation, so as increase in their monthly income. After all, political and 
educational background were the two personal particulars having a significant 
relationship with the sampled ruled's evaluational orientation towards administrative 
litigation. Yet, both were not simple direct linear relationships, but quite distinctive 
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and winding, confinning the weak effect of most personal particulars on the 
evaluational orientation pattern of the sampled ruled. 
D. Evaluational Orientation of the Surveyed Government Officials 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Officials' Evaluational Orientation 
Overall evaluational orientation scores of the officials about administrative 
litigation were comparable to those of the proprietors but with a quite different 
orientation pattern (see' Table 5.9 below). For the officials, the most commonly 
agreed consequence of administrative litigation was the collective effect of 
promoting the idea of rule of law in the society, which had the highest 96.6 per cent 
of affirmative answers. Next was in relation to their work - 96.0 per cent affirmed 
that administrative litigation could push the government to act according to the laws 
and 95.4 per cent said it could reduce abuse of power by the authority. Protecting 
citizens' rights was only their fourth consensus with 94.1 per cent agreeing it as one 
of the consequences. As for the two less immediate positive effects of administrative 
litigation on the government's operation efficiency and status, the officials were even 
less confident in the former than the proprietors, with only 75.6 per cent having that 
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faith while more or less the same as the proprietors regarding the latter, with the 
lowest 73.1 per cent of acquiescence. 
Table 5.9 Responses of the Officials to the Six Evaluational Orientation Questions 
19 Strengthen the protection of legal q 
- -
rights and interests of citizens. % 
20 Push the government to work q 
- -
according to the laws. % 
21 Strengthen the idea of rule of law q 
- -
in the society. % 
22 Reduce the cases of abusing authority q 
by government and its officials . % 
23 Increase the government's efficiency q 
--
at work. % 
24 Strengthen the government's status. q 
- -
% 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
143 
------
94.1 
146 
------
96.0 
147 
------
96.6 
145 
95.4 
115 
------
75.6 
111 
------
73.1 
N D ? s.d. 
4 3 2 0.67 
- - - -- - - - --
------
2.6 2.0 1.3 
5 1 0 0.61 
-- --- - - - --
------
3.3 0.7 0.0 
1 3 1 0.63 
- - - -- -----
------
0.7 2.0 0.7 
6 1 0 0.61 
3.9 0.7 0.0 
25 11 1 0 .89 
----- - - - --
------
16.5 7.2 0.7 
23 16 2 0.97 
- - --- -----
------
15.1 10.5 1.3 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
When comparing the officials' answers to the first four evaluational orientation 
questions on the direct consequences of administrative litigation with that of the 
proprietors, it was found that the officials projected a ruler-centred inclination as 
opposed to the proprietors' ruled-oriented perspective. For the officials, possible 
impact of administrative litigation on their work attracted more of their assent than 
the effect on protecting citizens' rights. Such a dichotomy might be due to the two 
parties' role difference and yet might as well reflect the difference in the way they 
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evaluate the institution. 
The average central tendency of the officials' responses in this orientation was 
as high as that of the proprietors, with standard deviations averaged at 0.73, ranging 
from as small as 0.61 to 0.97. Their overall evaluational orientation scores were also 
similar, 88.5 per cent endorsement compared to 3.8 per cent opposition (see Table 
5.10 below). 
Table 5.10 Overall Evaluationa1 Orientation Scores of the Officials 
Overall Evaluational Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don ' t know; 
A 
tq 807 
- - --- --------
aq 134.5 
- - - -- --------
% 88.S 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
N D ? 
64 35 6 
-------- -------- ---- ---
10.7 5.8 1.0 
-------- -------- - ------
7.0 3.8 0.7 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Officials' Evaluational Orientation 
A perfect correlation was also witnessed in the officials' evaluational 
orientation (see Table 5.11 below). Their answers to all six evaluational orientation 
questions proved to be mutually related. In addition, the level of internal correlation 
was very high, with Spearman's rho correlation coefficients from 0.48 to 0.88, which 
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were higher than that of the proprietors or the level of internal correlation found in 
the officials' jurisdictional orientation. 
Table 5.11 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Officials' Evaluational Orientation 
Q 19 20 21 22 23 24 
19 .85 .85 .67 ! .48 .52 
. . . i . 
........................ ········ .. ··············t············· .. · .. ··· .. ·t· .. · .. ··· .. · .. · .. · ...... ·j··· .... ·· ······· .. ··· .. ··t··· .... ··· .. ·············, ........................ . 
20 .85 i i .88 1 .77 i .53 1 .54 
~:~~I: : ~~t8~::t~: I:::~~~t: 5!~ 1~5i 
:: :!::~:; =I::I~ f :: t ~F!: ~ i::~~; : 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.66. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
The trend of diminishing correlation among answers from the first to the last 
evaluational orientation question reported by the proprietors was not found among 
the officials. But the latter did display a significantly stronger internal relationship 
among their answers to the first three questions, while as a group answers to the first 
three questions were least associated with answers to the last two questions 
concerning the institution's less direct effects on improving the government's 
efficiency and status. After all, the officials were found to have a highly consistent 
and cohesive evaluational orientation in their administrative litigation culture. 
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3. External Relationship of the Officials' Evaluational Orientation 
The external relationship of the officials' evaluational orientation was measured 
by correlation analysis and the results were summarised in Table 5.12 below. 
Table 5.12 External Relationship of the Officials' Evaluational Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Small 
Affective Fairly strong 
Jurisdictional Very strong 
Appraisal Small 
Expectational Perfect 
In quite a similar way, the officials' evaluational orientation was found to have 
no significant relationship with their cognitive and appraisal orientations. The 
officials' evaluational orientation answers were only occasionally related with their 
answers to cognitive orientation questions 2 and 5, as well as appraisal orientation 
questions 25, 30 and 32. The frequency and intensity of correlation were also not 
very high, with Spearman's rho correlation coefficients from 0.25 to 0.48 for 
relationship with cognitive orientation and 0.17 to 0.29 for relationship with 
appraisal orientation (see Table 5.13 below). In a nutshell, the officials' evaluational 
orientation towards administrative litigation appeared to be quite dissociated and 
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independent from their cognitive and appraisal orientations towards the same. 
Table 5.13 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Officials ' 
Evaluational Orientation 
Cognitive Affec tive Juri sdictional Appraisal Expectationa l 
O rientation Ori entation Ori entation Orientat ion Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
19 48 32 29 37 20 17 33 39 35 28 36 16 26 24 17 18 17 47 53 49 22 46 
20 36 22 17 30 33 37 30 32 25 29 24 17 17 45 51 42 29 47 
21 28 30 34 16 25 40 43 37 37 23 31 26 46 47 43 35 47 
22 25 33 35 17 16 17 43 50 41 37 37 17 39 29 17 32 38 39 29 38 
23 28 35 17 28 29 24 27 28 29 20 18 35 29 23 22 25 
24 29 25 23 20 20 29 32 30 38 30 19 29 25 35 27 22 22 26 
Phi correlation for QI-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance leve l at .05 , 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
On the other hand, their evaluational orientation responses were significantly 
correlated with their answers to four of the six affective orientation questions, with 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficients from -0.16 to -0.37. It suggested that those 
officials who accepted citizens using administrativ~ litigation for redress purposes, 
regarded the institution as suitable for China, supported its establishment, and cared 
about its implementation, were also likely to have a more positive evaluation of the 
institution's likely effects. The officials' affective bearing towards administrative 
litigation appeared to have a certain degree of significance to their evaluation of the 
institution. 
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How far the officials perceived the scope of jurisdiction for administrative 
litigation was found to be significantly related with how far they perceived the 
latter's effects. Their answers to six of the seven jurisdictional orientation questions, 
except question 17 concerning the abstract administrative act of unreasonable 
regulation, were perfectly correlated with their answers to all of the six evaluational 
orientation questions. The respective Spearman's rho correlation coefficients 
extended from 0.16 to 0.50. In view of the fact that jurisdictional orientation question 
17 was the least agreed by the officials, it could be confidently concluded that the 
officials' jurisdictional and evaluational orientations towards administrative litigation 
were very strongly related. In fact, as mentioned in chapter 4, when the officials 
agreed with the circumstances listed in the jurisdictional orientation questions as 
reasonable scope of judicial review, they would readily ascertain the likely effects of 
the institution on both the ruled and ruler. 
Achieving a level of perfection even stronger than that of the proprietors, the 
officials' answers to all six evaluational orientation questions were found to be 
entirely correlated with their responses to all five expectational orientation questions 
and the latter's Spearman's rho correlation coefficients were even higher, from 0.22 
to 0.53. Although the two parties were at the two ends of administrative litigation, 
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both seemed to have a total connection between their respective evaluation of and 
expectation for the institution, though their reasons might be different. The 
proprietors' faith in the institution might be simple wishful thinking of the ruled or 
genuine bona fides of the laymen. The officials' endorsement of the institution might 
also imply a clear vision of the rulers or sheer ritual of repeating the official 
statement. Anyway, a perfect connection between the respondents' evaluational and 
expectational orientations towards administrative litigation was statistically proven 
beyond doubt. 
4. Evaluational Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Officials 
Based on the results from cross-tabulation and correlation analysis, the officials' 
evaluational orientation is found to have very little relationship with their personal 
particulars. The results are summarised in Tables 5.14 and 5.15 below (details of the 
extensive cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space constraints). 
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Table 5.14 Relationship between the Officials' Evaluational Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Gender 
Age 
Political Status 
Insignificant Working Years 
Department 
Income 
Education Level 
Slightly Significant Working District 
Table 5.15 Correlation Coefficients for the Officials' Evaluational Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
~ d d 
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Phi for gender, Spearman's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, department & working district. 
Significance level at .05 , 2-tailed. 
Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
The evaluational orientation of the officials might be related with their other 
orientations but it was certainly not too well associated with their personal particulars. 
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Almost all of the personal particulars, except working district, were found to have 
little relationship with, not to mention impact on, the officials' evaluational 
orientation towards administrative litigation. 
The first three personal particulars of gender, age and political status, were 
basically umelated to the officials' evaluational orientation. Sub-groups under these 
three personal particulars responded very similarly, without major differences, and 
mainly along the average trend of the officials' overall evaluational orientation. The 
next two personal particulars of working years and department generated more 
varying answers among their sub-groups but the scores were mostly randomly 
distributed, meaning that a consistent pattern of relationship were improbable. The 
last two personal particulars of income and education level also showed no 
substantial connection with the officials' evaluational orientation because answers of 
the sub-groups under both personal particulars were similar, with evaluational 
orientation scores randomly distributed as well. 
Sub-Group with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Working district was the only personal particular found to have a slightly 
significant relationship with the officials' evaluational orientation. Cramer's V 
267 
correlation coefficients for this personal particular gave no significant findings but 
cross-tabulation showed that officials of Xuan Wu district were most confident in the 
immediate effects of the institution listed in the first four evaluational orientation 
questions whereas Xi Cheng officials were least so. As for the last two evaluational 
orientation questions about improving the government's efficiency and status, 
answers of Xi Cheng officials were contradictory, with the highest percentage of both 
agreeing and disagreeing whereas Hai Dian and Xuan Wu officials were relatively 
more neutral. Such a pattern of evaluational orientation was pretty consistent, 
suggesting a noticeable relationship between working district and evaluational 
orientation of the officials. As in the cases of cognitive and affective orientations, 
Xuan Wu district officials had higher evaluational orientation scores than their 
colleagues in Xi Cheng and Hai Dian districts, probably because of their being older 
in age and tie with the Communist Party or because of the specific ruled-rulers 
relationship in this traditional old district of the capital city. 
In summary, the cognitive, affective, and jurisdictional orientations of the 
officials all showed a certain degree of relationship with their personal particulars, 
like age, working years, working district, income, and education level. Evaluational 
orientation was the first orientation of the officials found to have no significant 
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relationship with those mentioned or other personal particulars. It suggested that the 
overall level and pattern of evaluational orientation found among the officials were 
commonly shared among the rulers sample and individual background of the 
respondents was not important. 
E. Summary 
The consequences of administrative litigation in the PRC, related articles in the 
Law, and the evaluational orientations of the ruled and rulers samples have been 
reported and discussed in this chapter. It is undeniable that the PRC's administrative 
litigation has brought many positive effects whether to the ruled and rulers in 
particular or to the society and country at large. However, it is equally obvious that 
those consequences are confined and biased by rigid stipulations in the Law. While 
administrative litigation is expected to provide relief to the ruled, the rulers are well 
protected against challenge of the institution since the early stage of designing and 
writing up the Law. 
In respect of the fourth research question, i.e. how the Chinese ruled and rulers 
evaluate the consequences of the PRC's administrative litigation, it is found that both 
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parties equally acclaim and agree with the consequences. However, they are clearly 
more concerned with those effects that have more direct relationship with their own 
interests. A perfect internal relationship is found in both samples' evaluational 
orientation, confirming the complementary nature of different consequences of 
administrative litigation and a highly consistent evaluational orientation in the two 
parties' administrative litigation culture. 
Besides, evaluational orientation is found not very significantly related with 
cognitive and affective orientations but very strongly with jurisdictional and 
expectational orientations in the administrative litigation culture of both sample 
groups. Conceived scope of jurisdiction, projected resulting consequences, and 
estimated future prospects for administrative litigation are believed to have a 
consequential relationship disrespect of the respondents' different status. 
In addition, the evaluational orientation of the sampled ruled is to some extent 
related with and possibly affected by their personal particulars like age, working 
years, income, political status and education level. On the contrary, the evaluational 
orientation of the sampled rulers is much less affected by their personal background. 
This suggests some other differences besides the above-mentioned self-interest 
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inclination behind the commonly positive and coherent evaluational orientation in 
both sample groups' administrative litigation culture. 
After all, it is not difficult for both the ruled and rulers samples to understand 
and agree with the potential effects of administrative litigation and hence, develop a 
highly positive evaluational orientation towards the institution in their respective 
administrative litigation culture. However, their highly affirmative evaluational 
orientation scores do not necessarily mean that the institution has been highly 
successful in achieving those effects. The reality may fall short of the ideal. That 
relates with the next research question of this paper, i.e. how useful the institution is, 
and the next administrative litigation orientation of the concerned parties, i.e. the 
appraisal orientation. 
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Chapter 6 Appraisal Orientation and the Usefulness of 
Administrative Litigation in the PRC 
Using administrative litigation to protect the lawful rights and interests of the 
ruled and to compel the rulers to rule according to the law will tum out to be no 
more than an empty promise if at the end of the day, administrative litigation is not 
used by members of the ruled. The preceding four chapters have shown that, to a 
varying extent, the surveyed ruled do realise the existence of administrative 
litigation as a redress channel, support its establishment in the mainland, endorse its 
scope of protection and review, as well as agree with its potential positive 
consequences. However, if they finally decide not to use it due to various reasons 
even when their rights are infringed by illegal administrative acts of the rulers, all 
the efforts and promises made when establishing administrative litigation will be in 
vain. That relates to the appraisal orientation of the ruled. This chapter focuses on 
reporting and discussing the appraisal orientation of the ruled and rulers samples. 
But firstly the usefulness of administrative litigation in the PRC and related 
provisions in the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law will be briefly discussed and 
diagnosed to provide the necessary contextual background. 
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A. Usefulness of Administrative Litigation in the PRe 
Appraisal orientation, as mentioned in the theoretical framework, refers to the 
comments of affected parties on the usefulness of administrative litigation. How 
useful do they find administrative litigation compared with other problem solving 
methods, how far do they trust the courts as an arbitrator in administrative litigation, 
and how difficult do they regard the use of administrative litigation are questions to 
be explored when measuring appraisal orientation. Members of the ruled may decide 
not to use administrative litigation even when there is a need if they believe there are 
other better alternatives, the courts cannot help, or administrative litigation is 
exceedingly difficult to use. Under such circumstances, the perceived usefulness as 
well as actual usage of administrative litigation will be very much undermined. 
In fact, administrative litigation is not and has not been the only channel or a 
long-accepted method to redress administrative disputes in the mainland. On the 
contrary, well before the setting up of administrative litigation, there have already 
been other established methods used by the ruled to resolve their disputes with the 
rulers. Petitioning to the higher level bureaus for administrative reconsideration and 
using personal connection or money are just some of the most common formal and 
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infonnal methods. 
Administrative reconsideration originates from the long-established system of 
writing to and visiting (xinfang 1tt:Q) party-state organs to provide war-time needed 
intelligence, present request of all kinds, and not the least, complain against 
illegality and irregularity of the authorities and their personnel. Xinfang emerged in 
the Jinggangshan period of 1920s and was later strengthened by Mao's mass line 
policy. It further expanded in the Yanan period of 1930s and was formally 
institutionalised after founding of the republic. Complaints against the authorities 
and their officials received through xinfang will be related to supervisory or 
appropriate administrative organs for internal reconsideration. Several pieces of the 
early republic's laws and regulations in the 1950s already carried provisions 
allowing the citizens to apply for administrative reconsideration. I During the period 
of rapid economic refonn in the 1980s, the number raised to over a hundred. After 
the establishment of the PRC's administrative litigation in 1989, the system of 
administrative reconsideration was also reconstructed by the administration, 
resulting in the promulgation of the Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration 
by the State Council on 24 December 1990. The boundary of administrative 
reconsideration was then expanded beyond individual laws and regulations to cover 
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all specific administrative acts similar to the earlier established administrative 
litigation. 
Administrative reconsideration resembles administrative litigation in many 
respects, differs in some others, but above all is designated by the laws to occupy a 
superior position above administrative litigation. As for their similarities, both 
institutions are designed to help settle administrative disputes between the ruled and 
rulers, alleviate tensions in the two's relationship, protect the ruled's rights, and 
regulate the rulers' acts. As for their differences, administrative reconsideration has 
the additional advantages of lower costs, quicker results, less procedures, fewer 
formalities, larger scope of review (including the reasonableness of administrative 
acts), and more powerful jurisdiction (ordering direct changes of administrative acts). 
Besides, administrative reconsideration is designated as a compulsory preceding step 
before taking administrative litigation according to many administrative rules and 
regulations and this is recognised in the PRe's Administrative Litigation Law. The 
administration is therefore given a vantage point to resolve many administrative 
disputes internally first, thereby eliminating the need to appear later in court as a 
defendant. 
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However, the major disadvantage with administrative reconsideration is the 
irremovable shade of favouritism and partiality. "Government officials protecting 
one another" (1" 1" f~ tl) has long been and is still a common deficiency with 
Chinese officialdom. In those circumstances, administrative reconsideration will 
only protect the rulers' interests rather than the interests of the ruled. Hence, it may 
not be the most preferred redress channel for the ruled. Though with similar 
objectives and functions, administrative reconsideration cannot replace 
administrative litigation but given its preceding position and other advantages, it is 
still a competitive alternative. 
The other two informal means of using personal connection (guanxi) and 
money to resolve administrative disputes in the Chinese context are very much 
related and similar, both in terms of their nature and popularity. According to White, 
both can be classified as corruption, only that the latter belongs to a class A 
corruption (palpably illegal and illegitimate) and is known as bribery, while the 
former belongs to a class C corruption (having highly ambiguous popular 
perceptions) and is a pervasive societal phenomenon in the Chinese community.2 
Using guanxi to get things done does not start with the PRC nor does it cater 
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for resolving ruled-rulers disputes only. The use of guanxi among Chinese can be 
traced back to the imperial years and can be distinguished in the achievement of 
political goals, the moderation of economic activities, the maintenance of social 
order, the fostering of community solidarity, and above all, the management of 
conflict. 3 When applied in the resolution of administrative disputes, guanxi can be 
sufficiently translated as personal connection. It does not need to be "a commonality 
of shared identification'''' or "personal bonds of acquaintanceship and mutual 
belonging,"S nor does it require the investment of ganqing (affective component) to 
building a close guanxi,6 though it may work better in those circumstances. For the 
resolution of disputes, as distinct from the building of solidarity, it suffices to have 
simply the connection, whether directly or indirectly, with the appropriate officials 
for the soliciting of favours to settle the disputes in question. One aphorism from the 
imperial past states the point: "All things become easy if you know someone in the 
government (or imperial court)" (fJJ tp 1if A:!tf1bf'). 
The use of guanxi is very much reinforced in the PRC as a natural consequence 
of a political system where rule by man prevails. A proactive approach is to develop 
a good connection with supervising officials directly, usually by offering favours 
first, whether in money or in kind. Those officials will then become friendly and feel 
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obliged to return favours when required. Guanxi then becomes a "defensive 
mechanism" as Christiansen and Rai name it. 7 The passive approach is to look for 
help when trouble has happened by finding someone who can solicit favours from 
those concerned officials. The former approach is preventive but costly. The latter is 
remedial and can be equally costly. Depending on the kind of disputes, there can be 
many types of favours to be asked of the rulers, e.g. performing or not performing 
some acts, exercising or not exercising certain powers, upholding or not upholding 
some decisions, and observing or not observing certain time limits. As a result, 
punishment can be reduced, inspection waived, license issued, troubles removed, 
needs fulfilled, and disputes settled. Although informal by nature and perhaps 
involving illegal practices, the use of guanxi can be very effective in practice, at 
least in the present cultural and political setting of the mainland. Hence, guanxi is a 
good substitute for administrative litigation. 
Using money, or giving bribes, is another alternative. Due to strong push and 
pull factors, it is commonly used by the ruled and those powerless to get things done 
in the mainland, not just for resolving administrative disputes but also for 
conducting many other lawful and unlawful activities.8 When used to settle 
administrative disputes, it is invariably for the ruled to offer money, mostly in cash 
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but it can also be in kind, to members of the rulers for getting around the problems 
in dispute. It is especially common for the settling of disputes over minor 
administrative acts concerning the exercise of discretionary authorities, e.g. general 
administrative punishments by law enforcing officials and processing of applications 
for the issuance of permits and licenses of all kinds. Offering a certain sum of 
money personally to the concerned officials can reduce the amount of fines, shorten 
the period of detention, whether of person or property, and speed up the process of 
application. Although administrative litigation can also help in those circumstances, 
the solution is often too late and too costly when compared with the use of money at 
the spot. In addition, money can be used together with guanxi, like a double dose of 
lubricant, for more effective resolution of disputes. Comparable to guanxi, money is 
also a common, though very much illegal, substitute for administrative litigation in 
thePRC. 
Besides the availability of alternatives, how the ruled assess the courts as 
arbitrator and a source of help will also affect the former's overall appraisal and 
ultimate use of administrative litigation. The difficulties and inadequacies of the 
Chinese courts in handling administrative litigation has been discussed in chapter 
three and will not be repeated here. In summary, the lack of judicial independence 
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will cause the potential users to suspect that the courts will defend the administration 
in similar way as those supervisory administrative agents in administrative 
reconsideration. Besides, the lack of jUdiciary status in the mainland's political 
system and in the country as a whole will also lead the potential users to worry that 
the courts' verdicts will not be binding on the administration and cannot be enforced. 
Given such weaknesses of the court in administrative litigation, the latter would not 
be regarded as helpful and useful as it is proposed or expected. 
Finally, the ruled will refrain from using administrative litigation if the latter is 
regarded as exceedingly difficult to use. There are many concrete situations where 
the ruled may find the use of administrative litigation difficult and a few examples 
can be given. For the two hundred million illiterate and uneducated members of the 
ruled in the PRe, filing their cases with the courts, defending their legal rights and 
interests in open debates, and presenting their requests against challenges of the 
rulers, could all be too demanding if not impossible. For the eight hundred million 
peasants living in the rural villages, pursuing administrative litigation could be very 
irksome and costly in terms of both time and money because those basic level 
people's courts with the jurisdiction to accept their cases may be tens or hundreds of 
miles away in the county cities.9 In fact, the more remote their place of living is, the 
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more difficult their resort to the use of administrative litigation will be, though not 
necessarily the less serious their rights are being infringed. For the thirty million 
individual household proprietors and many other breadwinners who need to work 
almost everyday to make a living, taking the trouble and spending the time to sue the 
rulers may just be too expansive and formidable. Finally, for all members of the 
ruled, who are subject to continuous administration of one kind or other, the costs of 
suing the rulers in terms of upsetting their relationship with their immediate 
governors and turning the latter into their enemies are just too high. The threat of 
retaliatory actions by the concerned authorities and their officials is always 
prominent and sufficient to deter attempts to sue the rulers. In short, putting 
administrative litigation into practice by members of the ruled is indeed much more 
difficult than putting administrative litigation into place by the rulers. 
B. Fifth Diagnosis of the Administrative Litigation Law 
This is the last but not the least diagnosis of the Law. Two remaining chapters 
of the Law - chapter 3 about jurisdiction of the courts and chapter 6 about bringing 
and hearing of cases, are diagnosed here because they relate with two of the issues 
discussed above, i.e. positions of the courts and administrative reconsideration in 
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administrative litigation. They account for the difficult position of the courts and the 
superior position of administrative reconsideration in administrative litigation. 
With no intention to create separate independent courts for hearing 
administrative litigation, elevate the jUdiciary's status above the administration, or 
alter the existing judicial establishment, the eleven articles in chapter 3 of the Law 
simply place administrative litigation in the existing judicial system, starting from 
the lowest basic-level people's courts. The eleven articles lay down clearly how the 
first hearings of administrative litigation cases are to be distributed among courts of 
different levels and locations. In essence, except certain complex cases or cases 
concerning administrative acts of provincial and above level governments, first 
hearings of all administrative cases will be conducted by the lowest basic-level 
people's courts in the places where the administrative acts are performed or where 
the defendants or plaintiffs are located. 
It is claimed that such arrangement is to make it more convenient and less 
costly for the ruled to pursue litigation for protecting their rights and interests. 
However, that supposed benefit is in fact less explicit than the resulting problem of 
placing the courts in a difficult position. Very often, the courts are under the 
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administrative jurisdiction of the defendants who are mostly local administrative 
authorities, and the presiding judges may also be inferior in rank than the 
defendants' representatives. This will make it very difficult for the courts and their 
judges to hear the cases impartially and execute their verdicts forcefully so as to 
protect the rights and interests of the ruled. Under such an awkward institutional 
arrangement, the practical usefulness of administrative litigation to the ruled are 
unavoidably reduced. 
On the other hand, while laying down the rules for the bringing and hearing of 
administrative litigation cases in six articles, chapter six of the Law operates to 
protect the interests of the administration and to reduce the cases of administrative 
litigation by endorsing the preceding position of administrative reconsideration to 
administrative litigation. Its first article states that administrative disputes must go 
through administrative reconsideration first before moving onto administrative 
litigation where and when that is required by the laws and regulations. Where and 
when that is not required, the article also encourages members of the ruled to 
consider applying for administrative reconsideration first before bringing their cases 
to the courts. 
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In fact, it was proposed when the Law was being drafted that administrative 
reconsideration should be set as the compulsory preceding step for taking 
administrative litigation in all cases. The proposal was dropped only because the 
PRC's administrative reconsideration was not well developed enough by then. 
Following promulgation of the Law, administrative reconsideration has been 
expanded and reconstructed, which then become very much comparable to 
administrative litigation in both jurisdiction and function. A subsequent explanatory 
note issued by the Supreme People's Court also helps explain in details how the 
superior position of administrative reconsideration is to be honoured. to Taken 
together, the usefulness of administrative litigation is to a certain extent eroded by 
the strengthening of administrative reconsideration. 
c. Appraisal Orientation of the Surveyed Individual Household Proprietors 
In connection with the above discussed issues, eight questions were asked of 
the surveyed individual household proprietors to measure their appraisal of the 
usefulness of administrative litigation and to identify the appraisal orientation of 
their administrative litigation culture (see Table 6.1 for the questions). The first three 
questions compare the usefulness of administrative litigation with three other 
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problems solving methods. The next three questions concern the courts' position in 
administrative litigation. The last two questions are about how difficult the use of 
administrative litigation is. The results are presented and discussed below. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Proprietors' Appraisal Orientation 
Unlike results in the previous orientations, appraisal scores of the proprietors 
are much less positive and agreeing. Their answers are quite mixed, spreading across 
both ends of the spectrum, and a lot more neutral and uncertain answers are recorded. 
It seems that although they welcome administrative litigation, support its purposes, 
and agree with its potential benefits, they do find it not specifically useful at the 
present moment in the reality of the PRe. 
When asked to compare administrative litigation with other problems solving 
mechanisms, the proprietors' responses were quite negative. Only 37.7 per cent of 
the proprietors believed using administrative litigation was more useful than 
petitioning to higher levels of the government for reconsideration, whereas 26.6 per 
cent believed in the opposite, and 19.3 per cent regarded the two methods as similar 
in their usefulness (see Table 6.1 below). A slightly higher percentage of 41.7 per 
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cent believed taking administrative litigation was more useful than using personal 
connection, but a comparable 39 per cent thought the other way round, and 14 per 
cent were indifferent between the two. Finally, an equal amount of 39 per cent 
believed in the problems resolving power of taking administrative litigation and 
using money whereas 16.7 per cent were neutral between the two. Such diversity in 
the proprietors' answers to these three questions produced standard deviations from 
1.06 to 1.27, reflecting measurable polarity in their appraisal comments on the 
relative usefulness of administrative litigation against the other three problems 
solving measures. Yet, it was particularly worrying when significantly more of the 
proprietors, as members of the ruled, indirectly insinuated that the two unofficial 
methods of using money and personal connection were even more useful and hence, 
more likely to be used, than the long-established official channel of petitioning for 
administrative reconsideration. 
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Table 6.1 Responses of the Proprietors to the Eight Appraisal Orientation Questions 
A 
25 Petitioning to higher levels of the government q 192 
- -
------
can better solve the problem than suing % 26.6 
the government in court. 
26 Using personal connection can better q 281 
- -
------
solve the problem than suing the % 39.0 
government in court. 
27 Using money can better solve the problem q 281 
-- ------
than suing the government in court. % 39.0 
28 Courts cannot fairly hear cases of admin- q 153 
- - ------
istrative litigation initiated by citizens. % 21.2 
29 Courts will defend the administration. q 201 
- -------
% 28.0 
30 Courts' verdicts cannot bind the q 162 
- - ------
administration. % 22.5 
31 Citizens do not dare to sue the government q 455 
- -I ~ 
for fear of revenge by the officials. % 
32 It is very difficult to put administrative q 
- -
litigation into practice. % 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral ; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
62.9 
338 
------
46.7 
N 0 ? s.d. 
139 272 118 1.06 
- -- -- -----
------
19.3 37.7 16.4 
101 301 38 1.23 
- ---- - ---- -- - ---
14.0 41.7 5.3 
120 281 38 1.27 
- - - -- -----
------
16.7 39.0 5.3 
182 313 74 1.06 
- -- -- -- - --
------
25.2 43.4 10.2 
171 245 99 1.12 
----- ---- - ." ------
23.9 34.3 13.8 
136 297 123 1.08 
----- -----
------
19.0 41.4 17.1 
95 148 25 1.16 
-- - -- - - - -- ------
13.1 20.5 3.5 
131 175 79 1.03 
- - - -- - - - -- ------
18.1 24.3 10.9 
o = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
Concerning the judiciary's position in administrative litigation, the proprietors 
also displayed certain hesitancies and reservations. Although their comments on the 
courts were still more positive than negative, the fonner was only a weak majority. 
In particular, there were 43.4 against 21.1 per cent who believed the courts could 
hear cases of administrative litigation fairly, whereas 25.2 per cent were not sure and 
10.2 per cent didn't know. There were 34.3 against 28 per cent who trusted that the 
courts would not defend the administration, but 23.9 per cent were not so sure and 
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13.8 per cent could not tell. Lastly, there were 41.4 against 22.5 per cent who opined 
that the courts' verdicts were binding on the administration, yet 19 per cent were not 
sure and 17.1 per cent didn't know. Standard deviations of 1.06-1.12 were recorded 
from answers of the proprietors to these three questions, suggesting quite diverse 
appraisal comments here as well. As arbitrator in the process of litigation, the 
court's independence and impartiality will not only affect people's respect for and 
trust in the litigation institution, but also people's reliance on and usage of the latter. 
The hesitant view of the proprietors in respect of the courts' position in 
administrative litigation implies that the support for and the value placed upon 
administrative litigation among the proprietors is not matched with comparable trust 
in the helpfulness and usefulness of the institution. 
In principle, administrative litigation can bring a wide range of potential 
benefits to the ruled as well as the rulers (see the evaluational comments in last 
chapter), but when put into practice in the reality together with the many empirical 
considerations and other competing alternatives, its actual benefits and usefulness 
may be reduced. As a matter of fact, as many as 62.9 per cent of the proprietors 
proclaimed that the ruled dared not sue the government for fear of revenge. In their 
last remark, the majority of the ruled sample claimed that it was very difficult to put 
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administrative litigation into practice. Those having such view almost doubled the 
amount of those with the opposing view (46.7 per cent against 24.3 per cent). 
In aggregate, the overall appraisal orientation scores of the proprietors indicate 
a high degree of disagreement and low level of confidence concerning the usefulness 
of administrative litigation. On average, the vote of non-confidence was even 
slightly higher than the vote of confidence (35.8 against 35.3 per cent) and almost 
one fifth was vote of indifference (see Table 6.2 below). While the proprietors' 
highly positive evaluational orientation scores reported in last chapter clearly 
confirms their belief in the potential value of administrative litigation in principle, 
their much weaker appraisal orientation scores revealed here strongly indicate their 
doubts about the usefulness of administrative litigation in practice. Their answers 
signal the need for improvements in the institutional arrangements and procedural 
implementation of administrative litigation in the PRe. 
Table 6.2 Overall Appraisal Orientation Scores of the Proprietors 
Overall Appraisal Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don't know; 
A 
tq 2063 
- - - -- -------
aq 257.9 
-- - -- -------
% 35.8 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
289 
N D ? 
1075 2032 594 
- - -- - -- ---- - -- -------
134.4 254.0 74.3 
------- ----- - - - - - - ---
18.6 35.3 10.3 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Proprietors' Appraisal Orientation 
The proprietors' appraisal orientation towards administrative litigation is the 
third one besides jurisdictional and evaluational orientations to have a perfect 
internal relationship, indicating a coherent and consistent appraisal orientation in the 
proprietors' administrative litigation culture. However, the degree of internal 
relationship was significantly lower than that of the other two orientations, probably 
because of the greater range of questions asked and the more diverse answers in 
return. The full range of significant Spearman's rho correlation coefficients for the 
proprietors' appraisal orientation responses varied from 0.17 to 0.75 (see Table 6.3 
below) and the average rho coefficient was 0.38, much lower than 0.63 and 0.60 of 
the jurisdictional and evaluational orientations, respectively. Yet, the rho coefficients 
for answers to certain appraisal orientation questions were much higher than the 
orientation average, signifying particular responses with stronger relationships 
deserving explanations. 
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Table 6.3 Spearman' s rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Proprietors ' Appraisal Orientation 
Q 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
25 . .28 ! .25 .27 . .28 1 .30 .17 I .20 
, ..................... ······················r··········· .. ··········r· .... · .. ·· ............ ··· ················· .. 1· .. ···················1·········· ............ ················· ·· ·· ·1 .. ········ ···· .. ··· .. ·· 
26 .28 i i .75 .43 ! .44 ! .39 .47 ! .35 
...................... ······················f .. · .. ·················j·········· ............. ·············· .. ···· ··t···· .. ················f······ ··· ............. ···· ··················l················ ·· ··· ·· 
27 .25 i .75 i .50 i .43 i .37 .51 ! .32 
.47 ii' 31 .17 .51 .36 ! .41 ! .31 ! .34 
· __ .. _-II -_·_ ... ·--1·_ .. _ ...... ·-i---I·-····-···-·····--·····l-~---·t-·-··---·-··-.. - .-..... ---.... - -.1"'' .. -.------.. -. 
32 .20 .35 .32 .32 ! .37 ! .34 .34 ! 
i i : 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.38. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
The strongest internal relationships were found among the proprietors' 
responses to two groups of appraisal orientation questions on the usefulness of 
administrative litigation. The first one concerns the courts' position in administrative 
litigation with an average correlation coefficient of 0.52. The second one concerns 
the comparative usefulness of administrative litigation against the other three 
problems solving methods with an average correlation coefficient of 0.43. These 
indicate first and foremost the importance of the courts to successful implementation 
of administrative litigation in the view of the ruled, and to lesser extent, the real 
challenge of competing alternatives, especially those informal ones, to the relative 
usefulness of administrative litigation in the calculation of the ruled. The results also 
suggest that the proprietors' appraisals in those two respects are not random but 
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consistent comments reflecting their genuine beliefs. 
3. External Relationship of the Proprietors' Appraisal Orientation 
The external relationship of the proprietors' appraisal orientation is not as 
strong as the above internal relationship but is not weak either. A very strong 
relationship was recorded with the jurisdictional and expectational orientations, a 
fairly strong relationship was identified with the cognitive and affective orientations, 
and evaluational orientation was the only one found to have little relationship with 
the proprietors' appraisal orientation (see Table 6.4 below). 
Table 6.4 External Relationship ofthe Proprietors' Appraisal Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Fairly Strong 
Affective Fairly Strong 
Jurisdictional Very Strong 
Evaluational Small 
Expectational Very Strong 
The proprietors' appraisal orientation answers, except that of question 25 about 
petitioning to higher levels government for administrative reconsideration, were 
significantly related with all their jurisdictional orientation answers according to the 
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computed Speannan's rho correlation coefficients (see Table 6.5 below). The lowest 
external correlation coefficients from 0.08 to 0.20 were detected from answers to the 
three appraisal questions that compared administrative litigation with other three 
problems solving methods. It implies that the perceived or written scope of 
protection for administrative litigation, however comprehensive, might not have too 
much practical significance, especially if other alternatives were regarded as more 
useful in the real world. The highest correlation coefficients of 0.12 to 0.30 rested 
with answers to appraisal question 32 about difficulty with putting administrative 
litigation into practice. From a pragmatic point of view, the more responsibilities the 
proprietors assign to administrative litigation, the more difficulty they expect with 
its use. 
Table 6.5 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Proprietors' 
Appraisal Orientation 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Expcctational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 33 34 35 36 37 
25 15 19 21 12 10 08 13 12 II 09 08 08 II 15 25 15 
26 13 20 14 09 14 09 13 20 16 14 18 12 14 13 10 09 II 16 19 II 
27 17 23 16 09 18 10 15 20 16 12 14 II 15 15 10 10 17 09 
28 15 12 19 17 07 II 12 20 20 19 21 20 20 22 08 II 25 16 
29 14 17 15 17 18 08 II 20 21 19 22 19 20 19 14 13 18 31 19 
30 15 23 23 08 22 08 08 II 22 20 22 20 16 22 15 10 10 08 17 14 15 18 29 15 
31 18 20 09 II 19 17 12 13 13 12 16 08 10 12 12 14 22 14 
32 15 15 26 15 08 12 30 25 26 27 26 26 22 13 15 14 20 29 16 
Phi correlation for QI-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
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The proprietors' appraisal orientation answers were also significantly correlated 
with all their expectational orientation answers as shown by their correlation 
coefficients, except that of question 27 about using money as an alternative and 
question 28 about the fairness of the courts in hearing administrative litigation cases. 
The correlation coefficients ranged from 0.08 to 0.31 and the highest were recorded 
from answers to questions about the courts' position in litigation. As a whole, the 
perceived usefulness of administrative litigation is closely linked with the expected 
future for the latter in the view of the ruled sample, especially the courts' position 
and performance which is a major practical concern of the ruled. 
The appraisal orientation of the proprietors related fairly strongly with both 
their cognitive and affective orientations, with average correlation coefficients of 
0.18 and 0.12, respectively. Coincidentally, the proprietors' appraisal orientation 
answers related more closely with their answers to an equal number of three 
questions in both the cognitive and affective orientations. As for the cognitive 
orientation, they were questions 1, 2, and 4 about awareness of the institution and 
the Law. As for the affective orientation, they were questions 7, 10, and 11 about 
suitability of administrative litigation for China, caring about its implementation, 
and keenness to get acquainted with it. Taken together, it tends to suggest that the 
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cognitive base of the proprietors' appraisal comments on the usefulness of 
administrative litigation is only a general awareness of the institution instead of 
detailed understanding and the affective support is mainly their acceptance of and 
caring about the same. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, no significant correlation was found between 
the proprietors' evaluational and appraisal orientations towards administrative 
litigation, except for their answers to appraisal question 30 about the binding force 
of the court's decision on the administration (rho coefficients 0.08 to 0.17). However 
low the correlation may be, the more results the proprietors expect administrative 
litigation to achieve, the greater worry they feel about actualisation of the courts' 
decision. 
4. Appraisal Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Proprietors 
Detailed analysis of the proprietors' responses by means of cross-tabulation 
shows that the proprietors' personal particulars have a different level of relationship 
with their appraisal orientation (see Table 6.6 below, details of the extensive cross-
tabulation results are not displayed due to space constraints). 
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Table 6.6 Relationship between the Proprietors ' Appraisal Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Insignificant Income Education Level 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Political Status 
Slightly Significant Working Years 
Kind of Business 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Gender 
Significant Age Residency 
Working District 
Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Income and education level of the proprietors were found to have little 
relationship with their appraisal orientation towards administrative litigation. All 
sub-groups under the two personal particulars basically followed the above-
mentioned overall level and pattern of appraisal orientation for the proprietors as a 
whole, except with slight variations on the three controversial issues of using 
personal connection, using money, and courts defending the administration. The 
Spearman's rho correlation analysis on these two personal particulars did not 
produce many significant findings (see Table 6.7 below). 
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Table 6.7 Correlation Coefficients for the Proprietors' Appraisal Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
.14 .16 .12 .13 
.13 .21 .12 .14 
.13 .21 .13 .13 
.16 .11 .10 
.15 .20 .13 .11 
.13 .23 .12 .16 
.14 .18 .09 
.13 .19 .13 .12 
.14 .12 
.27 .13 
.26 .18 
.27 
.21 .14 
.23 
.19 .15 
.22 .12 
~ 
8 
o 
u 
..s 
.08 
.11 
.09 
.10 
.14 
.09 
.12 
Phi for gender & residency, Spearman' s rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, kind of business & working district. 
Significance level at .05 , 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
The political status of the proprietors was found to have a slightly significant 
relationship with their appraisal orientation and each sub-group responded quite 
differently in connection with their different political background and exposure. 
Proprietors belonging to the Communist Party, who possessed official political status 
and tended to be politically more mature and sensitive, were found to have greater 
disbelief and doubt about administrative litigation in practice, especially when it 
concerned the administration. This sub-group had the highest percentage who said 
that internal administrative reconsideration by the administration could do better 
than administrative litigation by the courts, that the courts would not adjudicate 
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administrative litigation fairly but would most likely defend the administration and 
their verdicts would not be binding on the latter, that the ruled dared not challenge 
the rulers for fear of revenge, and that putting administrative litigation into practice 
was after all not easy. 
On the contrary, their juniors in the Communist Youth League, who tended to 
be younger and politically less mature, saw the institution from the opposite pole. 
They had the highest percentage who argued that money could not compare with 
administrative litigation, that the courts would not defend the administration but 
would hear administrative litigation pleas fairly with verdicts binding on the 
administration, that the citizens would not avoid litigation because of possible 
revenge from officials, and that the institution was after all not that difficult to put 
into practice. 
Lastly, those independent proprietors without political affiliation were more 
moderate but they had the highest percentage among all sub-groups who stated that 
both personal connection and money could do better than administrative litigation. 
Such appraisal idea constituted only the minority for the previous two sub-groups 
but was the majority for this independent sub-group of proprietors. By correlation 
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analysis, the proprietors' political status was found to have a significant relationship 
with their appraisal comments in respect of the relative usefulness of administrative 
litigation in comparison with the other three methods and the courts' position in 
litigation. The respective Cramer's V correlation coefficients ranged from 0.11 to 
0.13 (see Table 6.7 above). 
Working years of the proprietors also exhibited a slightly significant 
relationship with their appraisal orientation, which was negative and fairly direct. In 
particular, proprietors with longer years in the job tended to be more negative with 
administrative litigation than those with shorter. The veteran sub-group with over ten 
years of service was comparatively most against the institution, with the highest 
percentage agreeing with all eight negative statements in this orientation. On the 
contrary, new entrants, especially those with less than 3 years as proprietors, had 
relatively stronger affirmative appraisal about administrative litigation, upholding its 
usefulness on the practical level. Spearman's rho correlation analysis also indicated 
a significant correlation between working years and all appraisal orientation 
responses, with coefficients between -0.09 and -0.16 (see Table 6.7 above). 
The relationship between the proprietors' appraisal orientation towards 
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administrative litigation and the type of their business was just slightly significant 
because tangible difference was found with only one of the sub-groups, i.e. those in 
the repairing business. The other three sub-groups in retailing, catering and servicing 
businesses shared very similar appraisal orientations like that of the entire 
proprietors sample mentioned above. The repairing proprietors, who tended to be 
older and less educated, displayed distinctly more negative appraisal than the other 
three sub-groups as shown by their having the highest percentage of negative scores 
in all the eight appraisal orientation questions. In particular, those repairing 
proprietors commented that using personal connection and money were much better, 
and to lesser extent, administrative reconsideration as well, than taking litigation in 
resolving problems. It seems that those informal and to certain extent illegal means 
for settling administrative disputes are more popular with older members of the 
ruled who are mostly in the repairing business and with less education. Due to such 
a limited relationship, the Cramer's V correlation analysis for this personal 
particular could not identify much in the way of significant findings (see Table 6.7 
above). 
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Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
For the first time, gender was found to have a significant relationship with the 
proprietors' administrative litigation orientation. A consistent difference was 
observed in the appraisal orientation of the two genders and the phi correlation 
coefficients also testified significant findings of 0.13 to 0.15 (see Table 6.7 above). 
On the whole, male proprietors tended to have more reservations and a negative 
appraisal of administrative litigation, with a higher percentage of admission to all 
negative appraisal orientation questions. Yet, the females might not have 
significantly better appraisal, as they tended to have more unknown or neutral 
answers, suggesting a general uncertain tendency in the female's appraisal 
orientation. In particular, significantly more males complained about the courts 
defending the administration in administrative litigation, verdicts of the former not 
binding on the latter, administrative litigation not comparable to administrative 
reconsideration, the ruled not daring to sue for fear of revenge, and actual difficulty 
with putting administrative litigation into practice. After all, male proprietors 
appeared to be more assertive and critical in their appraisal orientation towards 
administrative litigation than their female counterparts. 
The proprietors' appraisal orientation was also found to have a significant 
301 
relationship with their age. By cross-tabulation, that relationship was non-linear and 
not very consistent, especially for the negative appraisal. At the two ends of the 
curvilinear relationship, both younger and older proprietors tended to have a more 
positive appraisal of administrative litigation. Those younger proprietors had the 
least doubt about the usefulness of administrative litigation. They had the highest 
percentage who argued that administrative litigation was better than all three other 
suggested alternatives, that the courts would not defend the administration and their 
verdicts were binding, that fear for revenge might not be a problem for the pursuit of 
litigation, and that putting administrative litigation into practice was not that difficult. 
At the other end, the older proprietors had the highest percentage who claimed that 
the courts would be fair in their adjudication. 
On the contrary, those middle-aged proprietors, especially those between 41 to 
50, tended to have a more negative appraisal orientation, with a comparatively 
higher percentage of agreeing with the negative appraisal orientation statements, 
displaying relatively more disapproval and reservation with the institution on the 
practical level (more than half of the 41 to 50 sub-group believed using personal 
connection and money were better than taking litigation). The Spearman's rho 
correlation analysis also indicated a significant association between age and all 
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appraisal responses with coefficients from -0.16 to -0.23 (see Table 6.7 above). 
Proprietors with and without local Beijing residency differed significantly in 
their appraisal orientation towards administrative litigation. Those with residency 
had a lower regard for the entire institution than those without, with more 
agreements with all eight negative appraisal orientation statements. The majority of 
the residents sub-group regarded that putting administrative litigation into practice 
was difficult and one major reason was possible revenge by the officials, hence, 
using personal connection and money were much better in practice to resolve 
problems. 
On the contrary, proprietors without residency were much more optimistic 
about administrative litigation in practice. The majority of them expressed trust in 
the courts and regarded administrative litigation as better than all three other 
problems solving methods. Yet, the majority of them still worried about possible 
revenge by the officials in particular and difficulty with the practice of 
administrative litigation in general. The phi correlation coefficients also confirmed a 
significant correlation of 0.14 to 0.27 between the proprietors' residency status and 
answers to the eight appraisal orientation questions (see Table 6.7 above). 
303 
Proprietors working in different districts also responded very differently to the 
appraisal orientation questions, suggesting a significant influence of that personal 
particular on their appraisal orientation. Xuan Wu district proprietors who tended to 
be older males with less education, had more negative overall appraisal comments, 
with the highest percentage who agreed with all eight negative appraisal orientation 
statements. On the other hand, Rai Dian district proprietors who tended to be 
younger and better educated, had a more positive overall appraisal, with the highest 
percentage who disagreed with all the eight negative appraisal orientation statements. 
Finally, Xi Cheng district proprietors who had relatively more females, had scores 
between that of the other two district sub-groups, with relatively more neutral and 
unknown answers. The above significant relationship was supported by the 
Cramer's V correlation analysis for working district, with coefficients from 0.12 to 
0.18 (see Table 6.7 above). 
In summary, those proprietors who are younger would tend to have more 
positive appraisal comments on the usefulness of administrative litigation, so as 
those who have just entered the career, are working in Rai Dian district, and do not 
have local residency. In contrast, those proprietors who are older would tend to have 
more negative comments, so as those who are males, Party members, local residents, 
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and working in Xuan Wu district. On the whole, generational background and work 
experiences accumulated over the years seems to be important to the appraisal 
orientation of the ruled sample towards the relative usefulness of administrative 
litigation in practice. 
D. Appraisal Orientation of the Surveyed Government Officials 
The same eight appraisal orientation questions were asked of the 152 
interviewed officials to explore how they appraise the usefulness of administrative 
litigation and to find out if they hold a different appraisal orientation than that of the 
proprietors. The officials' responses are presented and discussed below in the same 
way as that of the proprietors' above, plus a comparison between the two. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Officials' Appraisal Orientation 
Probably because of their official status, eagerness to defend the state-launched 
institution of administrative litigation, inclination to gloss over the latter's 
limitations, tendency to understate the supremacy of the administration vis-a-vis the 
judiciary, and instinct to underreport the seriousness of retaliation by the rulers after 
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being sued, the officials' answers to all appraisal orientation questions are 
consistently more on the positive side. Administrative litigation appears to be 
empirically much more useful and practically less difficult in the words of the 
officials. 
When asked to compare administrative litigation with the other three 
alternatives, administrative litigation was reported as more useful by the majority of 
the officials, with a percentage much higher than the proprietors. According to the 
officials' responses, administrative litigation compared most favourably to money, 
with a concurring percentage of 56.6 per cent, then to administrative reconsideration, 
with 52.7 per cent in support, and least favourably to guanxi, with only 48.6 per cent 
saying so (see Table 6.8 below). Conversely, 15.1 and 19.1 per cent of the officials 
admitted that administrative litigation was not as useful as administrative 
reconsideration and money, respectively, and guanxi was proclaimed to be more 
useful than administrative litigation by as many as 26 per cent. The admission of 
such informal means of using guanxi as more useful than taking administrative 
litigation among a quarter of the officials gives grounds for concern. In addition, the 
much higher percentage of neutral answers among the officials to these three 
questions as compared to the proprietors also deserves attention. For example, more 
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than one fifth compared administrative litigation as more or less equal to the two 
unofficial means of using guanxi and money when used to resolve administrative 
disputes. Taken into consideration the officials' tendency to gloss over the 
limitations of administrative litigation in their answers, their appraisal comments 
may not be very different from the proprietors' in that administrative litigation is not 
particularly useful and appealing when other powerful alternatives are available. 
Table 6 .8 Responses of the Officials to the Eight Appraisal Orientation Questions 
25 Petitioning to higher levels of the government q 
- -
can better solve the problem than suing % 
the government in court. 
26 Using personal connection can better q 
- -
solve the problem than suing the % 
government in court. 
27 Using money can better solve the problem q 
- -
than suing the government in court. % 
28 Courts cannot fairly hear cases of admin- q 
- -
istrative litigation initiated by citizens. % 
29 Courts will defend the administration. q 
- -
% 
30 Courts' verdicts cannot bind the q 
--
administration. % 
31 Citizens do not dare to sue the government q 
--
for fear of revenge by the officials. % 
32 It is very difficult to put administrative q 
--
litigation into practice. % 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don' t know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
23 
------
15.1 
39 
------
26.0 
29 
------
19.1 
14 
------
9.2 
22 
------
14.4 
16 
------
10.6 
66 
------
43.4 
46 
------
30.3 
N 0 ? s.d. 
40 80 9 0.87 
----- -----
------
26.3 52.7 5.9 
31 73 7 1.08 
----- -----
------
20.7 48.6 4 .7 
34 86 3 1.02 
- - - -- -----
------
22.3 56.6 2.0 
41 90 7 0.85 
----- -----
------
27.0 59.2 4.6 
34 93 3 0.94 
----- -----
------
22.4 61.2 2.0 
23 III 1 0.84 
----- -----
------
15.2 73.5 0.7 
28 56 2 1.12 
-- - -- - - - -- ------
18.4 36.9 1.3 
32 74 0 1.04 
- ---- -----
------
21.1 48.6 0.0 
o = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
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With a greater majority, the officials denied any cover-up by the judiciary and 
proclaimed that the courts had ultimate authority in administrative litigation. In 
particular, 59.2 per cent of the officials said the courts would hear administrative 
litigation impartially, 61.2 per cent said the courts would not defend the 
administration, and as high as 73.5 per cent said the courts' verdicts bound the 
administration (see Table 6.8 above). However, the extent of the opposite view 
deserves concern. Given their official status, still 9.2 per cent of them did not believe 
in judicial fairness, as many as 14.4 per cent admitted defense by the courts, and up 
to 10.6 per cent did not respect verdicts of the courts. Furthermore, the number of 
officials with a neutral view was comparable to that of the proprietors, from 15.2 per 
cent up to 27 per cent, showing a lot of reservations even among the officials about 
the courts' ruling position in administrative litigation. 
Furthermore, as many as 30.3 per cent of the officials agreed that 
administrative litigation was difficult to use. Worse still, 43.4 per cent openly 
confessed that citizens did not dare to sue the government because of fear for 
revenge by concerned officials as compared to only 36.9 per cent with the opposite 
view (see Table 6.8 above). The appraisal orientation question about possible 
revenge preventing pursuit of litigation is the only question to have the majority of 
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officials in support. Although the percentage of officials agreeing with the use of 
administrative litigation as difficult is significantly lower than that of the proprietors, 
their admission of difficulty with administrative litigation should not be taken lightly. 
After all, the denunciation that administrative litigation may be useful in principle 
but not in practice can be equally found in the officials' answers as in the 
proprietors' . 
In aggregate, the officials' overall appraisal comments on the usefulness of 
administrative litigation was significantly more positive than that of the proprietors, 
with 54.7 per cent in support of the institution's usefulness as compared to 21.0 per 
cent with the opposite view (see Table 6.9 below). Despite that, in view of the 
different position of the ruled and rulers in administrative litigation, appraisal 
comments of the officials at best can only reflect the rulers' views and wishes. It is 
after all the appraisal comments of the proprietors that determine how far they, as 
potential users, will rely on and make use of administrative litigation in reality. 
Table 6.9 Overall Appraisal Orientation Scores of the Officials 
Overall Appraisal Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don' t know; 
A 
tq 255 
-- - -- -- - ----
aq 31.9 
--- -- -------
% 21.0 
N = Neulral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
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N D ? 
263 663 32 
------- ------- - - -----32.9 82.9 4.0 
-------
------- ------ -21.7 54.7 2.6 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Officials' Appraisal Orientation 
The internal relationship of the officials' appraisal orientation is very much like 
that of the proprietors, approaching perfect like that of the proprietors but missing 
mutual correlation in one case, i.e. between answers to questions 25 and 31 (see 
Table 6.10 below). Yet, the level of internal relationship in the officials' appraisal 
orientation was stronger than that of the proprietors, with Spearman' s rho correlation 
coefficients from 0.22 to 0.75, averaged at 0.42, slightly higher than the proprietors' 
average of 0.38 . 
Table 6 .10 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Officials ' Appraisal Orientation 
Q 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
25 . .39 i .35 .31 . .25 I .30 I .31 
...................... · · ·· · · ·········· · · ····t · ···· · ··· ···· · ··· ·· ··· ~······ ·· ........ ...... ·· ·· ··················~·· ·· ·· ··· · ···· ·· ······t ······· · .............. ······· .. ········ .. ···1·············· .. ······· 
26 .39 i i .75 .46 : .39 i .35 .34 ! .41 
:! : ! ! 
.................... .. ····· .. ·········· .... ·!· .... ··· .. ···· .. ······i········· ·· ,··· .. ... ... ······· .. ·· .. ······· .. 1············ .. ··· .. ···t· ··· ·· ······· ........................... .... 1" ..................... . 
27 .35 I .75 I .57 i .59 I .51 .45 i .44 
28 .31 I .46 i .57 i .66 1 .49 .38 I .30 
.................... ·········· .. ····· ..···t· .. ·· .. · .... ··· .. ·····j .. ··· ·· .. ·· .. ····· ...... ········ .. · .. · .. , .. · .. t .. ··· ··· ..·· .... ···· .. t .. · .............. ·· .. · ...................... j .................... .. . 
29 .25 1 .39 ! .59 .66 ! i .64 .57 ! .28 
............ .......... ··· .......... ···· .... ·f· .. ·· .... · .. · .... ··· .. j·· .... ·· .... ··· .. ··· .. · .. · .......... •·· .... ··i .. · ...... ·· .... ·· .. ···t···· .. ·· .. ·· .... ·· .... ·· .... ··· .. ··· ...... ··1 .. .. .. ···· .. ·· .... ·· .. · 
30 .30 ! .35 I .51 .49 i .64 i .44 i .32 
: : . : 
.: :: i 
31 I .34 ! .45 .38 i .57 ! .44 i .22 
...................... ·· .... ··· .. ···· .. ·····t· .. · .... ·· ...... ··· .. ·! .... · .... ·"·· .. · .. ,, .. ··· .. ·· .... ···· .. ·····i···· .. ····· .. ·· .... ···+· .. ··· .. .. ·· .. ·· .. ·· ..................... ... ! .................... .. . 
32 .31 ! .41 i .44 .30 i .28 I .32 .22 ! 
! i! i 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.42. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
As in the case of the proprietors, the internal relationships of the officials' 
310 
responses to the two groups of appraisal questions concerning the relative usefulness 
of administrative litigation against other methods and the courts' position in 
litigation, were much higher than the orientation average, reaching a mean of 0.50 
and 0.60, respectively. With or without knowing, the officials' appraisal comments 
seem to reiterate the importance of the courts and to lesser extent, the influence of 
competing alternatives (especially the two infonnal methods of using guanxi and 
money), in affecting the usefulness of administrative litigation in practice. 
3. External Relationship of the Officials' Appraisal Orientation 
While the officials' appraisal orientation has a very strong internal relationship, 
it does not have a comparable external relationship. The results of correlation 
analysis on the external relationship of the officials' appraisal orientation are 
summarised in Table 6.11 below. 
Table 6.11 External Relationship of the Officials' Appraisal Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Small 
Affective Fairly Strong 
Jurisdictional Small 
Evaluational Small 
Expectational Small 
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Unlike the proprietors, the officials had their appraisal orientation towards 
administrative litigation significantly separated from their cognitive, jurisdictional, 
evaluational, and expectational orientations. The proprietors' answers to cognitive 
orientation question 2 about having heard of the administrative litigation institution 
and evaluational orientation questions 19 and 20 about the potential benefits of 
administrative litigation in protecting the citizens' legal rights and pushing the 
government to abide by the law, were the only cases to have incidental correlation 
with their answers to the appraisal orientation questions (see Table 6.12 below). 
Other correlation findings were basically not significant. In view of the lack of 
significant correlation, it may be concluded that the officials' appraisal comments on 
the usefulness of administrative litigation is by and large not tied with nor based on 
how much they know about the institution, how far they envisage its scope of 
jurisdiction, how confident they believe in its potential benefit, and how optimistic 
they estimate its future prospects. It is obvious that their appraisal orientation is not 
tied exclusively with the institution itself, but may be related with other factors. such 
as their above-mentioned concerns to defend administrative litigation, gloss over its 
limitations, understate their own threat to the institution as a result of their 
retaliatory actions, etc. 
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Table 6.12 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Officials' 
Appraisal Orientation 
Cognitive AtTective Jurisdictional Evaluational Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 \I 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 33 34 35 36 37 
25 27 21 24 19 24 24 26 29 20 20 24 
26 21 36 16 18 18 
27 32 19 33 
28 42 20 28 28 17 17 
29 39 22 37 17 
30 31 28 26 18 21 38 23 19 21 18 17 17 21 17 
31 19 24 17 25 
32 33 35 28 20 17 18 25 17 
Phi correlation for Q 1-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points . 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Affective orientation of the officials is the only exception to having a fairly 
strong relationship with their appraisal orientation towards administrative litigation. 
Officials, whose affective orientation was to support the institution's establishment, 
care about its implementation, and keen to get acquainted with it, would tend to have 
more positive and supportive appraisal comments on the usefulness of the institution. 
The correlation was slightly lower for answers to appraisal orientation questions 26 
about using guanxi, 27 about using money, 29 about the courts defending the 
administration, and 32 about use of administrative litigation being difficult. 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between the officials' appraisal and affective 
responses varied from 0.17 to 0.38 and averaged at 0.25 (see Table 6.12 above). 
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In summary, appraisal orientation of the sampled rulers appears to playa very 
different role in the latter's overall administrative litigation culture than in the case 
of the sampled ruled. For the ruled, appraisal orientation is closely related with the 
other orientations and constitutes an integral part of their overall administrative 
litigation culture. For the rulers, appraisal orientation is quite separated from the 
other orientations and does not play a similar important part in their overall 
administrative litigation culture. This is probably because the rulers' appraisal 
comments are not exclusively tied with administrative litigation per se but involve 
other factors and concerns that are related with their official position and status. 
4. Appraisal Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Officials 
Detailed analysis of the officials' answers by means of cross-tabulation shows 
that three of their personal particulars have little association with their appraisal 
orientation, four have a slightly significant correlation, and only one, i.e. education 
level, has a significant relationship (see Table 6.13 below, details of the extensive 
cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space constraints). 
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Table 6.13 Relationship between the Officials' Appraisal Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Gender 
Insignificant Age 
Income 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Political Status 
Slightly Significant Working Years Department 
Working District 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Significant Education Level 
Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Unlike the case of the proprietors where gender and age are both significant to 
appraisal orientation, these two personal particulars of the officials have no 
significant relationship with the latter's appraisal orientation towards administrative 
litigation. Corresponding phi and rho correlation analyses also confirmed no 
significant relationship (see Table 6.14 below). For the first personal particular, 
officials of both gender groups displayed basically similar appraisal orientation 
towards administrative litigation, equally reflecting the overall level and pattern of 
the whole group's appraisal orientation. As for the second personal particular, 
officials in the three different age sub-groups had quite different appraisal scores, 
displaying to a certain extent diverse appraisal comments. However, the scores were 
randomly distributed among all appraisal orientation questions, showing no 
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consistent or clear association with their appraisal orientation. 
Table 6.14 Correlation Coefficients for the Officials ' Appraisal Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Q C Q 
- 0 
C1) 
«1 '.c s= c; 01) 
€ 
01) 0 
.; $9 .9 ... 
] V> ~ .~ C1) '.c C1) u V> S "'-... s= 'Vi "0 :B il «1 U C1) 0. C1) C1) Q C1) ... ... p.. 0 ;:l > p.. .t:: ::s C1) 01) '0$9 ~~ C1) ~i5 () ~~ <00' 0 < ~r/) Cl ..s 
25 .22 .25 
26 .22 
27 .IS 
2S .16 
29 
30 .IS 
31 .30 
32 
Phi for gender, Spearman ' s rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, department & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
Monthly income of the officials was also found to have little relationship with 
their appraisal orientation largely because of statistical reasoning. While the sample 
size was already much smaller than that of the proprietors, the majority of the 
officials (almost 70 per cent) further concentrated in the single income sub-group of 
RMB601-1000. The next most substantial sub-group of RMB301-600 only 
constituted 20 per cent of the total respondents and the third sub-group of 
RMBlOOl-lSOO a mere ten per cent. Comparison based on such a small sample with 
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uneven distribution might be inaccurate, especially when appraisal scores of the 
majority sub-group replicated the group nonn and that of the other two sub-groups 
contained more extreme or uncertain distribution. The Speannan's rho correlation 
analysis also revealed little significant relationship (see Table 6.14 above). 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Political status of the officials was like that of the proprietors in having a 
slightly significant relationship with their respective appraisal orientation but the 
pattern of the relationship was different. Officials with Communist Party 
membership, who tended to be older and politically more mature, were more 
protective towards the established system and the administration. They had the 
highest percentage who disagreed with the charge that courts would defend 
administration and had powerless verdicts, and the allegation that litigation was 
hampered by likely revenge. 
Officials belonging to the Communist Youth League, who tended to be younger 
in both age and political life, were much less assured in their appraisal orientation, 
showing a lot of contradictory responses instead. They disagreed with the highest 
percentage that using personal connection was better than taking litigation, but they 
also agreed with the highest percentage that the courts were unfair in litigation 
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hearing and unbinding on the administration in verdicts. They had the highest 
percentage of both agreement and disagreement in the final appraisal orientation 
question about the institution's degree of difficulty in practice. 
As for those independent officials, their appraisal comments were also quite 
contradictory. They had the highest percentage of both agreement and disagreement 
in the question on comparing the use of money and litigation. They disagreed with 
the highest percentage that administrative reconsideration was better than 
administrative litigation and courts could not fairly hear litigation. Yet, they also 
agreed with the highest percentage that using personal connection was better than 
taking litigation, courts would defend the administration, and citizens dared not to 
sue for fear of revenge. Although Cramer's V correlation analysis has no significant 
findings (see Table 6.14 above), it is obvious from the above that appraisal 
orientation of the officials is to certain extent tied with their political affiliation. The 
Party sub-group has more "official" appraisal answers, whereas appraisal opinions 
of the Communist Youth League sub-group is more "unsettled", and finally the 
independent sub-group has more "free" appraisal comments, saying what they 
regard as true. 
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Working years as a personal particular of the officials had a slightly significant 
relationship with their appraisal orientation towards administrative litigation. 
Although all five sub-groups basically recited similar appraisal comments which 
were more supportive than disapproving, slight difference relating negatively to their 
seniority was still apparent. The most junior sub-group argued quite strongly for 
administrative litigation, with the highest percentage who refuted money as better 
than litigation, hearing of the courts as unfair, and the administration as defended by 
the courts. In view that there were only nine new recruits in this sub-group, their 
appraisal comments might not be very representative, yet the next sub-group with 1-
3 years in the government was not much less supportive. They had the highest 
percentage who rejected personal connection as better than litigation and potential 
revenge as preventing litigation, plus the second highest percentage who objected 
money as better than litigation, courts as defending and not binding the 
administration, and administrative litigation as difficult to practice. 
On the other hand, those with longer years of service had more disapproving 
appraisal comments. For the 4-6 working years sub-group, they had the highest 
percentage of agreement in five of the eight appraisal orientation questions, 
including the courts' confined position, and the second highest percentage in the 
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other three questions of comparing administrative litigation with other problems 
solving methods. As for the three appraisal orientation questions of comparing 
administrative litigation with other problems solving methods, the highest 
percentage of regarding personal connection and money as more useful belonged to 
the sub-group with 7-10 years of service whereas those who supported 
administrative reconsideration as more useful were mostly in the sub-group of over 
ten years. After all, the above-mentioned negative relationship was not 100 per cent 
consistent and clear. Spearman's rho correlation analysis did not have significant 
findings for this personal particular as well (see Table 6.14). But that however slight 
relationship could not be denied either. 
The officials' departmental background was not very significantly related with 
their appraisal orientation towards administrative litigation. Very distinct appraisal 
comments were not found based on departmental difference but unique variations 
were still observable. Public Security officials followed the group norm except being 
most at odds with the three appraisal orientation questions about weaknesses of the 
courts and the one about threat of revenge on pursue of litigation. Environmental 
Protection officials had the strongest admission that personal connection was more 
useful than administrative litigation. Industry and Commerce officials had the most 
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optimistic appraisal responses on putting administrative litigation into practice and 
superiority of administrative litigation over using personal connections. 
Civil Affairs officials had the highest percentage who regarded administrative 
litigation as not better than internal reconsideration by the administration and not 
likely to be used given the threat of possible revenge. Hygiene officials cast the 
highest vote of confidence in administrative litigation as being better than 
administrative reconsideration and using money, in the courts' hearing as fair, and in 
administrative litigation as feasible despite potential threat of revenge. Fire Services 
officials had almost opposite appraisal comments, with the highest percentage who 
said that using money was better than taking litigation, the courts were not fair, 
would defend the administration, and their verdicts were not binding, and after all, 
administrative litigation was difficult to practice. 
The relationship between the officials' working district and appraisal 
orientation was again slightly significant, in the sense that different sub-groups had 
slightly distinct scores and orientation away from the group norm, not that the 
overall degree of association was slightly weak. Appraisal comments of Hai Dian 
officials, who were mostly younger and junior, tended to be more optimistic, 
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disagreed with the highest percentage that money was more useful than litigation, 
courts were defending the administration, subsequent verdicts were not binding, and 
litigation was deterred by fear of revenge. Appraisal comments of Xi Cheng officials, 
who were mostly 30-40 in age and with over ten years of service, tended to be a bit 
more frustrated and desperate. They argued in the strongest for the practical 
usefulness of administrative litigation over and above the use of administrative 
reconsideration and personal connection. Yet, they also admitted with the highest 
percentage that administrative litigation was hampered by likely revenge and was 
difficult to put into practice. Comparatively, appraisal comments of Xuan Wu 
officials, who were mostly the oldest and most senior, showed the lowest regard for 
administrative litigation. They had the highest percentage who agreed that the 
institution was less useful than all other three suggested problems solving methods 
and that the courts did not have an impartial role nor binding authority in 
administrative litigation. 
Sub-Group with Significant Relationship 
Education level of the officials was the only personal particular having a 
significant relationship with their appraisal orientation, but interestingly in a 
negative sense, meaning the lower the education level, the more supportive in 
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appraisal comments, whereas the higher, the more disapproving. Of course, their 
relationship might not be exclusive and other intervening factors might be influential, 
e.g. age and political status. Anyhow, officials in the lowest education sub-group of 
upper secondary had the highest percentage of disagreement with four of the eight 
negative appraisal orientation questions and the second highest percentage in the 
other four, plus lowest percentage of agreement in six. In the opposite, officials in 
the highest education sub-group of undergraduate and above had the highest 
percentage of agreement with six of the negative appraisal orientation questions, 
plus lowest percentage of disagreement in all eight. In short, officials with a lower 
level of education were likely to have more approving appraisal comments on the 
usefulness of administrative litigation, whereas those with higher were likely to be 
less approving. Spearman's rho correlation analysis collaborated with the most 
significant findings in this personal particular with coefficients from -0.18 to -0.25 
(see Table 6.14). 
In summary, while personal backgrounds, such as age, gender, local ties and 
working district, of the ruled are important to their appraisal comments on the 
usefulness of administrative litigation in practice, the same is not true for the rulers. 
The latter's appraisal comments may be more closely tied with their political 
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concerns and positional considerations rather than their personal backgrounds. 
Education level is the only personal particular that has certain significance. But it 
seems that the more educated the officials are, the more critical they become. After 
all, limitations with the usefulness of administrative litigation are pretty obvious to 
both members of the ruled and rulers, and perhaps more so to those better educated 
and informed. 
E. Summary 
The usefulness of administrative litigation in the PRC, related articles in the 
PRC's Administrative Litigation Law, and the appraisal orientations of the ruled and 
rulers samples have been reported and discussed in this chapter. When members of 
the Chinese ruled and rulers agree with the potential benefits of administrative 
litigation, it does not mean that they are not aware of the limited usefulness of the 
institution in the present reality of the PRC. The entrenched practice of using guanxi 
and money to resolve problems by the Chinese is too pervasive and powerful for 
administrative litigation to demonstrate its usefulness. The present position of the 
courts in exercising its jurisdiction and enforcing its verdicts is too weak and inferior 
for administrative litigation to prove its usefulness. The incidents and the threat of 
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retaliatory action by the defending authorities and their officials is too menacing and 
harmful for administrative litigation to show its usefulness. The Law has done little 
to improve the situation but quite the opposite, has contributed to the problem by 
restricting the jurisdiction of the courts and the bringing of administrative litigation 
in the PRC. 
With regard to the fifth research questions, i.e. how the Chinese ruled and rulers 
assess the usefulness of the PRC's administrative litigation, it is found that both 
parties equally express hesitations and doubts in their answers. The two parties' 
appraisal orientations are much less positive and agreeing than their other 
administrative litigation orientations, in fact the least positive and agreeing, 
testifying the greatest scepticism in this orientation. Such scepticism is common and 
consistent in the two parties' appraisal orientation answers as shown by a high level 
of internal relationship in both parties' appraisal orientations. 
Despite the above similarities, appraisal orientation is found to have a different 
role in the configuration of the ruled and rulers' overall administrative litigation 
culture. Affective orientation is closely related with the other orientations and 
constitutes an integral part in the administrative litigation culture ofthe ruled. This is 
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not the case for the rulers, whose appraisal orientation is much less tied with the 
other orientations and whose administrative litigation culture is much less coherent. 
As in the other orientations, the appraisal orientation of the ruled is much more 
closely related with and affected by the latter's personal background than the rulers. 
Members of the ruled who have lived long enough to get used to employing other 
problems solving methods, resided long enough to establish roots in the local 
community, and worked long enough to experience the administrative improprieties 
with the Chinese officialdom, will tend to have greater scepticism and reservation 
with the usefulness of administrative litigation. The same relationship between 
personal background and appraisal orientation is not obvious with members of the 
rulers. It is obvious that there are different sources of influence on the ruled and 
rulers' appraisal orientation as well as administrative litigation culture. 
Different characteristics and perspectives of the ruled and rulers' administrative 
litigation culture are becoming more obvious when more and more administrative 
litigation orientations of the two parties are examined. The only one left behind is 
the expectational orientation, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Expectational Orientation and Further 
Development of the PRC's Administrative 
Litigation 
Expectational orientation is the final constituent component of administrative 
litigation culture and the central theme of this chapter. It is another orientation 
unique to this study, not employed in previous political culture studies but believed 
to be essential in a full-blown cultural study. An examination of administrative 
litigation culture will not be complete if the concerned parties' expectational 
orientation is not identified. Similarly, a diagnosis of the PRC's Administrative 
Litigation Law will not be satisfying if only its deficiencies are explored without 
recommendations for its repair. And a study of the PRC's administrative litigation 
will not be thorough if recommendations for its further improvement are missing. In 
this final examination of administrative litigation in the PRC and administrative 
litigation culture of the Chinese ruled and rulers, the necessary improvements for 
further development of the PRC's administrative litigation will be suggested 
alongside with the presentation and discussion of the Chinese ruled and rulers 
samples' expectational orientation towards the PRe's administrative litigation. 
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A. Further Development of the PRe's Administrative Litigation 
Discussions in earlier chapters have revealed that the PRe's administrative 
litigation is facing many obstacles and constraints, which can be harmful to the 
institution's future if not properly resolved. Those obstacles and constraints are 
wide-ranging, embedded in the Law, originated from the ruled, imposed by the 
rulers, and contributed by the courts. Suggestions for amendment and improvement 
in all four aspects are given below one by one. I 
1. The Law 
Based on the five detailed diagnoses of the PRe's Administrative Litigation 
Law elaborated in the preceding five chapters, seven articles of the Law are found to 
be highly restrictive on the existing operation and future development of the PRe's 
administrative litigation, hence, amendment ofthose articles is necessary if the latter 
is to be strengthened and developed. Firstly, the three purposes set for the PRe's 
administrative litigation according to Article one of the Law are problematic, 
misleading, and mutually conflicting. Upholding the administrative authorities' 
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exercise of authority should not be the purpose of administrative litigation. Prompt 
hearing by the courts and supervising the rulers' exercise of authority are only the 
requisites and necessary steps to fulfill the real purpose of administrative litigation, 
i.e. protecting the lawful rights and interests of the ruled. Article one of the Law 
should contain only that single purpose for the proper execution and development of 
administrative litigation in the PRe. 
Secondly, Article five of the Law traps the operation and development of 
administrative litigation in the PRC by stating two restrictions, i.e. examination of 
specific administrative acts only and examination of their legality only. Lawful 
rights and interests of the ruled cannot be fully protected and administrative 
litigation cannot be fully established under these two qualifications. The article 
should be amended to allow the PRC's administrative litigation to examine both 
specific and abstract administrative acts and most preferably the reasonableness of 
these acts as well. 
Thirdly, the scope of protection and review specified in Article 11 of the Law is 
too narrow for protecting lawful rights of the ruled and allowing growth of 
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administrative litigation in the mainland. Administrative litigation should not be 
restricted to reviewing the rulers' infringement on the ruled's personal and property 
rights only. The article should be revised to allow administrative litigation to review 
all infringements by the rulers on all kinds of lawful rights and interests of the ruled, 
including political and social rights. Fourthly, Article 12 of the Law should also be 
amended for the same reasons by reducing the list of exemptions to include only acts 
of the state. Administrative rules and regulations (i.e. abstract administrative acts), 
internal personnel decisions of the administration, and the so-called 'ultimate' 
specific administrative acts (i.e. acts declared as ultimate by laws and administrative 
rules) should not be allowed to escape the jurisdiction of administrative litigation. 
Fifthly, Article 41(1) of the Law restricts the protection of administrative 
litigation to only those members of the ruled whose rights are being "directly" 
infringed while those who have their rights indirectly infringed are not entitled to 
such protection. The article should be amended by removing this unreasonable 
restriction if lawful rights of all the ruled are to be equally protected and 
administrative litigation is to be fairly implemented and further developed. 
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Sixthly, following the above suggestion to include examination of the 
reasonableness of the rulers' administrative acts within the jurisdiction of 
administrative litigation, Article 54(4) of the Law will have to be amended to allow 
the courts to revoke administrative acts that are unjust or unreasonable. Lastly, the 
punishment of concerned officials for their administrative improprieties is too 
lenient under the present Article 68 for sufficient correctional and deterring effects. 
Although acting in the name of the government, individual officials should also bear 
the responsibility for their misuse of public power and improper acts. The penalty 
code that incident of administrative impropriety will be recorded in the personal 
dossiers of responsible officials and will be considered in the latter's performance 
appraisals, should be written into the said article so that proper administration and 
rule according to the law can be promoted and the full effects of administrative 
litigation can be achieved. 
The above suggested amendments of the Law aIm to bring the PRe's 
administrative litigation back to its real purpose, put the institution on the right path, 
and foster its further development in the long-run, but that objective also depends on 
the serious execution of the Law, and implementation of related supporting laws. 
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Revising the Law cannot help further administrative litigation if the Law is not 
seriously followed and executed. The Law, however well written, also needs the 
support of related legislation, e.g. the PRC's State Compensations Law and the 
PRC's Administrative Procedure Law, and their proper execution for a concerted 
effort to protect lawful rights of the ruled, to promote rule according to the law 
among the rulers, and to improve the ruled-rulers relationship in the mainland. 
2. The Ruled 
If administrative litigation is to be promoted and developed in the mainland, the 
"three-don't" syndrome of the Chinese ruled must be cured. Administrative 
litigation cannot endure and grow if the ruled don't know how to sue, don't want to 
sue, and don't dare to sue despite their intense need to do so. Short-lived propaganda 
by the rulers on the value and significance of the PRC's administrative litigation 
during its promulgation is more a display of the rulers' achievement than the 
education of the ruled on how to use the institution. To begin with, continuous 
promotion on what is administrative litigation, comprehensible explanation of the 
Law's stipulations, and user-oriented education on when, where and how to sue are 
332 
just the basic necessary steps to bring administrative litigation to the ruled. Every 
effort must be made to pass those information onto every member of the ruled, 
however remote they live and whatever job they do. 
On the other hand, to bring the ruled to administrative litigation can be more 
difficult because removing their hesitation and worry with the use of administrative 
litigation is not easy. The Chinese tradition of avoiding the rulers and the courts 
needs to be changed through long-term reinforcing education on the usefulness and 
helpfulness of the institution. This relates with the above suggested amendments of 
the Law to strengthen the usefulness of administrative litigation. The more helpful 
the institution is, the more attractive its use will be. In addition, promoting the idea 
of rule of law in the society and the use of litigation as means to resolve disputes can 
also help bring the Chinese ruled closer to the PRC's administrative litigation. This 
relates with the strengthening of the Chinese legal system which will be discussed in 
the last section concerning the courts. 
Hesitation with the use of administrative litigation can also be reduced if the 
related troubles are reduced to the minimum and maximum assistance is provided. 
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Some commentators suggest removing the basic-level people's courts from first 
hearing of administrative litigation cases so that the latter will be conducted by more 
powerful intermediate level people's courts.2 This may be advantageous to a minor 
group of the ruled who live in the cities and close to the higher level people's courts. 
But for the majority who reside in the counties and countryside, that would mean a 
lot more trouble and difficulty with the pursuit of litigation. The proposal will 
simply bring more harm than benefit. On the contrary, administrative litigation 
should be made as convenient as possible for the users, e.g. easily accessible, 
minimum formalities, and little technical procedure. Besides, assistance such as an 
information hot line, inquiry services, consultation aid, and help with filling in 
related papers, should be made available to potential users to facilitate their pursuit 
of litigation. 
Finally, worries with the use of administrative litigation can be reduced if the 
ruled are reassured of fair hearing and protected from retaliatory actions after suing 
the rulers. That can be difficult because the Chinese judiciary is dependent on the 
administration and the latter has been and is still overwhelmingly powerful. 
Measures to control retaliatory actions and to ensure a fair hearing will be discussed 
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in the following sections concerning the rulers and the courts, respectively. 
3. The Rulers 
Rectifying the rulers' "three-averse" syndrome, strengthening their legal 
training, rationalising their self-legislated rules and regulations, and preventing them 
from taking retaliatory actions after being sued, are some of the urgent tasks to be 
carried through not just for improving their administration but also for reducing their 
hindrance to the development of administrative litigation in the PRe. 
The "three-averse" syndrome among the rulers mainly originates from a self-
asserted sense of incontestability and supremacy over the ruled. If the rulers can 
really accept the proclaimed slogan that they dedicate to serve the people, the 
proclaimed master of the country, then they would not have undue worry about and 
passive resistance to administrative litigation. The key to rectifying the rulers' 
"three-averse" syndrome is therefore to change their attitude through education. 
They must be taught to drop their feeling of incontestability and supremacy so that 
they can accept being sued by the ruled and being equal with the ruled in 
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administrative litigation. The officials should have it explained to them that 
administrative litigation is just a legal forum for the ruled to defend lawful rights as 
much as for the rulers to defend lawful administrative acts, and that being sued does 
not means they have been wrong or they will lose in the end of litigation. The rulers 
should be cultivated with the courage to appear in courts to defend, if not to account 
for, their actions, and to take up rebuttal of or punishment for their faults. They 
should be reminded that their reputation and legitimacy depend not just on their 
good administration but also, or perhaps more so, on their correcting wrongful 
administration. In a word, they should be told that administrative litigation is not a 
threat or harassment but an opportunity if they are faultless, a rescue if they are not. 
Besides the above remedial education, further legal training for the rulers is 
essential if obstruction to administrative litigation is to be reduced and development 
to be facilitated. The rulers should be trained to respect the law so that they would 
respect administrative litigation and the courts. They should be trained to accept the 
rule of law so that they would not interfere with the process, participants, evidence 
and fairness of litigation. They should be trained with the laws upon which to 
exercise their authority so that they can observe the limits and procedure, thereby 
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reducing the cases for litigation on one hand and strengthening their own cases on 
the other hand. Such training should be gIven to all administrative officials, 
especially those in law enforcement and semor management because of their 
strategic position. Officials who represent the administration in litigation should also 
be trained with the necessary knowledge and skills so that they can fulfill the 
obligations of a defendant and facilitate the process of litigation. 
The third task is to rationalise the rulers' self-legislated administrative rules and 
regulations because the latter are too chaotic and defective at present to provide a 
clear and appropriate legal basis for the rulers to rule, the ruled to observe, and the 
courts to judge. Rules and regulations that contravene the constitution, state's laws 
or higher level administrative rules are simply illegal and should be discarded. 
Administrative acts based on such illegal rules and regulations are equally unlawful 
and should be revoked. Arbitrary or unreasonable rules and regulations should be 
amended and the related administrative acts corrected. Ambiguous rules and 
regulations should be clarified and better guidance should be given to front-line 
officials on the exercise of discretionary powers. Such a rationalisation exercise 
involves an enormous amount of work and all levels of the administration, from the 
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State Council to local level governments. Yet, it is only after the rulers complete this 
task seriously and satisfactorily can they then establish a solid ground to support 
their administrative acts, the courts find a yardstick for their judgment, and 
administrative litigation acquires the legal basis to proceed. 
The final task focuses on the problem of government officials' retaliation or 
threat of retaliation which deters the ruled from suing and hinders administrative 
litigation from growing. In fact, there are a lot of existing channels whereby those 
illegal retaliatory actions can be reported and handled, e.g. respective people's 
congress, higher levels of the government, the courts, the procuratorate, and even the 
mass media. However, the question is their effectiveness and helpfulness. To resolve 
the problem, these channels should be invigorated to strengthen their effectiveness 
in dealing with retaliation complaints. The affected members of the ruled should be 
encouraged to make complaint of such retaliation and reassured that their complaints 
will be seriously handled. Officials found responsible for retaliation have to be 
seriously punished, including dismissal or transfer-out. Strictly prohibiting and 
punishing retaliatory actions is essential to the normal functioning of administrative 
litigation and the building of a fair society. 
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4. The Courts 
The jUdiciary plays a very important role as the arbitrator in administrative 
litigation as well as the executor and defender of the institution, hence, strengthening 
the Chinese judiciary is critical to the implementation and development of the PRC's 
administrative litigation. Firstly, the judiciary must be separated from the 
administration and given its own budget and provisions to be managed vertically 
within the judiciary system so that the jUdiciary will no longer have to depend on the 
administration whom may appear as defendant in administrative litigation. 
Secondly, a team of professional administrative litigation judges must be 
established. The judges should be selected carefully from candidates of top calibre 
based strictly on merits, appointed with tenure for stronger sense of commitment and 
better career development, assured of job security if they can maintain good job 
performance, and paid with reasonably attractive remuneration to keep their 
attention on the job. They have to be accountable to the appointing authorities, 
whether the people's congress or higher level of the judiciary, only for their personal 
integrity and overall job performance, not specific decisions in individual cases. 
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Relevant and continuous training should be arranged for the judges to build up their 
professional knowledge and skills in respect of the conduct of administrative 
litigation, the contents of administrative legislation, and the conditions of public 
administration in the mainland. 
Thirdly, pitfalls in the conduct of case hearings should be corrected. The courts 
should stop playing the role of case investigator and prosecutor but retreat to acting 
as an independent arbitrator only rather than a master of the entire hearing process. 
There should be no more nominal collegial panel where in fact the first judge 
conducts the entire hearing. Members of the collegial panel should be carefully 
chosen to ensure they are all competent with regard to the case and assigned once a 
case is accepted to allow them time to prepare for the hearing. The panel should be 
given full power to hear the case independently, not on the direction of higher level 
court officials, and all members of the panel should be required to bear the full 
responsibility for their collective decisions. During the hearing, both the plaintiff and 
defendant should be allowed to present their cases and evidence fully in open court 
so that rights and wrongs can be clarified before all parties, justice can be protected 
throughout the process, and the final decision can be accepted by both the winner 
340 
and loser in the end. A major fault with past hearings is shifting the focus of hearing 
from examining the legality and reasonableness of the defendant's administrative 
acts to exploring the plaintiff's liability for the administrative acts and that mistake 
must be corrected if the hearing is not to be misdirected. 
In summary, separating the judiciary from the administration, building a 
professional team of administrative litigation judges, and reforming the hearing 
system, are some of the more important tasks to be fulfilled in respect of the courts 
if administrative litigation is to be better implemented and developed in the 
mainland. 
B. Expectational Orientation of the Surveyed Individual Household 
Proprietors 
As elaborated in the theoretical framework, expectational orientation refers to 
the faith of the concerned parties in administrative litigation, their belief about the 
institution's prospects, and hopes for its future. In particular, it seeks to explore how 
far the parties believe administrative litigation should be further developed, on what 
grounds and under what conditions. Accordingly, five questions were asked of the 
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sampled proprietors to measure their expectational orientation (see Table 7.1 for the 
questions). Their responses are reported and discussed in the following. 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Proprietors' Expectational Orientation 
In response to the first three expectational orientation questions about whether 
they look forward to further developing administrative litigation in the PRe and on 
what grounds, the proprietors' replies were very much alike, with standard 
deviations as small as 0.58 to 0.64 (see Table 7.1 below). In all three cases, over 90 
per cent of the proprietors readily articulated support for further development of 
administrative litigation, with above 30 per cent of them stating totally agree, and 
only less than 2 per cent saying no (see Appendix 5). In particular, the proprietors' 
first concern and strongest support (93.5 per cent) was due to expectation for further 
protection of citizens' legal rights and interests under administrative litigation. This 
was followed by the expectation for strengthening the rule of law under the 
institution (91 per cent), and then advancing the reform and opening (90.1 per cent). 
It is obvious that all the three reasons are more or less equally important in the 
proprietors' expectational orientation, and are all important factors contributing to 
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their support for further development of administrative litigation in the mainland. 
Table 7.1 Responses of the Proprietors to the Five Expectational Orientation Questions 
33 Administrative litigation can help q 
- -
advance the reform and opening, % 
hence should be further developed. 
34 Administrative litigation can help q 
--
protect citizens' legal rights and interests, % 
hence should be further developed. 
35 Administrative litigation can help q 
- -
strengthen the rule of law, % 
hence should be further developed. 
36 Development of administrative litigation q 
- -
requires judicial independence. % 
37 There is a bright future for administrative q 
- -
litigation but the road is winding. % 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
652 
------
90.1 
678 
------
93.S 
657 
------
91.0 
414 
------
57.2 
596 
------
82.3 
N D ? s.d. 
35 II 26 0.64 
----- - - - --
------
4.8 1.5 3.6 
26 4 17 0.58 
- - --- - - - --
------
3.6 0.6 2.3 
37 8 20 0.61 
----- - - - --
------
5.1 1.1 2.8 
77 73 160 1.02 
----- -----
------
10.6 10.1 22.1 
57 17 54 0.70 
----- -----
-- ..... -
7.9 2.3 7.S 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don't know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
Besides high expectations, the majority of the proprietors also had faith in the 
institution's future but they were equally aware of the difficulties on the way. Up to 
82.3 per cent of the proprietors understood the road to success would be winding. 
With regard to judicial independence as a necessary condition for further 
development of administrative litigation, the proprietors were much more unsure. 
There were 57.2 per cent of them who believed judicial independence was necessary, 
10.1 per cent considered it not necessary, and as much as 32.7 per cent were not sure 
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or did not have an answer. Diversity in their responses to this question produced a 
much higher standard deviation of 1.02. 
Overall expectational orientation scores of the proprietors indicate a clear 
majority of 82.8 per cent in support of further developing administrative litigation in 
the mainland, despite all practical difficulties, and securing judicial independence is 
probably one of the difficulties that needs to be overcome (see Table 7.2 below). 
Unsupporting opinion amounts to only 3.1 per cent. After all, administrative 
litigation is tied with the proprietors' personal interests and the nation's well being. 
It is clear that most of the proprietors have no doubt about that, they have solid faith 
in the institution and high hope for its further development. 
Table 7.2 Overall Expectational Orientation Scores of the Proprietors 
Overall Expectational Orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don't know; 
A 
tq 2997 
-- - -- -------
aq 599.4 
---- --------
% 82.8 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
344 
N D ? 
232 113 277 
------- ------- -------
46.4 22.6 55.4 
------- ------- -------
6.4 3.1 7.7 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Proprietors' Expectational Orientation 
Expectational orientation is the fourth administrative litigation orientation of 
the proprietors with a perfect internal relationship (see Table 7.3 below). The 
proprietors' answers to all five expectational orientation questions were mutually 
correlated. The degree of correlation was pretty strong as well, with an average 
correlation coefficient of 0.53. Responses to the first three expectational orientation 
questions on the grounds for supporting further development of administrative 
litigation had an association coefficient even up to 0.80, which was much higher 
than the average. It is clear that there are multiple grounds for the proprietors' 
expectation for further development of administrative litigation and those 
considerations are all important in leading to the proprietors' high hope for a better 
administrative litigation in the mainland. With greater uncertainty on the issue of 
judicial independence, the proprietors' answers to that question were least correlated 
with that of the other four questions. 
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Table 7.3 Speannan's rho Correlation Coefficients for Internal Relationship of the 
Proprietors' Expectational Orientation 
Q 33 34 35 36 37 
33 .78 .78 .31 i 047 
.. I 
...................... ·······················t··· ·················· .. j·· .. •· ·· ··• .. ··· .. •· .. ················ ··· ·····1····· .. ·· ·········· .... 
34 .78 ! I .80 .31 I .50 
: 1 • 
....... ....... ........ ......... ...... ....... ~ .. ........ ... .......... ! ....... .... .. .... .. .... ················· ······t ······· ·· ·· ···· ·· ····· 
35 .78 ! .80 ! .39 I .52 
:: . 
36 .31 I .3 1 I .39 i Al 
...................... ,·········· ···········i····· .. ········· ··· .. ··!· .... ··· .... · .......... ·······················t···· .. ······ .. · .. ····· 
37 .47 i .50 1 .52 AI ! 
Row highest in shade, average rho coefficient = 0.53. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
3. External Relationship of the Proprietors' Expectational Orientation 
The external relationship of the proprietors' expectational orientation measured 
by correlation analysis is summarised and reported in Table 7.4 below. 
Table 7.4 External Relationship of the Proprietors' Expectational Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Slight 
Affective Small 
Jurisdictional Perfect 
Evaluational Perfect 
Appraisal Very Strong 
The proprietors' cognitive and expectational orientations were only slightly 
related, meanjng that their expectation in respect of administrative litigation was 
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basically not tied with nor based upon their cognition of it. A slightly better 
correlation was found for answers to cognitive orientation questions 4 and 5 about 
knowledge of the Law. It seems that proprietors with more specific knowledge of the 
Law tend to have higher expectation. However, that association was not too strong, 
with Spearman's rho correlation coefficients from only 0.14 to 0.19 (see Table 7.S 
below). Yet, it IS quite obvious that simple realisation of the existence of 
administrative litigation IS not enough for members of the ruled to breed high 
expectations whereas more solid cognition would tend to help. 
Table 7.S Correlation Coefficients for External Relationship of the Proprietors ' 
Expectational Orientation 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
33 14 18 10 08 23 22 24 22 19 18 18 42 40 43 40 39 33 08 09 14 14 12 15 
34 16 15 16 15 09 22 20 21 22 16 14 14 40 41 41 39 36 29 11 II 13 15 12 14 
35 15 18 14 10 10 27 26 27 26 21 19 20 38 38 42 37 39 37 15 16 10 11 18 18 14 20 
36 16 17 08 16 22 24 23 27 16 20 08 11 16 14 19 27 25 19 17 25 31 29 22 29 
37 19 17 11 18 22 20 25 17 17 16 23 29 29 24 24 27 15 11 09 16 19 15 14 16 
Phi correlation for QI-5 , rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
To a lesser extent, expectational orientation of the proprietors was also not tied 
with nor based upon their affective orientation towards administrative litigation. 
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Limited association was found between the two except for affective orientation 
question 8, i.e. whether the respondent supported establishing the institution. Yet, the 
correlation coefficients were even less strong, only -0.09 to -0.10. It seems that how 
well the respondents receive the institution and how far they want it to go are two 
quite different issues. The former is more about feeling while the latter is more on 
the practical side of the subject. That may as well explain the close relationship 
between jurisdictional and expectational orientations of the proprietors. 
Both being concerned with administrative litigation in practice, jurisdictional 
and expectational orientations of the proprietors matched with a perfect relationship. 
Although the Spearman's rho correlation coefficients were not too high, just 0.14-
0.27, but answers to all questions of the two orientations were indeed significantly 
related. It may be said that what they conceive administrative litigation should do, 
inherently leads to which direction they expect the institution to develop. In 
particular, answers to the five jurisdictional orientation questions concerning the 
depth of protection under administrative litigation had a closer association with 
answers to all expectational orientation questions than that of the other two 
jurisdictional orientation questions about the width of protection. The two types of 
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protection do manifest difference when related with the long-term development of 
administrative litigation, i.e. the depth of protection is more important and 
influential. 
Based on the conceived capacity of administrative litigation, subsequent effects 
of the institution can be calculated, and then its likely prospects can be projected. 
However remote, that is the consequential order mentioned in chapter 5 and inferred 
from the finding of a perfect relationship between the proprietors' jurisdictional and 
expectational orientations, as well as between their evaluational and expectational 
orientations. The degree of correlation for the latter varied from Spearman's rho 
correlation coefficients of 0.08 to 0.42, with the highest for answers to expectational 
orientation question 33 about administrative litigation could help promote reform, 
and the lowest for answers to expectational orientation question 36 about judicial 
independence. The average correlation coefficient was 0.32. 
Lastly, relationship of the proprietors' expectational orientation with their 
appraisal orientation was also very strong, with Spearman's rho correlation 
coefficients from 0.08 to 0.31. Only answers to two of the appraisal and 
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expectational orientations questions were not mutually correlated. It indicates that 
the proprietors' expectation on the future of administrative litigation is also tied with 
and, to certain extent, affected by their appraisal of the institution's usefulness. 
4. Expectational Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Proprietors 
Detailed analysis of the proprietors' responses by means of cross-tabulation 
shows that two of their personal particulars have little association with their 
expectational orientation, four have a slightly significant correlation, and the other 
three have a significant relationship (see Table 7.6 below, details of the extensive 
cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space constraints). 
Table 7.6 Relationship between the Proprietors' Expectational Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Insignificant Gender Income 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Age 
Slightly Significant Political Status Kind of Business 
Working District 
-------------------------. --------------------------
Working Years 
Significant Residency 
Education Level 
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Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
As in the case of four other orientations, gender was again not an important 
factor in the proprietors' expectational orientation and had no significant 
relationship with the latter. Both gender sub-groups had a similar expectation on 
administrative litigation especially in support of it based on the three suggested 
grounds. Slight difference was only discerned in the last two expectational 
orientation questions. A significantly higher percentage of the male proprietors 
believed that administrative litigation would have a bright future though not an easy 
one and that judicial independence was necessary for the institution's real progress. 
Comparatively, the females were less certain in these two regards, with much more 
unknown answers to both questions. The phi correlation analysis also generated little 
significant findings (see Table 7.7 below). 
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Income of the proprietors was another personal particular found to have little 
relationship with their expectational orientation because the expectational 
orientation scores for sub-groups of this personal particular were very fluctuating, 
showing no consistent pattern of association. Uneven distribution of the proprietors 
sample among varIOUS Income sub-groups also made the search for correlation 
difficult. Statistical bias might happen to sub-groups with particularly small sizes 
like the three highest income sub-groups. Spearman's rho correlation analysis also 
gave no significant findings (see Table 7.7 above). In short, how much income the 
proprietors earn each month seems to have no impact on how they foresee the future 
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of administrative litigation, i.e. personal economic factor is not too important here. 
Sub-Groups with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Age of the proprietors showed a slightly positive relationship with their 
expectational orientation, especially with regard to the last two expectational 
orientation questions about judicial independence and the institution's road ahead. 
The majority of the proprietors belonged to the first two age sub-groups where the 
elder ones had significantly higher percentage of supportive answers to all 
expectational orientation questions than the younger ones. In addition, the eldest age 
sub-group of over 60 also had the highest percentage of positive answers to two of 
the expectational orientation questions and the second highest to the other three. On 
the contrary, the younger age sub-group tended to have a higher percentage of 
neutral, negative and unknown answers. On the whole, greater years of age was 
related with a higher expectation on administrative litigation as well as greater 
consensus on a winding road ahead for the institution. Spearman's rho correlation 
analysis also confirmed that answers to all five expectational orientation questions 
were significantly related with the proprietors' age, but the correlation coefficients 
were not too high, from just -0.09 to -0.21 (see Table 7.7 above). 
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Political status of the proprietors was also found to have a slightly significant 
association with their expectational orientation because one of the sub-groups, i.e. 
Communist Party members, possessed distinctly higher scores in all five 
expectational orientation questions, suggesting a relatively greater influence of such 
membership on their expectational orientation. Other than those democratic parties 
members who did not have a sufficient population in the sample for viable 
comparison, the other two sub-groups of Communist Youth League members and 
independent proprietors had quite similar expectational orientation scores except on 
the issue of judicial independence where the Communist Youth League members 
disagreed significantly more. Yet, such a difference was not comparable to the 
departure from group norm of the Communist Party members who had distinctly 
high affirmative answers to all expectational orientation questions. Their consistency 
in saying yes was not matched by the other two sub-groups. Yet, Cramer's V 
correlation analysis could not reveal the above association in its findings (see Table 
7.7 above). 
Analogous to their appraisal orientation, the proprietors' expectational 
orientation was also slightly related with and affected by their kind of business in 
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that the repairing sub-groups responded uniquely distinct from the rest. Although the 
repairing sub-group was most negative with the practical usefulness of 
administrative litigation under the present reality of the PRC as mentioned in the last 
chapter, they had the highest faith and greatest hope in the institution's future. They 
rendered 100 per cent support for further development of administrative litigation 
with no hesitation, seeing all three suggested grounds important and sound enough 
for rendering support. They also agreed with the highest percentage that judicial 
independence was important and necessary for furthering the institution. The other 
three sub-groups of retailing, catering, and servicing proprietors had basically 
similar expectational orientation scores and their nature of business did not seem to 
have differentiating effect on their expectational orientation. Again, the Cramer's V 
correlation analysis failed to identify such a unique relationship and turned out with 
no significant findings (see Table 7.7 above). 
Proprietors working in different districts were basically similar in their level of 
conviction about improving administrative litigation. However, they differed 
significantly in how they saw the institution's future. Xuan Wu district proprietors 
were much more convinced with the necessity of judicial independence and the 
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possibility of a bright future for administrative litigation, whereas Hai Dian district 
proprietors, who tended to be younger and better educated, were much less 
optimistic in both regards. In view of this, the working district of the proprietors was 
regarded as having only slight impact on and association with their expectationai 
orientation. Cramer's V correlation analysis also affirmed a significant association 
between working district and answers to the first and the last two expectational 
orientation questions, with the same coefficient of 0.12 (see Table 7.7 above). 
Sub-Groups with Significant Relationship 
On the whole, there was basically a significant positive relationship between 
the proprietors' working years and expectational orientation but there was consistent 
slight variation at both extremes of the sub-groups. Looking at the agreeing answers 
in all expectational orientation questions, there was a significant percentage increase 
with the rise in seniority for the middle three sub-groups between one to ten years in 
the job. Proprietors with longer working years tended to have stronger and more 
positive expectation on administrative litigation. Yet, the new entrances of less than 
one year had higher expectations than the next more senior sub-group of one to three 
years in four expectational orientation questions, though still lower than the next 
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sub-group of four to six years. On the other hand, the most senior sub-group with 
over ten years as proprietors did not follow the increasing trend but had slight 
regress in all questions. Such trend of positive increase with zigzag at both ends was 
pretty consistent, clearly showing how the proprietors' expectational orientation 
changed with their years in the industry. Spearman's rho correlation analysis also 
confirmed a significant relationship between working years and answers to all 
expectational orientation questions, with coefficients from -0.08 to -0.18 (see Table 
7.7 above). 
With or without local residency was also significantly related with the 
proprietors' expectational orientation. Those with Beijing municipal residency had 
significantly higher percentage of supportive answers to all expectational orientation 
questions than those without, especially to the last two questions about judicial 
independence and the road ahead for administrative litigation. With a closer tie to 
the locality and probably stronger sense of belonging, local residents presented a 
higher expectation on administrative litigation and more affirmative answers on the 
necessity of judicial independence and likelihood of a bright future. Those without 
residency were much more unsure on the issue of judicial independence, with 
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significantly higher percentage of disagreeing and unknown answers. The phi 
correlation analysis confinned a significant relationship between residency and 
answers to the last three expectational orientation questions with coefficients from 
0.13 to 0.29 (see Table 7.7 above). 
A basically positive relationship was also found between the proprietors' 
education level and expectational orientation. Higher level of education was 
correlated with higher level of expectation on administrative litigation. Though 
being only the minority sub-group, proprietors with undergraduate and above 
education presented 100 per cent support for the institution's further development. A 
slight variation happened to the second lowest education sub-group of lower 
secondary only, whose percentage of supportive answers to the last two 
expectational orientation questions was the lowest while that of unknown answers 
was highest. This sub-group appeared to be most uncertain in regard of the necessity 
of judicial independence and the road ahead for administrative litigation. 
Spearman's rho correlation analysis also confinned a significant relationship 
between education level and answers to four of the expectational orientation 
questions, with coefficients of -0.08 to -0.19 (see Table 7.7 above). 
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In summary, the majority of the interviewed proprietors supported further 
development of administrative litigation, agreed with the grounds for such 
development, and expected a bright future for the institution. Major deviation from 
this group norm was only observed in sub-groups under three personal particulars. 
To certain extent, proprietors with lower level of education, fewer working years in 
the industry, and catering and servicing as their businesses, were likely to have lower 
level of expectation on administrative litigation and support for its further 
development. In respect of the last two expectational orientation questions about 
judicial independence and the road ahead for administrative litigation, greater 
variation was found in the proprietors' answers. Proprietors who were males, older 
in age, senior in the industry, retailing by business, Communist Party members, local 
residents, and better educated, tended to have distinctly more affirmative answers, 
regarding judicial independence as indispensable and the future for administrative 
litigation to be bright. To conclude, supporting further development of 
administrative litigation is little disputed by the proprietors, but how and how far are 
issues with dissonance. 
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C. Expectational Orientation of the Surveyed Government Officials 
1. Overall Level and Pattern of the Officials' Expectational Orientation 
Unlike the proprietors who are the principal beneficiaries of administrative 
litigation, government officials are potential defendants to whom the institution may 
be less pleasing. However, the interviewed officials uttered even stronger support for 
the institution's further development than the proprietors, though for slightly 
different reasons. Enhancing rule of law in the country was the most important 
expectation of the officials, shared by 96.0 per cent of the sample, when they offered 
support for the institution's continuity (see Table 7.8 below). The proprietors' first 
choice of strengthening protection of citizens' legal rights and interests was only the 
second concern to the officials, maintained by 94.7 per cent of the sample, yet still 
1.2 per cent higher than the proprietors. Last was helping the reform and opening, 
declared by 90.7 per cent of the sample. If the officials' answers represent their true 
expectation, then they are supporting the institution not for their own interest or 
direct benefit, but for the well-being of the society and the ruled in general. That is 
in itself already very promising for the future of administrative litigation. 
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Table 7.8 Responses of the Officials to the Five Expectational Orientation Questions 
33 Administrative litigation can help q 
--
advance the reform and opening, % 
hence should be further developed. 
34 Administrative litigation can help q 
- -
protect citizens ' legal rights and interests, % 
hence should be further developed. 
35 Administrative litigation can help q 
- -
strengthen the rule of law, % 
hence should be further developed. 
36 Development of administrative litigation q 
- -
requires judicial independence. % 
37 There is a bright future for administrative q 
--
litigation but the road is winding. % 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; 
? = Don't know; s.d. = Standard deviation; 
A 
138 
------
90.7 
144 
------
94.7 
146 
------
96.0 
117 
------
76.9 
134 
------
88.2 
N D ? s.d. 
II 2 I 0.65 
- - - -- - ---- ------
7.2 1.4 0.7 
5 I 2 0.58 
- - - -- - - - --
--- - - -
3.3 0.7 1.3 
5 I 0 0.58 
- ---- - - - --
------
3.3 0.7 0.0 
20 7 8 0.78 
......... ... ... ............... 
------
13.2 4.6 5.3 
13 I 4 0.58 
............... ... ............ 
------
8.5 0.7 2.6 
D = Totally disagree and disagree; 
q = Frequency. 
"Don' t know" and "missing value" not included in the calculation of standard deviation. 
Another promising sign is 76.9 per cent of the interviewed officials subscribed 
to judicial independence for the development of administrative litigation, which is 
19.7 per cent higher than that of the proprietors. Only less than 5 per cent of the 
officials did not see the need. Moreover, 88.2 per cent of them expected a bright 
future for administrative litigation despite a rather zigzag road along the way. In 
view of the fact that allowing judicial independence is not the official policy, the 
officials' responses are believed to reflect their individual opinions, not the official 
standpoint, and their responses are indeed unorthodox and daring. 
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On the whole, expectational orientation of the officials was even more positive 
with more supportive answers and more consistent with smaller standard deviations 
than the proprietors. The officials' overall expectational orientation scores showed 
89.3 per cent being optimistic and expectant with administrative litigation, which 
was 6.5 per cent higher than that of the proprietors. Only 1.6 per cent of the officials 
as a whole expressed negative expectations (see Table 7.9 below). 
Table 7.9 Overall Expectational Orientation Scores of the Officials 
A N 0 ? 
tq 679 54 12 15 
- - - -- ------- ------- ------- -------
Overall Expectational Orientation aq 135.8 10.8 2.4 3.0 
............... 
------- ------- ------- -- ---- -% 89.3 7.1 1.6 2.0 
A = Totally agree and agree; 
? = Don' t know; 
N = Neutral; 
tq = Total Frequency; 
o = Totally disagree and disagree; 
aq = Average Frequency. 
2. Internal Relationship of the Officials' Expectational Orientation 
The expectational orientation of the officials was the third and the last one to 
have a perfect internal relationship besides jurisdictional and evaluational 
orientations (see Table 7.10 below). In much the same way as the proprietors, the 
officials' answers to all five expectational orientation questions were mutually 
correlated and the degree of correlation was quite strong as well, with an average 
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coefficient of 0.54. Answers to the first three questions on the grounds for support of 
further developing administrative litigation were also found to be more closely 
related, with coefficients up to 0.88. The officials also exhibit multiple grounds for 
their expectation on further development of administrative litigation and those 
reasons are very much inter-related. With greater certainty on the issue of judicial 
independence, the officials' answers to that question were not much less correlated 
with that of the other questions, especially with answers to the last question where a 
higher than average coefficient was found. 
Table 7.10 Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficients for the Internal Relationship of the 
Officials' Expectational Orientation 
Q 33 34 35 36 37 
33 ! .79 1 .72 .33 .43 
! i 1 
....................... · .. ····· .. ···· .. ······1·········· .... ··· .. ····r .. ··· .. ········ ....... ········· .. ···· .. ···· ··r· ·· ··················· 
34 .79 i 1 .88 .27 i .51 
.............. ........ ...................... 4 ..... " ................ ~ ................. .. ........................... ~ .... ................. . 
: i ! 35 .72 i .88 i .31 i .53 
i i ! 
36 .33 I .27 I .31 I .60 
...... ................................... .. ....... ..... ... ... .. ...... j .... ...... .. ..... .... .. ............ ..... .... .. ,. .. ... .. .............. . 
37 .43 ! .51 i .53 .60 i 
:! i 
Row highest in shade, average rho coeffici ent = 0.54. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
3. External Relationship of the Officials' Expectational Orientation 
The external relationship of the officials' expectational orientation measured by 
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correlation analysis is summarised and reported in Table 7.11 below. 
Table 7.11 External Relationship of the Officials' Expectational Orientation 
Orientation Relationship 
Cognitive Small 
Affective Fairly Strong 
Jurisdictional Fairly Strong 
Evaluational Perfect 
Appraisal Small 
The expectational orientation of the officials had limited relationship with their 
cognitive orientation, to an even lesser extent than the proprietors. Simple realisation 
and solid understanding of administrative litigation do not seem to make any 
difference in the officials' expectational orientation. After all, the cognitive 
orientation of the officials is found to be insignificantly related with their all other 
five orientations, which means that cognitive orientation may not be a very 
important part of the officials' administrative litigation culture. 
To a greater extent than the proprietors this time, a fairly strong relationship 
was found between the officials' expectational and affective orientations, with 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficients from -0.17 to -0.35 (see Table 7.12 below). 
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As mentioned In chapter 3, the officials' answers to all expectational orientation 
questions, except question 36 about judicial independence, were significantly 
correlated in ascending order with their answers to affective orientation questions 6, 
8, and 10. To reiterate, officials who agreed with the use of administrative litigation, 
supported its establishment, and, in particular, cared for its implementation, were 
also likely to have a greater commitment to the institution's further advancement, 
especially on the grounds of protecting citizens' legal rights and promoting further 
reform and opening. It seems that better affective feeling towards administrative 
litigation can contribute to a higher expectation on the latter among the officials. 
Table 7.12 Correlation Coefficients for the External Relationship of the Officials' 
Expectational Orientation 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Q I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
33 26 23 30 23 29 28 17 34 24 47 45 46 32 35 35 20 
34 37 32 24 24 33 35 19 33 33 20 31 21 27 53 51 47 38 29 27 24 21 17 
35 37 23 23 26 28 37 32 24 33 18 29 49 42 43 39 23 22 17 
36 21 17 22 29 35 29 22 22 
37 30 17 22 33 26 26 22 19 23 46 47 47 38 25 26 
Phi correlation for Ql-5, rho for others, phi & rho coefficients at 2 decimal points. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed, negative in shade. 
The relationship between the officials' expectational and jurisdictional 
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orientations was not perfect like that of the proprietors but still fairly strong. By the 
same rationale, how much further the officials expect administrative litigation to be 
developed is related with and affected by what they conceive the institution to do. 
Spearman's rho correlation coefficients between the two orientations varied from 
0.17 to 0.37 (see Table 7.12 above). The only jurisdictional orientation question that 
had answers with no significant correlation with the expectational orientation 
responses was question 17 about the abstract administrative act of unreasonable 
regulation. It does reflect the greater reservation among the officials concerning 
unreasonable regulation as a ground for litigation by the ruled. 
The evaluational orientation of the officials was the only one to have a perfect 
relationship with their expectational orientation. As mentioned earlier, likely 
immediate effects and estimated long-term development of administrative litigation 
are two inseparable issues. Spearman's rho correlation coefficients for these two 
orientations of the officials were even higher than that of the proprietors, reaching 
0.22 to 0.53, meaning that the prefect relationship was pretty strong as well. In 
particular, answers to the first four evaluational orientation questions 19-22 about 
direct correctional effects of administrative litigation, were much more strongly 
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correlated with the officials' expectational orientation responses than that of the last 
two evaluational orientation questions about the less direct positive effects of 
administrative litigation on the government. This further suggests that effects that 
are more immediately and directly related with the institution of administrative 
litigation, like protecting citizens' legal rights and interests, will have a stronger 
relationship with and implication on the expectation outlook for the institution. 
Unlike the case of the proprietors where a strong correlation was found, the 
officials' appraisal and expectational orientations were barely correlated. Only five 
cases of correlation were found. The Spearman's rho correlation coefficients among 
them were -0.17 to -0.24. The officials' expectation on administrative litigation 
seems to be little related with and barely dependent upon their rating on the latter's 
present usefulness. 
4. Expectational Orientation among Different Sub-Groups of Officials 
Analysis of the officials' expectational orientation responses by means of cross-
tabulation shows that almost all of their personal particulars have no significant 
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relationship with their expectational orientation, except for the personal particular of 
income where a slightly significant relationship is found (see Table 7.13 below, 
details of the extensive cross-tabulation results are not displayed due to space 
constraints ). 
Table 7.13 Relationship between the Officials' Expectational Orientation and Personal 
Particulars 
Level of Relationship Personal Particulars 
Gender 
Age 
Political Status 
Insignificant Working Years 
Department 
Working District 
Education Level 
-------------------------- --------------------------
Slightly Significant Income 
Sub-Groups with Insignificant Relationship 
Like the proprietors, the officials also displayed high level of consensus in 
supporting further development of administrative litigation, no matter for advancing 
reform and opening, protecting citizens' rights or strengthening rule of law in the 
country. Differences in their gender, age, political status, working years, department, 
working district, and education level all produced no visible difference in their 
expectational orientation. Yet, incidental variations did exist, e.g. the female officials 
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were much more ready to support furthering administrative litigation for the reason 
of better protecting citizens' rights and interests, and Hygiene officials were a bit 
more doubtful about the connection between developing administrative litigation 
and advancing the reform and opening. Yet, such variations were not a significant 
challenge to the consistency in the officials' expectational orientation. Alike the 
cross-tabulation analysis, the correlation analysis also generated no significant 
findings on the relationship between the officials' expectational orientation and their 
personal particulars (see Table 7.14 below). 
Table 7.14 Correlation Coefficients for the Officials' Expectational Orientation and 
Personal Particulars 
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Phi for gender, Spearman's rho for age, working years, income & education level. 
Cramer's V for political status, department & working district. 
Significance level at .05, 2-tailed. 
In respect of the last two expectational orientation questions, more variations 
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were noted. Significantly less of the eldest officials between 41-50 concurred with 
judicial independence as important for further development of administrative 
litigation. On the opposite, there were significantly more with such belief among 
officials working in Xi Cheng district. Officials who were politically independent 
had a significantly higher percentage endorsing judicial independence but 
significantly lower percentage expecting a bright future for administrative litigation. 
Finally, officials working with the Fire Services and Environmental Protection 
departments had a significantly lower percentage agreeing with the necessity of 
judicial independence as well as the likelihood of a bright future. However, all these 
variations are more incidental than common, hence cannot be taken to infer a 
significant relationship between related personal particulars of the officials and their 
expectational orientation. 
Sub-Group with Slightly Significant Relationship 
Only monthly income of the officials was found to have a slightly significant 
relationship with their expectational orientation because one of the sub-groups had 
answers different from the group norm in all five expectational orientation questions. 
While the lower income sub-groups had similar responses to all expectational 
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orientation questions, following largely the group nonn in general, the highest 
income sub-group, hence the most senior or most high ranking sub-group, answered 
quite differently. They had a significantly lower percentage of supportive answers to 
the first three expectational orientation questions and to the last one, implying a 
weaker expectation on administrative litigation and less certainty with a bright 
future for the latter. However, the highest income sub-group had a slightly higher 
percentage agreeing with the importance of judicial independence for further 
development of administrative litigation. After all, the higher income and higher 
ranking officials appears to be more prudent and pragmatic, less inclined to project 
optimistic expectations on administrative litigation. 
Based on the above findings, it may be said that the officials' strong faith and 
high hope in the future of the PRe's administrative litigation are a common 
expectational orientation shared by almost all the interviewed officials, independent 
of their personal background and particulars. 
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D. Summary 
Further development of the PRe's administrative litigation will not be possible 
if the many obstacles and constraints faced by the institution are not removed. Those 
obstacles are complex and multiple, concerning the Law, the ruled, the rulers, as 
well as the courts. If the PRC's administrative litigation is to be further developed, 
many works need to be done and those works are neither simple nor easy. Piecemeal 
solutions will not help. An integrated program is needed. A comprehensive list of 
the more essential steps and urgent tasks is suggested in this chapter not for selective 
or random implementation but for concerted action, else the effect will be very much 
undermined. 
Despite the arduous works ahead, further developing the PRC's administrative 
litigation is the common expectation of both the Chinese ruled and rulers. 
Notwithstanding their position difference in administrative litigation, continuation 
and further growth of the institution is undisputed by both parties when different 
advantages of the institution are counted. In fact, the rulers sample's expectational 
orientation is even better than the ruled sample's. The interviewed rulers have 
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stronger hope for further developing administrative litigation not for self-interest but 
for the benefit of society as a whole. Besides, they are less idealistic and more 
rational than the ruled in their expectation, with a greater percentage realising the 
difficulties lying ahead and the necessity of judicial independence as a prerequisite. 
Such expectational comments are too radical to be a simple reiteration of the official 
standpoint but can only be the rulers sample's personal and genuine ideas. To sum 
up the two parties' expectational orientation in response to the sixth research 
question of how the ruled and rulers expect the future of administrative litigation, it 
is obvious that both parties strongly believe that administrative litigation should be 
further developed and they have solid grounds for such conviction. 
In addition, the two parties' expectational orientations are highly consistent, 
both with a perfect internal relationship among their different expectational 
comments, indicating the two parties' agreeing ideas about the future of the PRe's 
administrative litigation. The external relationship of the ruled sample's 
expectational orientation is stronger than that of the rulers sample, suggesting that 
expectational orientation is more an integral part of the administrative litigation 
culture of the ruled than the rulers. For both the ruled and rulers samples, 
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expectational orientation is more closely related in ascending order with appraisal, 
jurisdictional and evaluational orientations. To reiterate, conceived scope of 
jurisdiction, estimated immediate consequences, rated usefulness, and estimated 
future prospects for administrative litigation are found to have a consequential 
relationship in both the ruled and rulers' administrative litigation culture. 
Finally, the rulers' expectational orientation is little affected by their 
personal background and particulars whereas such effect are relatively more 
significant with respect of the ruled. Working years, residency and education level 
are closely tied with the expectational orientation of the sampled ruled. On the 
contrary, the rulers sample's supportive expectational orientation is commonly 
shared by almost all members disregard their gender, age, political status, seniority, 
position, etc. It reaffirms that the rulers' expectational orientation is more well 
considered and grounded, with more rationality and less effect of their individual 
characteristics. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Contemporary China is experiencing tremendous changes that scholarly studies 
have not been able to fully keep track of. One example is the introduction of the 
PRC's administrative litigation ten years ago, which has brought about important 
changes to the Chinese legal system and ruled-rulers relationship but has not been 
seriously researched before. The purpose and contribution of this thesis is in 
reducing this gap in our knowledge and in enhancing our understanding of the 
PRC's administrative litigation. This thesis presents the first major research on the 
PRC's administrative litigation. 
Besides being a macroanalysis of the PRC's administrative litigation, this thesis 
is more specifically a microanalysis of the Chinese ruled and rulers' administrative 
litigation culture. By expanding and improving previous cultural study methods, this 
thesis constitutes a multi-dimensional and full-blown cultural study of the PRC's 
administrative litigation. The extensive findings of both analyses have been reported 
and discussed in the previous chapters. All things considered, the entire thesis will 
be concluded in this chapter and recommendations on the subject will also be given. 
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A. Conclusion 
By examining the pattern of orientations, i.e. administrative litigation culture, 
within which the PRC's administrative litigation is embedded, this thesis explicates 
the larger cultural background within which the structure and actions of 
administrative litigation exist. At the same time, this thesis also looks back into the 
structure and problems of the PRC's administrative litigation through apprehension 
of its larger cultural background. In the end, a confined and underdeveloped 
administrative litigation is found to exist within a receptive but discontented cultural 
background. 
1. Macroanalysis of the PRC's Administrative Litigation 
A clear-cut dichotomy marks the Chinese ruled-rulers relationship whether in 
the ancient, feudal or socialist period. The rulers uphold their rule in the name of the 
heaven, national survival, common good, communism, etc., even if ruling for 
themselves in all respects. The ruled accept being ruled with little realisation of their 
individual rights, little objection to the ruler's exploitation, and little interest to rule. 
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The law, ifused, is usually a tool initiated and employed by the rulers to protect their 
rule and to strengthen the dichotomy. The law has seldom been a shield put up by 
the ruled to safeguard their rights against the rulers' infringements. Rule of law in its 
modem Western meaning is unknown to most Chinese and underdeveloped in this 
oriental state. That accounts for the late arrival of administrative litigation in China 
and in the PRC (see "Rationale" in chapter one). 
Due to the entrenched dichotomy between the Chinese ruled and rulers and the 
age-old subordination of the Chinese ruled to rule of the rulers, any major change in 
the two parties' relationship can hardly be originated by the ruled from below. The 
PRC's administrative litigation, introduced for the first time in the mainland after 
long delay in 1989, is both a concession and a contrivance of the PRC's rulers. It is a 
concession of the rulers made necessary by their loss of legitimacy in the Cultural 
Revolution and their decline in popularity resulting from endemic administrative 
improprieties. It is a contrivance of the rulers amid both these legitimacy and 
popularity crises to strengthen and prolong their rule after serious misrule in the past. 
As a result, the PRC's administrative litigation has always suffered from a dilemma, 
from its design to its implementation - whether to protect the rights and interests of 
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the ruled or to promote the rulers' rule. Since the rulers dictate the whole exercise 
from above, with little participation of ruled, the PRC's administrative litigation is 
basically a reflection of the rulers' will and needs and it has always been a confined 
concession. Provisions in the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law are full of such 
limitations, e.g. the rulers only allow those members of the ruled who are under their 
administrative control to sue, only their administrative offices to be sued, and only 
their specific administrative acts to be challenged (see first two sections of chapter 
two). 
Besides the innate bias and limitations, the PRC's administrative litigation is 
also faced with many operational difficulties. By and large, the political reality and 
legal establishment in the mainland are not conducive to the implementation of 
administrative litigation and the Chinese rulers have not attempted to make the 
environment more facilitating when they deliver the institution. Almost all 
concerned parties are not ready and not prepared for administrative litigation. The 
ruled are not used to taking legal actions, confronting the rulers, and protecting their 
interests. The rulers are not used to answering to the ruled, examination by the 
courts, and abiding by the laws. The courts are not well established enough to try the 
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rulers, carry through justice, and execute administrative litigation. These explain 
why the PRC's administrative litigation has gone through a difficult ten years and its 
development is sti11limited (see first two sections of chapter three). 
Another proof of a confined concession and reason for limited development 
with regard to the PRC's administrative litigation is the latter's confusing and 
restricted scope of jurisdiction. The PRC's rulers resolve to mImmIse the 
institution's scope of review and challenge on their administrative actions but want 
their establishment to be seen as maximal as possible. This makes the provisions of 
the PRC's Administrative Litigation Law very much misleading and mutually 
conflicting, with generous promise first but then disappointing restrictions later. In 
the end, the scope of protection only covers infringement on the personal and 
property rights of the ruled by unlawful specific administrative acts and clearly 
unjust sanctions of the rulers. All other acts of infringement by the rulers, such as 
wrongful policies and unreasonable demands, on all other kinds of rights of the ruled, 
such as political and social rights, are denied even the chance to argue in open court. 
This curbs the effort to protect the rights and interests of the Chinese ruled and the 
growth of administrative litigation in the mainland (see first two sections of chapter 
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four). 
As a result of the institution's innate bias, implementational difficulties, and 
restricted jurisdiction, the immediate effects and benefits of the PRe's 
administrative litigation are no less biased and restricted. In principle, the PRe's 
administrative litigation can bring wide-ranging consequences. It can help protect 
the rights and interests of the ruled, correct administrative improprieties of the rulers, 
improve the rulers' administration, ameliorate the ruled-rulers relationship, 
strengthen the legal system, enhance the rule of law, maintain social stability, and 
promote economic development. But in actuality, the PRe's administrative litigation 
has not been doing its best and has been benefiting the rulers more than the ruled. 
For example, the courts are required to help enforce the rulers' administrative 
decisions on the ruled, the rulers' liability to compensate the ruled for damage 
caused to the latter is very much limited, and the responsible officials for wrongful 
acts are basically left unpunished (see first two sections of chapter five). 
Under a confined and hostile environment, the practical usefulness of the 
PRe's administrative litigation IS also jeopardised. The long-established and 
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recently strengthened fonnal complaint channel of administrative reconsideration is 
designated by the rulers to precede and preempt the use of administrative litigation. 
Other infonnal and even illegal means, like using personal connection and money, 
are also common substitutes for administrative litigation in the mainland for the 
resolution of disputes and management of conflicts between the ruled and the rulers. 
Besides, the courts' inadequacies in executing administrative litigation also reduces 
the latter's effectiveness in tenns of monitoring the rulers' actions and protecting the 
interests of the ruled. Finally, the ruled may face many practical difficulties in the 
pursuit of administrative litigation, e.g. the skills, time and money needed for suing 
the rulers, the risk of making enemies among local officials, and the possible 
retaliatory actions of the rulers, which are more than sufficient to make the ruled 
regard the PRC's administrative litigation not as helpful and useful as it is proposed 
or expected (see first two sections of chapter six). 
A bright future for the PRe's administrative litigation can hardly be possible if 
nothing is done on the above problems and limitations. The first section of chapter 
seven provides comprehensive suggestions in four major aspects for further 
development of the PRC's administrative litigation. Firstly, seven articles of the 
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PRe's Administrative Litigation Law should be amended to clarify and expand the 
purpose and scope of the PRe's administrative litigation. Secondly, user-oriented 
promotion and assistance should be given to members of the ruled to bring the 
PRe's administrative litigation to the ruled as well as the ruled to the institution. 
Thirdly, elaborate training and improvement measures should be implemented on 
members ofthe rulers to remove their resistance to administrative litigation, build up 
their respect for the law, rationalise their self-legislated administrative rules, and 
punish their damage to administrative litigation by retaliatory actions. Finally, the 
courts should also be strengthened by separating the judiciary from the 
administration, building a professional team of administrative litigation judges, and 
reforming the hearing system. All these four aspects are inter-related and 
improvement efforts should not miss out anyone of these aspects. 
In summary, the PRe's administrative litigation is very much confined and 
underdeveloped even after ten years of implementation. Its initial design has been 
limited by the will and needs of the PRe's rulers and its subsequent implementation 
has been hindered by many operational difficulties and practical problems. However, 
that does not mean that the PRe's administrative litigation is not welcomed and 
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supported by the people in the mainland. In fact, a receptive and endorsing cultural 
environment for administrative litigation is present. Besides, it is obvious that the 
present confined administrative litigation is lagging behind people's expectations, 
especially for the ruled in the PRC. 
2. Microanalysis of the Ruled and Rulers' Administrative Litigation Culture 
The microanalysis of the Chinese ruled and rulers' administrative litigation 
culture in this study makes use of the past political culture model but adds to the 
latter three more constituent orientations because of this study's uniqueness and the 
past model's inadequacy. Cognitive and affective orientations used in the past are 
lucid and indispensable but evaluational orientation is too broadly used for precise 
discourse. Evaluational orientation is, hence, specified in this study to refer to 
comments on the immediate consequences of administrative litigation only while 
comments on the empirical usefulness of administrative litigation is grouped under a 
new appraisal orientation. Another new expectational orientation is added to cover 
beliefs about the future development of administrative litigation. Finally, unique for 
this study is jurisdictional orientation, which embraces ideas about the appropriate 
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scope of jurisdiction for administrative litigation. It is believed that only by 
examining these six orientations can a multi-dimensional and full-blown legal 
culture study be then possible (see "Theoretical Framework" in the first chapter for 
details). 
The six cultural orientations of the surveyed Chinese ruled and rulers towards 
the PRC's administrative litigation are reported and discussed in chapters two to 
seven, respectively. By summing up and integrating individual findings in the six 
orientations, we can find out the two parties' overall administrative litigation culture, 
which is the seventh and final research question of this study. In essence, it is found 
that both the surveyed Chinese ruled and rulers have a well established 
administrative litigation culture based on consistent and clearly defined constituent 
orientations. Unfriendly and disapproving comments are much less common than 
receptive and supportive attitudes. However, the basic configuration as well as 
personal variation of the two parties' administrative litigation cultures are quite 
different and their ultimate administrative litigation cultures are also different. 
Using the overall administrative litigation orientation scores of the two samples 
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as a reference, members of the ruled and rulers display quite different administrative 
litigation orientations, resulting in quite different administrative litigation cultures 
(see Table 8.1 below). Cognitive orientation of the ruled is limited, passive and 
incoherent whereas that of the rulers is more deep-set, proactive and solid (see 
second half of chapter two for details). Affective orientation of the ruled is largely 
positive and supportive but not particularly strong whereas that of the rulers is even 
more positive and endorsing, clearly in support of the official establishment (see 
second half of chapter three for details). Jurisdictional orientation of the ruled is 
divided among their members but the majority is basically idealistic and unreserved 
with the idea of a full scope of protection under administrative litigation. On the 
contrary, jurisdictional orientation of the rulers is more realistic and alike the 
existing provision with little dispute against judicial review on the legality of their 
administrative acts but greater reluctance about that on abstract administrative acts 
(see second half of chapter four for details). 
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Table 8.1 Overall Orientation Scores of the Two Samples by Percentage plus Remarks· 
Proprietors Officials 
Yes No 
Remarks 
Yes No 
Remarks 
A N D ? A N D ? 
Cognitive 49.7 50.3 Limited 72.9 27.1 More 
orientation deep-set 
Affective 19.5 12.5 56.9 11.1 Supportive 9.9 6.8 82.2 1.1 Endors ing 
orientation 
Jurisdictional 64.5 8.0 19.8 7.7 Idealistic 78.2 8.9 10.4 2.5 More 
orientation reali stic 
Evaluational 87.6 5.8 3.6 3.0 Ruled- 88.5 7.0 3.8 0.7 Ruler-
orientation oriented oriented 
Appraisal 35.8 18.6 35.3 10.3 Disappointed 21.0 21.7 54.7 2.6 Defending 
orientation 
Expectational 82.8 6.4 3.1 7.7 Optimistic 89.3 7.1 1.6 2.0 Promising 
orientation 
A = Totally agree and agree; N = Neutral; D = Totally disagree and disagree ; ? = Don't know. 
• The figures are reproduced from respective tables in chapters two to seven. 
Evaluational orientation of the ruled and rulers are similar on the level they 
acclaim and agree with the potential consequences of administrative litigation but 
both parties equally display a self-oriented inclination, i.e. more concern with those 
effects that have direct relationship with their own interests (see second half of 
chapter five for details). Appraisal orientation of the ruled is much lower and more 
negative than their other orientations, showing noticeable disappointment and 
reservation with the usefulness of administrative litigation whereas that of the rulers 
is more affirmative and defending, with a tendency to gloss over the institution's 
limitations (see second half of chapter SIX for details). Finally, expectational 
orientation of the ruled is very much optimistic and instinctive whereas that of the 
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rulers is highly promising regarding their establishment and more prudent with 
greater recognition of the difficulties ahead (see chapter seven for details). 
As a whole and in general, members of the ruled tend to have a limited, 
supportive, idealistic, ruled-oriented, disappointed, but largely optimistic 
administrative litigation culture. In contrast, members of the rulers tend to have a 
more deep-set, endorsing, more realistic, ruler-oriented, defending, and promising 
administrative litigation culture. In comparison, we cannot say that the rulers have a 
better administrative litigation culture but just that the two parties' administrative 
litigation cultures are ultimately different, reflecting and related with their respective 
background, position, and needs. After all, the administrative litigation cultures of 
both parties are comparably receptive and endorsing towards the PRe's 
administrative litigation. 
Whatever the difference, whether positive or negative, it is beyond doubt that 
both the surveyed ruled and rulers have well established administrative litigation 
culture based on clearly defined and consistent administrative litigation orientations. 
On the one hand, both the ruled and rulers tend to have a low level of neutral and 
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unknown answers, except for the appraisal orientation, indicating basically clearly 
defined constituent orientations In support of their respective administrative 
litigation culture (see Table 8.1 above). On the other hand, the two parties' clearly 
defined constituent orientations are also highly consistent and coherent as indicated 
by the high level of internal relationship for all orientations except the first cognitive 
orientation (see shaded boxes In Table 8.2 and 8.3 below). In a word, the 
administrative litigation culture of both the ruled and rulers are well grounded and 
established with consistent and clear orientations for meaningful analysis. 
Table 8.2 
Cognitive 
orientation 
Affective 
orientation 
Jurisdictional 
orientation 
Evaluational 
orientation 
Appraisal 
orientation 
Expectational 
orientation 
Internal and External Relationship of the Proprietors' Administrative 
Litigation Orientations· 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Slight Very Strong Fairly Strong Slight Fairly Strong Slight 
Very Strong Strong Small Slight Fairly Strong Small 
Fairly Strong Small Perfect Very Strong Very Strong Perfect 
Slight Slight Very Strong Perfect Small Perfect 
Fairly Strong Fairly Strong Very Strong Small Perfect Very Strong 
Slight Small Perfect Perfect Very Strong Perfect 
• Summarised from respective tables in chapters two to seven. Internal relationship in shade. 
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Table 8.3 
Cognitive 
orientation 
Affective 
orientation 
Jurisdictional 
orientation 
Evaluational 
orientation 
Appraisal 
orientation 
Expectational 
orientation 
Internal and External Relationship of the Officials' Administrative Litigation 
Orientations* 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
Slight Small Small Small Small Small 
Small Strong Small Fairly Strong Fairly Strong Fairly Strong 
Small Small Perfect Very Strong Small Fairly Strong 
Small Fairly Strong Very Strong Perfect Small Perfect 
Small Fairly Strong Small Small Very Strong Small 
Small Fairly Strong Fairly Strong Perfect Small Perfect 
* Summarised from respective tables in chapters two to seven. Internal relationship in shade. 
However, the underlying configuration of the two parties' administrative 
litigation culture is quite different. Administrative litigation culture of the ruled has a 
clearly higher level of internal coherence and unity, with their six administrative 
litigation orientations significantly correlated with one another (see Table 8.2 above). 
Within that coherent administrative litigation culture, the jurisdictional orientation 
plays the most integral and important role In shaping the overall administrative 
litigation culture of the ruled. To a lesser extent, the evaluational and appraisal 
orientations are also significant. For example, the expectational orientation of the 
ruled towards the PRe's administrative litigation IS statistically tied with and 
probably dependent upon their jurisdictional, evaluational, and appraisal orientations. 
On the contrary, the rulers' administrative litigation culture is much more discrete 
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and divided, with each constituent orientation quite separated from the others and 
none playing a distinctly more important role in the configuration of their overall 
administrative litigation culture (see Table 8.3 above). 
In addition, personal variation in the ruled and rulers' administrative litigation 
culture is also different. For members of the ruled, the extent of variations in their 
administrative litigation culture according to their personal particulars is pretty high, 
suggesting a personal and original inclination in their culture. In contrast, the same 
is much lower among the rulers, indicating a more impersonal and standardised 
tendency in the rulers' administrative litigation culture. In particular, education level 
is the most important personal factor among the ruled with a significantly positive 
relationship with their administrative litigation culture. The next most important 
personal factor for the ruled is residency, followed by age, working years and 
political status (see Table 8.4 below). In contrast, the rulers' administrative litigation 
culture is not very significantly related with their personal particulars (see Table 8.5 
below). For both the ruled and rulers, jurisdictional orientation is the one with the 
greatest personal variation and gender is the least important personal factor with the 
lowest level of relationship with their respective administrative litigation culture. 
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Table 8.4 
Gender 
Age 
Political 
Status 
Working 
Years 
Kind of 
Business 
Residency 
Working 
District 
Income 
Education 
Level 
Relationship between the Proprietors' Administrative Litigation Orientations 
and Personal Particulars 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
-- -- -- --
* 
--
./ 
* * 
./ 
* 
./ 
./ --
* * 
./ ./ 
-- ./ 
* 
./ ./ 
* 
--
* 
./ -- ./ ./ 
* 
--
* 
--
* * 
-- --
* 
--
* 
./ 
./ ./ ./ ./ -- --
* * * * 
--
* 
-- = Insignificant ./ = Slightly Significant * = Significant 
Table 8.5 
Gender 
Age 
Political 
Status 
Working 
Years 
Department 
Working 
District 
Income 
Education 
Level 
Relationship between the Officials' Administrative Litigation Orientations and 
Personal Particulars 
Cognitive Affective Jurisdictional Evaluational Appraisal Expectational 
Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation Orientation 
./ ./ ./ -- -- --
./ 
* * 
-- -- --
--
./ 
* 
--
./ --
./ 
* * 
--
./ --
* 
-- -- --
./ --
* 
--
* 
./ ./ --
--
* 
./ -- --
./ 
* 
./ 
* 
--
* 
--
-- = Insignificant ./ = Slightly Significant * = Significant 
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B. Recommendations 
1. Recommendations for Further Research 
This is the first and pioneering study of the PRe's administrative litigation 
using the cultural approach, many successive and related researches are needed for a 
better and richer understanding of the subject. Similar researches on other members 
of the ruled, in other locations and at different time periods can contribute to a more 
accurate understanding and a comparative analysis of the Chinese populace's 
administrative litigation culture. The differences and similarities in administrative 
litigation culture of people in different countries and of different nationalities can 
also be compared by cross-country comparisons. Moreover, the relationship between 
administrative litigation culture and administrative litigation at different stages of 
development can also be tested by more successive cultural studies. 
On the other hand, related researches on the PRC's administrative litigation 
using other approaches can expand our knowledge of the field and complement the 
cultural studies. Although the present study also looks into the structure and 
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problems of the PRC's administrative litigation, the formal set-up of the courts and 
the administration in respect of administrative litigation are still not examined fully 
enough and the concrete actions of the concerned parties in administrative litigation 
are barely studied. Studies on the PRC's administrative litigation using the 
institutional and behavioural approaches, if possible, will enrich our understanding 
in these aspects. 
Besides, administrative litigation is just one aspects of the ruled-rulers 
relationship. Studies on other related issues, like the PRC's administrative 
reconsideration, the role of people's congress in protecting interests of the ruled and 
monitoring actions of the rulers, the use of guanxi and money in the management of 
conflict between the Chinese ruled and rulers, will all expand our understanding 
about the PRC's ruled-rulers relationship. 
2. Recommendations for the Chinese Rulers 
The setting up of administrative litigation is a revolutionary and daring 
initiative of the PRC's rulers, which may help them reach their contrivance to 
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sustain their rule, enhance their legitimacy, and promote their popularity. However, 
their resolution on a minimal concession can hardly bring them what they want but 
would rather defeat their intended purpose. The problems and difficulties 
encountered during the past ten years have vividly pointed out the insufficiency of 
the PRC's administrative litigation. For the benefit of the ruled as much as for the 
rulers, it is imperative that the institution be improved and uplifted from its 
underdeveloped condition. Dissonance between the populace's expectation and the 
present practice of the PRC's administrative litigation has to be remedied if the 
rulers do want to increase their legitimacy and popularity by such establishment. 
The ways to improve the PRC's administrative litigation were stated in the last 
chapter. In a nutshell, the return depends on the offer and the best offer is a fully-
fledged administrative litigation package, not a deceiving and defensive concession. 
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Appendix 1 The PRe's Administrative Litigation Law 
Chapter 1 : General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is formulated in accordance with the Constitution in order to ensure 
the just and prompt hearing of administrative cases by the people's courts, protect the lawful 
rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations and uphold and 
supervise administrative authorities in exercising their administrative authority in 
accordance with law. 
Article 2 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations shall have the right to bring 
proceedings in a people's court in accordance with the provisions of this Law against 
administrative authorities or their work personnel whose specific administrative acts have, 
in the opinion of the citizens, legal persons or other organizations, infringed upon their 
lawful rights and interests. 
Article 3 The people's courts shall, in accordance with law, exercise the right to 
adjudicate administrative cases independently and shall not be subject to interference by 
administrative authorities, social groups and individuals. The people's courts shall establish 
administrative tribunals to hear administrative cases. 
Article 4 In hearing administrative cases, the people's courts shall take facts as their 
basis and law as their criterion. 
Article 5 In hearing administrative cases, the people's courts shall conduct examination 
of the legality of specific administrative acts. 
Article 6 In hearing administrative cases, the people's courts shall, in accordance with 
law, implement a system in which there is a collegiate system and withdrawal, adjudication 
is conducted in public and the second instance shall be the final instance. 
Article 7 Parties shall have equal legal status in administrative proceedings. 
Article 8 Citizens of every ethnic group shall have the right to conduct administrative 
proceedings in their native spoken and written languages. 
In areas inhabited by a concentrated minority ethnic group or by several 
ethnic groups, the people's courts shall use the spoken and written language in common use 
in the locality in conducting hearings and in issuing legal documents. 
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The people's courts shall provide translation for participants in proceedings 
who are not proficient in the spoken and written language commonly used by ethnic groups 
in the locality. 
Article 9 Parties shall have the right to conduct debate in administrative proceedings. 
Article 10 The people's procuratorates shall have the right to carry out legal supervision 
over administrative proceedings. 
Chapter 2 : Scope of Acceptance of Cases 
Article 11 The people's courts shall accept and hear proceedings in which citizens, legal 
persons and other organizations disagree with the following specific administrative acts: 
(1) administrative penalties such as detention, fines, cancellation of permits and licenses, 
orders to cease production or business; or confiscation of property; 
(2) coercive administrative measures such as restriction of personal freedom or the 
sealing up, seizing or freezing of property; 
(3) infringement by administration authorities of their operational autonomy that is 
stipulated by law; 
(4) either rejection of or no reply by administrative authorities to an application to 
administrative authorities for the issuance of permits and licenses, despite compliance 
with the legal requirements for application; 
(5) either rejection of or no reply by administrative authorities to an application for 
performance of the legal responsibility of the administrative authorities to protect 
personal and property rights; 
(6) failure by administrative authorities to pay, in accordance with law, pensions for 
disabled persons or to the family of a deceased; 
(7) unlawful requirement by administrative authorities of the performance of obligations; 
or 
(8) infringement by administrative authorities of other personal or property rights. 
Apart from those cases stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the people's 
courts shall accept and hear other administrative cases in which the bringing of proceedings 
is permitted by law or rules and regulations. 
Article 12 The people's courts shall not accept and hear proceedings in which citizens, 
legal persons or other organizations bring proceedings in respect of the following matters: 
(1) acts of state pertaining to such matters as national defense or diplomatic relations; 
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(2) administrative rules and regulations, articles and by-laws or generally binding 
decisions or orders formulated or issued by administrative authorities; 
(3) decisions of administrative authorities on matters such as reward and punishment and 
appointment and dismissal of personnel; and 
(4) specific administrative acts that are stipulated by law to be finally decided by 
administrative authorities. 
Chapter 3 : Jurisdiction 
Article 13 The basic-level people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first 
instance over administrative cases. 
Article 14 The intermediate-level people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first 
instance over the following administrative cases: 
(1) cases of confirmation of rights to invention patents and cases handled by Customs; 
(2) cases in which proceedings are brought in respect of specific administrative acts of 
various departments of the State Council or the people's governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central authorities; and 
(3) complex cases having great impact on their own jurisdictional district. 
Article 15 The higher-level people's courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first 
instance over complex administrative cases having great impact on their own jurisdictional 
district. 
Article 16 The Supreme People's Court shall have jurisdiction as the court of first 
instance over complex administrative cases having great impact on the entire country. 
Article 17 Administrative cases shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court in 
the place where the administrative authority that initially performed the administrative act is 
located. Reconsidered cases in which the reconsidering authority modified the original 
specific administrative act may also be under the jurisdiction of the people's court in the 
place where the reconsidering authority is located. 
Article 18 Proceedings arising from disagreement with coercive administrative measures 
that restrict personal freedom shall be under the jurisdiction of the people's court in the place 
where the defendant or plaintiff is located. 
Article 19 Administrative proceedings arising from immovable property shall be under 
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the jurisdiction of the people's court in the place where the immovable property is located. 
Article 20 Where two or more people's courts have jurisdiction over a case, the plaintiff 
may select one court in which to bring proceedings. Where the plaintiff has brought 
proceedings in two or more people's courts that have jurisdiction, the people's court that first 
received the complaint shall handle the case. 
Article 21 Where a people's court discovers that a case it has accepted for hearing is not 
within its jurisdiction, it shall transfer the case to a people's court that has jurisdiction. A 
people's court to which a case has been so transferred shall not transfer the case of its own 
accord. 
Article 22 Where a people's court having jurisdiction over a case cannot exercise such 
jurisdiction due to special reasons, a higher-level people's court shall designate another 
people's court to exercise jurisdiction. 
A dispute between people's courts over jurisdiction shall be resolved by the 
disputing people's courts through consultation. If consultation fails, the matter shall be 
reported to a higher-level people's court that is common to both for designation of 
jurisdiction. 
Article 23 The higher-level people's courts shall have the right to adjudicate 
administrative cases over which the lower-level people's courts have jurisdiction as courts of 
first instance. Such courts may also transfer administrative cases over which they 
themselves have jurisdiction as courts of first instance to the lower-level people's courts. 
When a lower-level people's court considers it necessary that an 
administrative case over which it has jurisdiction as a court of first instance be adjudicated 
by a higher-level people's court, it may submit the case to a higher-level people's court for 
decision. 
Chapter 4 : Participants in Proceedings 
Article 24 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations that bring administrative 
proceedings in accordance with this Law shall be plaintiffs. 
In the event of the death of a citizen who has the right to bring proceedings, 
his or her close relatives may bring proceedings. 
In the event of the termination of a legal person or other organization, the 
legal person or other organization that succeeds to its rights may bring proceedings. 
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Article 25 Where citizens, legal persons or other organizations bring proceedings 
directly in the people's courts, the administrative authorities that performed the specific 
administrative acts shall be the defendants. 
In reconsidered cases, where a reconsidering authority has decided to uphold 
an original specific administrative act, the administrative authority that performed the 
original specific administrative act shall be the defendant; where the reconsidering authority 
has modified the original specific administrative act, the reconsidering authority shall be the 
defendant. 
Where two or more administrative authorities perform the same specific 
administrative act, the administrative authorities that jointly performed the specific 
administrative act shall be co-defendants. 
Where organizations authorized by law or rules and regulations perform 
specific administrative acts, such organizations shall be the defendants. Where organizations 
entrusted by administrative authorities perform specific administrative acts, the entrusting 
administrative authorities shall be the defendants. 
Where administrative authorities have been cancelled, the administrative 
authorities that continue to perform their functions shall be the defendants. 
Article 26 Proceedings shall be joint when there are two or more persons on one side or 
both sides of an administrative case arising from the same specific administrative act, or 
from similar specific administrative acts, and the people's court considers that they may be 
heard together. 
Article 27 Other citizens, legal persons or other organizations that have an interest in the 
specific administrative act in respect of which proceedings are being brought may apply to 
participate in proceedings as third parties or shall be notified by a people's court to 
participate. 
Article 28 A legal agent shall proceed on behalf of a citizen who does not have the 
competence to perform procedural acts. When legal agents are mutually reluctant to fulfil 
their responsibilities as agents, a people's court shall appoint one from among them to act in 
proceedings on a citizen's behalf. 
Article 29 Parties or legal agents may entrust one to two persons to represent them in 
proceedings. 
Lawyers, social groups, close relatives of citizens bringing proceedings or 
persons recommended by the citizens' units, as well as other citizens permitted by a people's 
court, may be appointed as agents in proceedings. 
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Article 30 A lawyer acting as an agent in proceedings may, in accordance with 
provisions, consult materials concerning the case and investigate relevant organizations and 
citizens and collect evidence. The lawyer shall, in accordance with the provisions of law, 
maintain confidentiality with respect to materials involving state secrets and the private 
affairs of individuals. 
With the permission of the people's court, parties and other agents in 
proceedings may consult materials to be examined in court concerning the case, with the 
exception of materials involving state secrets or the private affairs of individuals. 
Chapter S : Evidence 
Article 31 Evidence shall consist of the following various types: 
(1) documentary evidence; 
(2) material evidence; 
(3) audio-visual materials; 
(4) testimony of witnesses; 
(5) statements of the parties; 
(6) conclusions of expert evaluations; and 
(7) records of inspection or records of the scene of an incident. 
The above evidence must undergo examination by the court for verification 
before it can be regarded as a basis for establishing a case. 
Article 32 The defendant shall bear the burden of proof with respect to specific 
administrative acts and shall provide evidence for performing such specific administrative 
acts and the regulatory documents on which such specific administrative acts were based. 
Article 33 During the course of proceedings, the defendant may not of its own accord 
collect evidence from the plaintiff or witnesses. 
Article 34 The people's courts shall have the right to require parties to provide or 
supplement evidence. 
The people's courts shall have the right to investigate and obtain evidence 
from relevant administrative authorities, as well as other organizations and citizens. 
Article 3S During the course of proceedings, where a people's court considers that 
specialized problems require expert evaluations, such problems shall be turned over to 
legally prescribed expert evaluation departments for expert evaluations; where there is no 
legally prescribed expert evaluation department, the people's court shall designate an expert 
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evaluation department to carry out expert evaluations. 
Article 36 Under circumstances in which evidence might be lost or destroyed or difficult 
to obtain later, the participants in proceedings may apply to the people's court for the 
preservation of evidence. The people's court may also take the initiative in adopting 
preservation measures. 
Chapter 6 : Bringing and Acceptance and Hearing of Cases 
Article 37 In dealing with administrative cases that are within the scope accepted for 
hearing by the people's courts, citizens, legal persons or other organizations may initially 
apply to administrative authorities at the next higher level or those prescribed by law or 
rules and regulations for reconsideration and then, if they disagree with the reconsideration, 
bring proceedings in a people's court; they may also go directly to a people's court to bring 
proceedings. 
Where citizens, legal persons or other organizations are required by law or 
rules and regulations to initially apply to an administrative authority for reconsideration and 
then, if they disagree with the reconsideration, bring proceedings in a people's court, they 
shall do so in accordance with the provisions of the law or rules and regulations. 
Article 38 Where citizens, legal persons or other organizations apply to an 
administrative authority for reconsideration, the reconsidering authority shall render its 
decision within two months of the date of receipt of the application, except as may 
otherwise be stipulated by law or rules and regulations. 
An applicant that disagrees with a decision of reconsideration may bring 
proceedings in a people's court within 15 days of the date of receipt of the decision of 
reconsideration. Where the reconsidering authority fails to render its decision within the 
specified period, the applicant may bring proceedings in a people's court within 15 days of 
expiration of the reconsideration period, except as may otherwise be stipulated by law. 
Article 39 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations that directly bring proceedings 
in the people's courts shall do so within three months of the date on which the specific 
administrative act became known to them, except as may otherwise be stipulated by law. 
Article 40 Where citizens, legal persons or other organizations fail to act within the 
legally prescribed period because offorce majeure or other special circumstances, they may, 
within 10 days after the hindrance is removed, apply to the people's courts for a decision to 
extend the period. 
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Article 41 In bringing proceedings, the following requirements shall be met: 
(1) the plaintiff must be a citizen, legal person or other organization that considers its 
lawful rights and interests infringed upon by a specific administrative act; 
(2) there must be a clear and definite defendant; 
(3) there must be a specific claim and a factual basis on which to have proceedings; and 
(4) the case must fall within the jurisdictional scope of the people's courts and under the 
jurisdiction of the people's court in which proceedings are brought. 
Article 42 Within seven days following receipt of a written complaint and upon review, 
the people's court shall register the case or rule not to accept and hear the case. The plaintiff 
may appeal if it does not agree with the ruling. 
Chapter 7: Hearings and Judgements 
Article 43 The people's court shall send a copy of the complaint to the defendant within 
five days of registering a case. The defendant shall provide relevant materials concerning 
the specific administrative act and present a reply brief to the people's court within 10 days 
following receipt of the copy of the complaint. The people's court shall send a copy of the 
reply brief to the plaintiff within five days of receipt of the reply brief. 
The failure of a defendant to present a reply brief shall not affect the hearing 
of a case by the people's court. 
Article 44 During the period of proceedings, the performance of the specific 
administrative act shall not be terminated. However, in anyone of the following 
circumstances, performance of the specific administrative act shall be terminated: 
(1) the defendant considers it necessary to terminate performance; 
(2) the plaintiff applies for termination of performance, and the people's court rules to 
terminate performance because it considers that performance of such specific 
administrative act will result in irreparable damage and that termination of such act 
will not harm the public interest; or 
(3) law or rules and regulations stipulate that performance be terminated. 
Article 4S The people's courts shall conduct hearings of administrative cases in public; 
except for cases involving state secrets, the private affairs of individuals and cases as may 
otherwise be stipulated by law. 
Article 46 Hearings of administrative cases by the people's courts shall be conducted by 
a collegial panel of judges or a collegial panel composed of judges and assessors. The 
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number of members composing a collegial panel shall be an odd number of three or more. 
Article 47 Parties who consider that adjudication personnel have an interest in a case or 
have other relationships that may influence the fair and just adjUdication of the case shall 
have the right to apply for the withdrawal of the adjudication personnel. 
Adjudication personnel who consider that they themselves have an interest in 
a case or other relationships shall apply for withdrawal. 
The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall also apply to clerks, 
interpreters, expert witnesses and inspectors. 
The withdrawal of the president serving as presiding judge shall be decided 
by the adjudication committee. Withdrawal of other adjudication personnel shall be decided 
by the president. Withdrawal of other personnel shall be decided by the presiding judge. A 
party who does not agree with such decisions may apply for reconsideration. 
Article 48 Where a plaintiff legally summoned twice by the people's court refuses 
without legitimate grounds to appear, it shall be considered to have applied for the 
withdrawal of proceedings. Where a defendant refuses without legitimate grounds to appear, 
a default judgement may be rendered. 
Article 49 The people's courts may, according to the seriousness of the circumstances, 
reprimand, order the making of a statement of repentance from, fine up to 1,000 yuan or 
detain up to 15 days participants in proceedings or other persons with respect to anyone of 
the following acts and, if the act constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall be 
investigated in accordance with the law: 
(1) groundless evasion and procrastination, rejection or hindrance of enforcement by 
persons whose duty it is to assist in enforcement and who are in receipt of a notice of 
the people's court requesting assisting in such enforcement; 
(2) falsification, concealment or destruction of evidence; 
(3) instigation, bribery or coercion of false testimony by another person, or threat or 
hindrance of testimony by witnesses; 
(4) concealment, transfer, sale or destruction of property that has been sealed, seized or 
frozen; 
(5) obstruction of personnel of a people's court in carrying out their duties or disturbance 
of the work order of a people's court by force, threat and other means; or 
(6) insult, slander, false accusation, beating of or other means of retaliation against 
personnel of a people's court, participants in proceedings or people assisting in 
enforcement. 
Fines and detentions must be approved by the president of a people's court. A 
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party that does not agree with the decision may apply for reconsideration. 
Article 50 In hearing administrative cases, the people's courts shall not apply mediation. 
Article 51 Where, prior to pronouncement of a judgement or ruling by a people's court, a 
plaintiff makes an application to withdraw an action or a defendant modifies its specific 
administrative act and the plaintiff agrees to make an application to withdraw the action, the 
people's court shall make a ruling on whether to approve such application. 
Article 52 The people's courts shall base their hearing of administrative cases on law and 
administrative and local rules and regulations. Local rules and regulations shall apply to 
administrative cases that arise within the administrative region concerned. 
The people's courts shall base their hearing of administrative cases of ethnic 
autonomous localities on the regulations on the exercise of autonomy and separate 
regulations of such ethnic autonomous localities. 
Article 53 The people's courts shall hear administrative cases with reference to rules and 
regulations fonnulated or issued by ministries or commissions of the State Council in 
accordance with the law and the State Council's administrative rules and regulations, 
decisions and orders, as well as rules and regulations formulated or issued by the people's 
governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central 
authorities and municipalities in which the people's governments of provinces or 
autonomous regions are situated, and the people's governments of relatively large 
municipalities approved by the State Council, in accordance with the law and the State 
Council's administrative rules and regulations. 
Where the people's courts consider that the rules and regulations fonnulated 
or issued by local people's governments are inconsistent with the rules and regulations 
fonnulated or issued by ministries or commissions of the State Council or that the articles 
and by-laws formulated or issued by ministries or commissions of the State Council are 
inconsistent within themselves, the Supreme People's Court shall refer the inconsistencies to 
the State Council for interpretation or ruling. 
Article 54 After a hearing, a people's court shall, according to different circumstances, 
render the following judgements respectively: 
(1) where, in respect of a specific administrative act, the evidence is conclusive, the 
application of law or rules and regulations was correct and the legally prescribed 
procedure was complied with, the judgement shall be to uphold the specific 
administrative act; 
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(2) where anyone of the following circumstances occurs, in respect of a specific 
administrative act, the judgment shall be to revoke all or part of the specific 
administrative act and may also be to require the defendant to perform a new specific 
administrative act: 
(a) there is insufficient principal evidence; 
(b) the application of law or rules and regulations was incorrect; 
(c) there was a violation of legally prescribed procedure; 
(d) the limit of authority was exceeded; or 
(e) there was an abuse of authority; 
(3) where a defendant fails to perform or delays the performance of its legal duties, the 
judgment shall be to require the defendant to carry out performance within a specified 
period; and 
(4) where administrative penalties are clearly unjust, the judgment may be to modify the 
administrative penalties. 
Article 55 Where the judgment of a people's court requires a defendant to perform a new 
specific administrative act, the defendant may not, based on the same facts and reasons, 
perform a specific administrative act that is basically the same as the original specific 
administrative act. 
Article 56 In hearing administrative cases, if a people's court considers that there is a 
violation of governmental discipline by the personnel in charge or the directly responsible 
persons of an administrative authority, the people's court shall transfer the relevant materials 
to such administrative authority or the administrative authority at the next higher level or the 
supervisory or personnel authority; if it considers that there is a criminal act, it shall transfer 
the relevant materials to the public security or procuratorial authority. 
Article 57 A people's court shall renew a judgment of the first instance within three 
months of the date of registration of a case. Extensions required under special circumstances 
shall be approved by the higher-level people's court. Extensions required by higher-level 
people's court in hearing cases of the first instance shall be approved by the Supreme 
People's Court. 
Article 58 A party that does not agree with a judgment of the first instance of a people's 
court shall have the right to appeal to a people's court at the next higher level within 15 days 
of the date of the serving of the judgment. A party that does not agree with a ruling of the 
first instance of a people's court shall have the right to appeal to a people's court at the next 
higher level within 10 days of the date of the serving of the ruling. If an appeal has not been 
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made within the time period, a judgment or ruling of the first instance of a people's court 
shall become legally effective. 
Article 59 The people's courts may conduct documentary hearings of appeals for which 
they consider the facts to be clear. 
Article 60 In hearing an appeal, a people's court shall render a final judgment within two 
months of the date of receipt of the written appeal. Extensions required under special 
circumstances shall be approved by the higher-level people's court. Extensions required by 
the higher-level people's court in hearing appeals shall be approved by the Supreme People's 
Court. 
Article 61 In hearing an appeal, a people's court shall handle it according to the 
following circumstances, respectively: 
(1) where the determination of facts is clear and the application of law or rules and 
regulations was correct in the original judgment, its judgment shall reject the appeal 
and uphold the original judgment; 
(2) where the determination of facts in the original judgment is clear, but here was an 
error in the application of law or rules and regulations, it shall revise the judgment 
according to law; or 
(3) where the determination of facts in the original judgment was unclear or the evidence 
was insufficient or there was a violation of legally prescribed procedure that could 
have affected the correct determination of the case, it shall make a ruling to revoke 
the original judgment and return the case to the people's court that originally 
adjudicated it for readjudicaton, or it may revise the judgment after making a 
thorough investigation of the facts. A party may appeal against a judgment or ruling 
of a readjudicated case. 
Article 62 Where parties consider that there are actual errors in judgments or rulings that 
have already become legally effective, they may petition the people's court that originally 
adjudicated the cases or a higher-level people's court, but such judgments or rulings shall 
continue to be enforced. 
Article 63 Where presidents of the people's courts discover that there are violations of 
the provisions of law or rules and regulations in judgments or rulings of their courts that 
have already become legally effective and consider that they need to be readjudicated, they 
shall send the cases to the adjudication committee to decide whether they will be 
readjudicated. 
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Where higher-level people's courts discover that there are violations of the 
provisions of law or rules and regulations in judgments or rulings of lower-level people's 
courts that have already become legally effective, they shall have the right to remove the 
cases for their own adjudication or direct the lower-level people's courts to readjudicate 
them. 
Article 64 Where the people's procuratorates discover that there are violations of the 
provisions of law or rules and regulations in judgments or rulings of the people's courts that 
have already become legally effective, they shall have the right to protest in accordance with 
the procedure for the supervision of adjudication. 
Chapter 8 : Enforcement 
Article 65 Parties must perform judgments or rulings of the people's courts that have 
become legally effective. 
Where a citizen, legal person or other organization refuses to perform a 
judgment or ruling, an administrative authority may apply to the people's court of first 
instance for compulsory enforcement or compel enforcement in accordance with the law. 
Where an administrative authority refuses to perform a judgment or ruling, 
the people's court of first instance may adopt the following measures: 
(1) notification to the bank to transfer any fine refundable or compensation payable from 
the account of such administrative authority; 
(2) where an administrative authority fails to carry out performance within a stipulated 
period, a fine of 50 yuan up to 100 yuan per day starting from the expiration of such 
period shall be imposed on such administrative authority; 
(3) presentation of a judicial proposal to the administrative authority at the next level 
higher than such administrative authority or to the supervisory or personnel authority. 
An authority accepting a judicial proposal shall handle the matter in accordance with 
relevant provisions and inform the people's court of how the matter has been handled; 
and 
(4) where the circumstances of refusal to perform a judgment or ruling are serious and 
the act constitutes a crime, the criminal responsibility of the persons in charge and the 
persons directly responsible shall be investigated in accordance with the law. 
Article 66 Where a citizen, legal person or other organization neither brings proceedings 
nor carries out performance in respect of a specific administrative act within the legally 
prescribed period of time, an administrative authority may apply to a people's court for 
compulsory enforcement or compel enforcement in accordance with the law. 
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Chapter 9 : Liability to Compensate for Infringement of Rights 
Article 67 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations whose lawful rights and 
interests are infringed upon by specific administrative acts of administrative authorities or 
their personnel which result in damage shall have the right to claim compensation. 
Where a citizen, legal person or other organization acts alone in claiming 
compensation for damage, the matter shall first be handled by an administrative authority. 
Where the citizen, legal person or other organization disagrees with how the administrative 
authority handled the matter, such citizen, legal person or other organization may bring 
proceedings in a people's court. 
Mediation may be applied in compensation proceedings. 
Article 68 Where an administrative authority or its work personnel performs a specific 
administrative act that infringes the lawful rights and interests of a citizen, legal person or 
other organization and results in injury, such administrative authority or the administrative 
authority to which such work personnel belong shall be liable for compensation. 
After compensating for the losses, the administrative authority shall cause its 
work personnel who acted with intent or gross negligence to bear part or all of the 
compensation costs. 
Article 69 Compensation costs shall be itemized as an expenditure of the finance 
departments at various levels. The people's governments at various levels may cause the 
responsible administrative authorities to pay for part or all of the compensation costs. 
Specific measures shall be stipulated by the State Council. 
Chapter 10 : Administrative Proceedings Involving Foreign Interests 
Article 70 This Law shall apply to administrative proceedings conducted in the People's 
Republic of China by foreigners, stateless persons or foreign organizations, except as may 
otherwise be stipulated by law. 
Article 71 A foreigner, stateless person or foreign organization that conducts 
administrative proceedings in the People's Republic of China shall have rights and 
obligations in proceedings equal to those of a citizen or organization of the People's 
Republic of China. 
Where a court of a foreign country imposes limits on the administrative rights 
of citizens or organizations of the People's Republic of China in proceedings, the people's 
courts shall cany out the principle of reciprocity with respect to the administrative rights in 
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proceedings of the citizens or organizations of that country. 
Article 72 Where there is an inconsistency between the provisions of an international 
treaty entered into or participated in by the People's Republic of China and the provisions of 
this Law, the provisions of such international treaty shall be applied, except for articles in 
respect of which the People's Republic of China has declared reservation. 
Article 73 Where a foreigner, stateless person or foreign organization conducts 
administrative proceedings in the People's Republic of China and entrusts representation in 
the proceedings to a lawyer such entrustment shall be to a lawyer of a law office of the 
People's Republic of China. 
Chapter 11 : Supplementary Provisions 
Article 74 The people's courts shall collect litigation fees for hearing administrative 
cases. Litigation fees shall be borne by the losing party or shared by both parties if both are 
liable. Specific measures for collecting litigation fees shall be separately formulated. 
Article 7S This Law shall be implemented from October 1, 1990. 
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Appendix 2 Survey Questionnaire for Individual Household 
Proprietors 
Dear citizens and friends, 
As a scientific research and to help further develop our country's administrative 
litigation, we are now conducting a survey in Beijing regarding the implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law. Questions in this questionnaire are mostly related to your 
daily life. There is no correct or wrong answer. Respond directly to the question and give 
your general opinion according to your usual belief and behaviour will be sufficient. You do 
not have to write your name or unit. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. Thank 
you very much for your cooperation. 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the appropriate box. 
Yes No 
I Have you heard of cases about citizens suing the government? 
2 Have you heard that citizens can now sue the government? 
3 Have you yourself sued the government? 
4 Have you heard of the "Administrative Litigation Law"? 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative Litigation Law"? 
Our country had formally established administrative litigation in October 1990, 
commonly known as "citizens suing the government". On that, do you agree with the 
following statements? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other 
methods should be used to solve the problem. 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our 
country. 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out illegal action. 
10 I don't care about implementation of the institution. 
11 I know very little about the present institution. 
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Do you agree that citizens can initiate administrative litigation in the following 
circumstances? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
12 Officials abuse their authority in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
13 Officials exceed the limit of their legal authority 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
14 Officials use the wrong regulation in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
15 Officials violate the legally prescribed procedure 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
16 Officials have insufficient essential evidence 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
17 Registration fees regulation made by government 
is unreasonable. 
18 The Industry and Commerce Bureau collects 
registration fees in excess of the amount 
stipulated in the regulation. 
Do you agree that establishing administrative litigation will bring the following 
consequences? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
19 Strengthen the protection oflegal rights and 
interests of citizens. 
20 Push the government to work according 
to the laws. 
21 Strengthen the idea of rule of law in the society. 
22 Reduce the cases of abusing authority by 
government and its officials. 
23 Increase the government's efficiency at work. 
24 Strengthen the government's status. 
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There are different views regarding the implementation of administrative litigation, do 
you agree with the following statements? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
25 Petitioning to higher levels of the government 
can better solve the problem than suing 
the government in court. 
26 Using personal connection can better solve the 
problem than suing the government in court. 
27 Using money can better solve the problem 
than suing the government in court. 
28 Courts cannot fairly hear cases of administrative 
litigation initiated by citizens. 
29 Courts will defend the administration. 
30 Courts' verdicts cannot bind the administration. 
31 Citizens do not dare to sue the government for 
fear of revenge by the officials. 
32 It is very difficult to put administrative 
litigation into practice. 
Do you agree with the following statements about the future development of 
administrative litigation? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
33 Administrative litigation can help advance 
the refonn and opening, hence should 
be further developed. 
34 Administrative litigation can help protect 
citizens' legal rights and interests, hence should 
be further developed. 
35 Administrative litigation can help strengthen the 
rule of law, hence should be further developed. 
36 Development of administrative litigation requires 
judicial independence. 
37 There is a bright future for administrative litigation 
but the road is winding. 
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Please continue answering the foUowing questions by ticking the appropriate box. 
38. Your gender: 0 1. Male 02. Female 
39. Your age: 01. 18-30 02. 31-40 03. 41-50 
04. 51-60 05. 61 and above 
40. Your political status: 
01. Communist Party member 02. Communist Youth League member 
03. Democratic Party member 04. Non-member 
41. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
o 1. Less than 1 year o 2. 1-3 year o 3. 4-6 year 
o 4. 7-10 year o 5. Over 10 year 
42. What kind of business are you running? 
01. 
04. 
Retailing 
Repairing 
02. 
05. 
Catering D 3. Servicing 
Others 
43. Are you registered Beijing municipal resident? D 1. Yes 02. No 
44. Your working district: D I. Hai Dian 
D 3. XuanWu 
D 2. Xi Cheng 
D 4. Others ___________ _ 
45. Your average real monthly income during the past year (RMB): 
D I. 300 and below 
D 4. 1001-1500 
D 7. Above 4000 
46. Your education level: 
o 1. No formal education 
D 3. Lower Secondary 
D 5. Post-secondary 
D 2. 301-600 
D 5. 1501-2500 
D 2. Primary 
D 3. 601-1000 
D 6. 2501-4000 
o 4. Upper Secondary 
D 6. Undergraduate and above 
End of questionnaire. 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 3 Survey Questionnaire for Government Officials 
Dear comrade, 
As a scientific research and to help further develop our country's administrative 
litigation, we are now conducting a survey in Beijing regarding the implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law. Questions in this questionnaire are mostly related to your 
daily life. There is no correct or wrong answer. Respond directly to the question and give 
your general opinion according to your usual belief and behaviour will be sufficient. You do 
not have to write your name or unit. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. Thank 
you very much for your cooperation. 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the appropriate box. 
Yes No 
1 Have you heard of cases about citizens suing the government? 
2 Have you heard that citizens can now sue the government? 
3 Have you participated in administrative litigation? 
4 Have you heard of the "Administrative Litigation Law"? 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative Litigation Law"? 
Our country had formally established administrative litigation in October 1990, 
commonly known as "citizens suing the government". On that, do you agree with the 
following statements? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other 
methods should be used to solve the problem. 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our 
country. 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out illegal action. 
10 I don't care about implementation of the institution. 
11 I know very little about the present institution. 
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Do you agree that citizens can initiate administrative litigation in the following 
circumstances? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
12 Officials abuse their authority in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
13 Officials exceed the limit oftheir legal authority 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
14 Officials use the wrong regulation in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
15 Officials violate the legally prescribed procedure 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
16 Officials have insufficient essential evidence 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
17 Registration fees regulation made by government 
is unreasonable. 
18 The Industry and Commerce Bureau collects 
registration fees in excess of the amount 
stipulated in the regulation. 
Do you agree that establishing administrative litigation will bring the following 
consequences? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
19 Strengthen the protection oflegal rights and 
interests of citizens. 
20 Push the government to work according 
to the laws. 
21 Strengthen the idea of rule of law in the society. 
22 Reduce the cases of abusing authority by 
government and its officials. 
23 Increase the government's efficiency at work. 
24 Strengthen the government's status. 
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There are different views regarding the implementation of administrative litigation, do 
you agree with the following statements? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
25 Petitioning to higher levels of the government 
can better solve the problem than suing 
the government in court. 
26 Using personal connection can better solve the 
problem than suing the government in court. 
27 Using money can better solve the problem 
than suing the government in court. 
28 Courts cannot fairly hear cases of administrative 
litigation initiated by citizens. 
29 Courts will defend the administration. 
30 Courts' verdicts cannot bind the administration. 
31 Citizens do not dare to sue the government for 
fear of revenge by the officials. 
32 It is very difficult to put administrative 
litigation into practice. 
Do you agree with the following statements about the future development of 
administrative litigation? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
I 2 3 4 5 9 
33 Administrative litigation can help advance 
the reform and opening, hence should 
be further developed. 
34 Administrative litigation can help protect 
citizens' legal rights and interests, hence should 
be further developed. 
35 Administrative litigation can help strengthen the 
rule of law, hence should be further developed. 
36 Development of administrative litigation requires 
judicial independence. 
37 There is a bright future for administrative litigation 
but the road is winding. 
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Please continue answering the foUowing questions by ticking the appropriate box. 
38. Your gender: 0 1. Male 02. Female 
39. Your age: 0 l. 18-30 D 2. 31-40 03. 41-50 
04. 51-60 D 5. 61 and above 
40. Your political status: 
01. Communist Party member 02. Communist Youth League member 
03. Democratic Party member 04. Non-member 
41. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
o 1. Less than 1 year o 2. 1-3 year o 3. 4-6 year 
o 4. 7-10 year o 5. Over 10 year 
42. Which department are you working in? 
o 1. Public Security D 2. Environmental Protection 
o 3. Industry and Commerce o 4. Civil Affairs 
o 5. Hygiene 
o 7. Others 
43. Your working district: 
o 6. Fire Services 
D 1. Hai Dian 
D 3. XuanWu 
D 2. Xi Cheng 
D 4. Others ____ ~ ___ _ 
44. Your average real monthly income during the past year (RMB): 
o 1. 300 and below 
o 4. 1001-1500 
D 7. Above 4000 
45. Your education level: 
D 2. 301-600 
o 5. 1501-2500 
o 3. 601-1000 
o 6. 2501-4000 
o 1. No formal education o 2. Primary 
o 3. Lower Secondary o 4. Upper Secondary 
o 5. Post-secondary D 6. Undergraduate and above 
End of questionnaire. 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 4 Questionnaire for Pilot Survey 
Dear citizens and friends, 
As a scientific research and to help further develop our country's administrative 
litigation, the Institute of Public Administration, People's University of China, is now 
conducting a survey in Beijing regarding the implementation of the Administrative 
Litigation Law. Questions in this questionnaire are mostly related to your daily life. There is 
no correct or wrong answer. Respond directly to the question and give your general opinion 
according to your usual belief and behaviour will be sufficient. You do not have to write 
your name or unit. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you very much for 
your cooperation. 
Please answer the following questions by ticking the appropriate box. 
Yes No 
1 Have you heard of cases about citizens suing the government? 
2 Have you heard that citizens can now sue the government? 
3 Have you yourself sued the government? 
4 Have you heard ofthe "Administrative Litigation Law"? 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative Litigation Law"? 
Our country had formally estabUshed administrative litigation in October 1990, 
commonly known as "citizens suing the government". On that, do you agree with the 
following statements? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other 
methods should be used to solve the problem. 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our 
country. 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out illegal action. 
10 I don't care about implementation of the institution. 
11 I know very little about the present institution. 
12 If you have other opinion about establishment of administrative litigation, please state: 
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Do you agree that citizens can initiate administrative litigation In the following 
circumstances? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
13 Officials abuse their authority in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
14 Officials exceed the limit of their legal authority 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
15 Officials use the wrong regulation in awarding 
penalties to citizens. 
16 Officials violate the legally prescribed procedure 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
17 Officials have insufficient essential evidence 
in awarding penalties to citizens. 
18 One individual household proprietors feels that the 
registration fees regulation made by the Industry 
and Commerce Bureau is unreasonable. 
19 If you have other opinion about the circumstances where citizens can sue the 
government, please state: 
Do you agree that establishing administrative litigation wiu bring the following 
consequences? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
I 2 3 4 5 9 
20 Strengthen the protection of legal rights and 
interests of citizens. 
21 Push the government to work according 
to the laws. 
22 Strengthen the idea of rule of law in the society. 
23 Reduce the cases of abusing authority by 
government and its officials. 
24 Increase the government's efficiency at work. 
25 Strengthen the government's status. 
26 If you have other opinion about the consequences of administrative litigation, 
please state: 
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There are different views regarding the implementation of administrative litigation, do 
you agree with the following statements? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
27 Petitioning to higher levels of the government 
can better solve the problem than suing 
the government in court. 
28 U sing personal connection can better solve the 
problem than suing the government in court. 
29 Using money can better solve the problem 
than suing the government in court. 
30 Courts can fairly hear cases of administrative 
litigation initiated by citizens. 
31 Courts will defend the administration. 
32 Courts' verdicts is binding on the administration. 
33 Citizens do not dare to sue the government for 
fear of revenge by the officials. 
34 It is very difficult to put administrative 
litigation into practice. 
35 If you have other opinion about the implementation of administrative litigation. 
please state: 
Do you agree with the following statements about the future development or 
administrative litigation? Please tick the appropriate box. 
1 = Totally Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 9 = Don't Know. 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
36 Administrative litigation can help advance 
the reform and opening, hence should 
be further developed. 
37 Administrative litigation can help protect 
citizens' legal rights and interests, hence should 
be further developed. 
38 Administrative litigation can help strengthen the 
rule of law, hence should be further developed. 
39 Development of administrative litigation requires 
judicial independence. 
40 There is a bright future for administrative litigation 
but the road is winding. 
41 If you have other opinion about the implementation of administrative litigation, 
please state: 
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Please continue answering the following questions by ticking the appropriate box. 
42. Your sex: o 1. Male o 2. Female 
43. Your age: 
D 1. 18-30 
D 4.51-60 
D 2.31-40 D 3.41-50 
D 5.61 and above 
44. Your political status: 
D 1. Communist Party member 
D 3. Democratic Party member 
D 2. Communist Youth League member 
D 4. Non-member 
45. Your occupation: 
D 1. Government Official 
D 3. Worker 
D 5. Judge of court 
o 2. Individual household proprietor 
D 4. Lawyer 
D 6. Others ________ __ _ _ __ 
46. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
D 1. Less than 1 year 
D 4.7-10 year 
D 2.1-3 year 
o 5. Over 10 year 
D 3. 4-6 year 
47. If you are an individual household proprietor, what kind of business are you running? 
o 1. Retailing 
o 4. Repairing 
o 3. Servicing D 2. Catering 
o 5. Others 
------
48. If you are a government official, what position are you in? 
D 1. Front-line 
o 3. Managerial 
49. Your working district: 
D 1. Hai Dian 
D 3. FengTai 
o 2. Supporting 
o 4. Others _____ ___ _ _____ _ 
D 2. Xi Cheng 
D 4. Others ________ _ 
50. Your average real monthly income during the past year: 
D 1. 300 and below 
D 4. 1001-1500 
D 7. Above 4000 
51. Your education level: 
D 1. No formal education 
D 4. Upper Secondary 
D 7. Postgraduate 
o 2.301-600 
D 5. 1501-2500 
o 2. Primary 
D 5. Post-secondary 
o 3.601-1000 
o 6. 2501-4000 
D 3. Lower Secondary 
o 6. Bachelor 
End of questionnaire. Thank you for your cooperation! 
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Appendix 5 Frequency Distribution Results for Individual 
Household Proprietors 
Yes No 
1 Have you heard of cases about q 555 182 
citizens suing the govenunent? % 75.3 24.7 
2 Have you heard that citizens can q 521 215 
now sue the government? % 70.8 29.2 
3 Have you yourself sued q 36 701 
the government? % 4.9 95.1 
4 Have you heard of the "Administrative q 565 168 
Litigation Law"? % 77.1 22.9 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative q 151 582 
Litigation Law"? % 20.6 79.4 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other q 21 69 96 350 171 
methods should be used to solve the problem. % 2.9 9.4 13.1 47.8 23.3 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our q 15 45 71 356 112 
country. % 2.1 6.2 9.8 49.0 15.4 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. q 24 51 86 382 126 
% 3.3 7.0 11.8 52.5 17.3 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out q 19 20 60 339 193 
illegal action. % 2.6 2.8 8.3 46.6 26.5 
10 I don't care about implementation of the q 12 89 146 333 63 
institution. % 1.7 12.3 20.3 46.2 8.7 
11 I know very little about the present institution. q 54 432 85 49 14 
% 7.4 59.1 11.6 6.7 1.9 
1 2 3 4 :5 
12 Officials abuse their authority in awarding q 219 315 30 64 89 
penalties to citizens. % 30.0 43.1 4.1 8.7 12.2 
13 Officials exceed the limit of their legal q 190 313 41 74 81 
authority in awarding penalties to citizens % 26.0 42.8 5.6 10.1 11.1 
14 Officials use the wrong regulation in q 147 294 86 82 42 
awarding penalties to citizens % 20.3 40.6 11.9 11.3 5.8 
15 Officials violate the legally prescribed q 149 315 48 88 59 
procedure in awarding penalties to citizens. % 20.6 43.6 6.7 12.2 8.2 
16 Officials have insufficient essential q 147 296 62 98 61 
evidence in awarding penalties to citizens. % 20.4 41.1 8.6 13.6 8.5 
17 Registration fees regulation made by q 133 304 81 74 52 
government is unreasonable. % 18.3 41.9 11.2 10.2 7.2 
18 The Industry and Conunerce Bureau q 168 288 59 78 63 
collects registration fees in excess of the % 23.1 39.7 8.1 10.8 8.7 
amount stipulated in the regulation 
MIssing 
1 
2 
1 
5 
5 
9 0 
26 5 
3.5 
127 12 
17.5 
59 10 
8.1 
96 11 
13.2 
78 17 
10.8 
97 7 
13.3 
9 0 
14 7 
1.9 
32 7 
4.4 
73 14 
10.1 
63 16 
8.7 
56 18 
7.8 
81 13 
11.2 
70 12 
9.6 
1 = Totally Agree; 
9 = Don't Know; 
2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 
o = Missing value; q = Frequency; % = Valid Percentage. 
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1 2 3 4 5 9 
19 Strengthen the protection of legal q 308 387 16 5 6 9 
rights and interests of citizens. % 42.1 53.0 2.2 0.7 0.8 1.2 
20 Push the government to work q 267 411 29 6 6 9 
according to the laws. % 36.7 56.5 4.0 0.8 0.8 1.2 
21 Strengthen the idea of rule of law q 252 434 28 3 4 6 
in the society. % 34.7 59.7 3.9 0.4 0.5 0.8 
22 Reduce the cases of abusing authority q 260 383 38 15 12 19 
by government and its officials. % 35.8 52.7 5.2 2.1 1.6 2.6 
23 Increase the government's efficiency q 223 379 63 15 6 42 
at work. % 30.6 52.1 8.6 2.1 0.8 5.8 
24 Strengthen the government's status. q 180 342 80 61 17 47 
% 24.8 47.0 11.0 8.4 2.3 6.5 
I 2 3 4 5 ... «1 
25 Petitioning to higher level of the government q 43 149 139 241 31 118 
can better solve the problem than suing % 5.9 20.7 19.3 33.4 4.3 16.4 
the government in court. 
26 Using personal connection can better solve the q 84 197 101 236 6S 38 
problem than suing the government in court. % 11.7 27.3 14.0 32.7 9.0 5.3 
27 Using money can better solve the problem q 83 198 120 183 98 38 
than suing the government in court. % 11.5 27.5 16.7 25.4 13.6 5.3 
28 Courts cannot fairly hear cases of q 36 117 182 244 69 74 
administrative litigation initiated by citizens. % 5.0 16.2 25.2 33.8 9.6 10.2 
29 Courts will defend the administration. q 49 152 171 183 62 99 
% 6.8 21.2 23.9 25.6 8.7 13.8 
30 Courts' verdicts cannot bind the q 34 128 136 241 56 123 
administration. % 4.7 17.8 19.0 33.6 7.8 17.1 
31 Citizens do not dare to sue the government q 147 308 95 102 46 25 
for fear of revenge by the officials. % 20.3 42.6 13.1 14.1 6.4 3.5 
32 It is very difficult to put administrative q 61 277 131 158 17 79 
litigation into practice. % 8.4 38.3 18.1 21.9 2.4 10.9 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
33 Administrative litigation can help q 246 406 35 9 2 26 
advance the reform and opening, % 34.0 56.1 4.8 1.2 0.3 3.6 
hence should be further developed. 
34 Administrative litigation can help q 245 433 26 2 2 17 
protect citizens' legal rights and interests, % 33.8 59.7 3.6 0.3 0.3 2.3 
hence should be further developed. 
35 Administrative litigation can help q 223 434 37 6 2 20 
strengthen the rule of law, % 30.9 60.1 5.1 0.8 0.3 2.8 
hence should be further developed. 
36 Development of administrative litigation q 169 245 77 62 11 160 
requires judicial independence. % 23.4 33.8 10.6 8.6 1.5 22.1 
37 There is bright future for administrative q 212 384 57 14 3 54 
lititgation but the road is winding. % 29.3 53.0 7.9 1.9 0.4 7.5 
1 = Totally Agree; 
9 = Don't Know; 
2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 :: Totally Disagree; 
o = Missing value; q = Frequency; % = Valid Percentage. 
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0 
7 
10 
11 
11 
10 
11 
IY 
17 
17 
18 
16 
22 
20 
15 
15 
() 
14 
13 
16 
14 
14 
38. Your gender: 
39. 
40. 
Male 
Female 
Missing value 
Your age: 
18-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61 and above 
Missing value 
Your political status: 
Communist Party member 
Communist Youth League member 
Democratic Party member 
Non-member 
Missing value 
FrequeE~), 
472 
255 
11 
377 
203 
84 
37 
24 
13 
53 
166 
2 
481 
36 
41. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
Less than 1 year 101 
1-3 years 261 
4-6 years 158 
7-10 years 79 
Over 10 years 119 
Missing value 20 
42. What kind of business are you running? 
Retailing 368 
Catering 140 
Servicing 119 
Repairing 36 
Others 7 
Missing value 68 
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{~o} 
(64.9) 
(35.1) 
(52.0) 
(28.0) 
(11.6) 
(5.1) 
(3.3) 
(7.6) 
(23.6) 
(0.3) 
(68.5) 
(14.1) 
(36.3) 
(22.0) 
(11.0) 
(16.6) 
(54.9) 
(20.9) 
(17.8) 
(5.4) 
(1.0) 
43. Are you registered Beijing municipal resident? 
44. 
Yes 
No 
Missing value 
Your working district: 
Hai Dian 
Xi Cheng 
Xuan Wu 
Others 
Missing value 
335 (46.7) 
383 (53.3) 
20 
208 (28.2) 
275 (37.3) 
255 (34.5) 
0 (0.0) 
0 
45. Your average real monthly income during the past year (RMB): 
300 and below 104 (14.5) 
301-600 243 (34.0) 
601-1000 229 (32.0) 
1001-1500 67 (9.4) 
1501-2500 39 (5.4) 
2501-4000 14 (2.0) 
Above 4000 19 (2.7) 
Missing value 23 
46. Your education level: 
No formal education (0.1 ) 
Primary 65 (9.0) 
Lower Secondary 313 (43.3) 
Upper Secondary 251 (34.7) 
Post-secondary 70 (9.7) 
Undergraduate and above 23 (3.2) 
Missing value 15 
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Appendix 6 Frequency Distribution Results for Government 
Officials 
Yes No 
1 Have you heard of cases about q 139 12 
citizens suing the government? % 92.1 7.9 
2 Have you heard that citizens can q 139 12 
now sue the government? % 92.1 7.9 
3 Have you participated in q 14 136 
administrative litigation? % 9.3 90.7 
4 Have you heard of the "Administrative q 147 5 
Litigation Law"? % 96.7 3.3 
5 Have you studied the "Administrative q 112 40 
Litigation Law"? % 73.7 26.3 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 Citizens should not sue the government, other q 3 8 11 97 32 
methods should be used to solve the problem. % 2.0 5.3 7.2 63.8 21.0 
7 It is a Western institution, not suitable for our q 1 6 7 108 29 
country. % 0.7 3.9 4.6 71.0 19.1 
8 I do not support establishing the institution. q 3 6 4 102 36 
% 2.0 4.0 2.6 67.6 23.8 
9 Government bureaus do not carry out q 1 4 2 93 47 
illegal action. % 0.7 2.6 1.3 61.2 30.9 
10 I don't care about implementation of the q 3 6 16 110 14 
institution. % 2.0 4.0 10.7 73.3 9.3 
11 I know very little about the present institution. q 8 41 22 74 4 
% 5.3 27.2 14.6 49.0 2.6 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 Officials abuse their authority in awarding q 53 88 4 4 2 
penalties to citizens. % 34.9 57.9 2.6 2.6 1.3 
13 Officials exceed the limit of their legal q 43 97 6 3 1 
authority in awarding penalties to citizens % 28.3 63.8 3.9 2.0 0.7 
14 Officials use the wrong regulation in q 37 85 14 11 1 
awarding penalties to citizens % 24.4 55.9 9.2 7.2 0.7 
15 Officials violate the legally prescribed q 37 95 9 6 2 
procedure in awarding penalties to citizens. % 24.3 62.5 5.9 4.0 1.3 
16 Officials have insufficient essential q 35 85 15 11 1 
evidence in awarding penalties to citizens. % 23.2 56.3 9.9 7.3 0.7 
17 Registration fees regulation made by q 23 49 28 40 3 
government is unreasonable. % 15.1 32.3 18.4 26.3 2.0 
18 The Industry and Commerce Bureau q 36 68 19 25 1 
collects registration fees in excess of the % 23.7 44.7 12.5 16.4 0.7 
amount stipulated in the regulation 
Missing 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
9 0 
1 0 
0.7 
1 0 
0.7 
0 1 
0.0 
5 0 
3.3 
1 2 
0.7 
2 I 
1.3 
9 0 
1 0 
0.7 
2 0 
1.3 
4 0 
2.6 
3 0 
2.0 
4 1 
2.6 
9 0 
5.9 
3 0 
2.0 
1 = Totally Agree; 
9 = Don't Know; 
2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 
o = Missing value; q = Frequency; % = Valid Percentage. 
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I 2 3 4 5 9 
19 Strengthen the protection of legal q 64 79 4 2 I 2 
rights and interests of citizens. % 42.1 52.0 2.6 1.3 0.7 1.3 
20 Push the government to work q 60 86 5 0 I 0 
according to the laws. % 39.4 56.6 3.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 
21 Strengthen the idea of rule of law q 57 90 1 2 I 1 
in the society. % 37.4 59.2 0.7 1.3 0.7 0.7 
22 Reduce the cases of abusing authority q 54 91 6 0 1 0 
by government and its officials. % 35.5 59.9 3.9 0.0 0.7 0.0 
23 Increase the government's efficiency q 40 75 25 9 2 1 
at work. % 26.3 49.3 16.5 5.9 1.3 0.7 
24 Strengthen the government's status. q 43 68 23 14 2 2 
% 28.3 44.8 15.1 9.2 1.3 1.3 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
25 Petitioning to higher level of the government q 4 19 40 75 5 9 
can better solve the problem than suing % 2.6 12.5 26.3 49.4 3.3 5.9 
the government in court. 
26 Using personal connection can better solve the q 12 27 31 65 8 7 
problem than suing the government in court. % 8.0 18.0 20.7 43.3 5.3 4.7 
27 Using money can better solve the problem q 10 19 34 76 10 3 
than suing the government in court. % 6.6 12.5 22.3 50.0 6.6 2.0 
28 Courts cannot fairly hear cases of q 7 7 41 84 6 7 
administrative litigation initiated by citizens. % 4.6 4.6 27.0 55.3 3.9 4.6 
29 Courts will defend the administration. q 8 14 34 84 9 3 
% 5.2 9.2 22.4 55.3 5.9 2.0 
30 Courts' verdicts cannot bind the q 3 13 23 95 16 1 
administration. % 2.0 8.6 15.2 62.9 10.6 0.7 
31 Citizens do not dare to sue the government q 16 50 28 50 6 2 
for fear of revenge by the officials. % 10.5 32.9 18.4 32.9 4.0 1.3 
32 It is very difficult to put administrative q 10 36 32 68 6 0 
litigation into practice. % 6.6 23.7 21.1 44.7 3.9 0.0 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
33 Administrative litigation can help q 44 94 II I I I 
advance the reform and opening, % 28.9 61.8 7.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 
hence should be further developed. 
34 Administrative litigation can help q 46 98 5 0 I 2 
protect citizens' legal rights and interests, % 30.2 64.5 3.3 0.0 0.7 1.3 
hence should be further developed. 
35 Administrative litigation can help q 48 98 5 0 I 0 
strengthen the rule of law, % 31.6 64.4 3.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 
hence should be further developed. 
36 Development of administrative litigation q 30 87 20 5 2 8 
requires judicial independence. % 19.7 57.2 13.2 3.3 1.3 5.3 
37 There is bright future for administrative q 34 100 13 1 0 4 
lititgation but the road is winding. % 22.4 65.8 8.5 0.7 0.0 2.6 
1 = Totally Agree; 
9 = Don't Know; 
2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Totally Disagree; 
0= Missing value; q = Frequency; % = Valid Percentage. 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
38. Your gender: 
Fre_9.lI:ency (%) 
Male 90 (59.6) 
Female 61 (40.4) 
Missing value 
39. Your age: 
18-30 56 (36.8) 
31-40 73 (48.0) 
41-50 20 (13.2) 
51-60 3 (2.0) 
61 and above 0 (0.0) 
Missing value 0 
40. Your political status: 
Communist Party member 88 (58.3) 
Communist Youth League member 26 (17.2) 
Democratic Party member (0.7) 
Non-member 36 (23.8) 
Missing value 
41. How long have you been in your present occupation? 
Less than 1 year 9 (5.9) 
1-3 years 32 (21.1) 
4-6 years 23 (15.1) 
7-10 years 24 (15.8) 
Over 10 years 64 (42.1) 
Missing value 0 
42. Which department are you working in? 
Public Security 16 (11.2) 
Environmental Protection 24 (16.8) 
Industry and Commerce 38 (26.5) 
Civil Affairs 32 (22.4) 
Hygiene 16 (11.2) 
Fire Services 13 (9.1 ) 
Others 4 (2.8) 
Missing value 9 
Missing value 68 
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43. Your working district: 
Rai Dian 77 (50.7) 
Xi Cheng 36 (23.7) 
Xuan Wu 39 (25.6) 
Others 0 (0.0) 
Missing value 0 
44. Your average real monthly income during the past year (RMB): 
300 and below 1 (0.7) 
301-600 29 (19.3) 
601-1000 101 (67.3) 
1001-1500 15 (10.0) 
1501-2500 2 (1.3) 
2501-4000 (0.7) 
Above 4000 1 (0.7) 
Missing value 2 
45. Your education level: 
No formal education 0 (0.0) 
Primary 0 (0.0) 
Lower Secondary 1 (0.7) 
Upper Secondary 25 (16.4) 
Post-secondary 74 (48.7) 
Undergraduate and above 52 (34.2) 
Missing value 0 
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Appendix 7 
Proprietors 
Male 
(64 .9%) 
Female 
(35.1%) 
18-30 
(52.0%) 
31-40 
(28.0%) 
41-50 
(11.6%) 
51-60 
(5.1%) 
Over 60 
(3.3%) 
CCP member 
(7.6%) 
CYL member 
(23 .6%) 
DP member 
(0.3%) 
Non-member 
(68.5%) 
Below 1 year 
(14. 1%) 
1-3 years 
(36.3%) 
4-6 years 
(22 .0%) 
7-10 years 
(11.0%) 
Over 10 years 
(16.6%) 
Retailing 
(54.9%) 
Catering 
(20.9%) 
Relationship between Personal Particulars of the 
Individual Household Proprietors 
Tend to be 
Old (over 60), CCP member, senior (4 to over 10 years), in repairing, in 
Xuan Wu, earning RMB 1 00 1-1500, extreme in education background 
Young (18-30), CYL member, junior (less than I to 3 years), in servicin " 
in Xi Cheng, low income of below RMB300 to 600, median educati on 
attainment 
Female, CYL member, new entrant (less than I to 3 years), non-rc idcnt, 
in Hai Dian, high income from RMB2501 to RMB4000 
Politically independent, in repairing, resident, median income RM 1360 1-
1000 and 1501-2500, highest education of upper secondary and above 
CCP member, senior (over 10 years), resident, in XlIan Wu, lower 
secondary 
CCP member, senior (7 to over 10 years) in repairing, resident , in XlIan 
Wu, primary only 
Male, CCP member, senior (7 to over 10 years), in rcpairing and ca teri ng, 
resident, in Xuan Wu, earning RMB 1 00 I to over 4000, primary only 
Male, old (41 to over 60), very senior (over 10 years) in repairing 
resident, in Xuan Wu, high income of RM B 150 I to over 4000, po t-
secondary and above 
Female, aged 18-30, new entrant (less than I to 3 years), non-resident , in 
Hai Dian and Xi Cheng, low income of RMB30 1-600, upper to po t-
secondary 
Male, young (18-40), non-resident, in Xuan Wu, earning RM B 0 1- 1000, 
lower to upper secondary 
Early middle age (3 1-40), in repairing, in Xuan Wu, earn ing RMI3GO 1-
1500, primary only 
Female, young (18-30), CYL member, in servicing, in Hai Dian, low 
income of below RMB300 to 600, degree-holder 
Female, young (18-30), CYL member, in catering, non-resident, in Hui 
Dian, low income of RMB30 1-600 
Male, in repairing, in Xuan Wu, earni ng RMB601 to over 4000, lower 
secondary 
Male, old (5 1 to over 60), in repairing, in Xuan Wu earn ing RMI3I 00 1-
1500, some over RMB4000, primary only 
Male, old (41 to over 60), CCP member, in repairing resident, in Xuun 
Wu, high income of over RMB4000, primary as well as post-secondary 
Non-resident, in Xuan Wu, high income of over RMB4000 
Old (over 60), new entrant (I to 3 year ), re ident, in Il ui Dian, cumin 
RMB 150 1-2500 
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Proprietors Tend to be 
Servicing Female, new entrant (less than I year), non-resident, in Ilai Dian and Xi 
(17.8%) Cheng, high income of RMB250 1-4000, degree-holder 
Repairing Male, old (31-40 and over 50), CCP member as well a non-member, 4 to 
(5.4%) over 10 years in the job, resident, in Xuan Wu, earning RM B I 00 1-1500, 
primary only 
Resident Old (31 to over 60), CCP member, senior (over 10 years), in catering and 
(46.7%) repairing, earning RMB60 I-I 000, upper secondary and above 
Non-resident Young (18-30), CYL member,junior (I to 3 years), in retailing and 
(53.3%) servicing, low income of less than RMB300 to 600, lower secondary 
Rai Dian Young (I 8-30), CYL member, new entrant (less than I to 3 year ), in 
(28.2%) catering and servicing, full range of income, post-secondary and above 
Xi Cheng Female, CYL member, in servicing, high income ofRMB 2501-4000 
(37.3%) 
Xuan Wu Male, old (41 to over 60), CCP member as well as non-member, 4 to ovcr 
(34.5%) 10 years in the job, in retailing and repairing, low income of below 
RMB300, primary to lower secondary 
300 & less Female, new entrant (less than I year), non-resident, in Hai Dian and 
(14.5%) Xuan Wu, primary to lower secondary 
301-600 Female, CYL member, new entrant (less than I to 3 year ), non-re id nt , 
(34.0%) upper secondary 
601-1000 Aged 31-40, politically independent, 4 to 6 years in the job, resident, 
(32.0%) upper secondary and above 
1001-1500 Male, old (over 60), politically independent, 4 to 10 years in thcjob, in 
(9.4%) repairing, degree-holder 
1501-2500 Aged 31-40 and over 60, CCP member, 4 to 6 year in the job, in 
(5.4%) catering, post-secondary and above 
2501-4000 Aged 18-30 as well as over 60, CCP member, 4 to 6 years in the j b, in 
(2.0%) servicing, in Xi Cheng, post-secondary 
Over 4000 Old (over 60), CCP member, 4to over 10 years in thej b, if1l'etailing, in 
(2.7%) Hai Dian, post-secondary and above 
No formal Female, old (over 60), politically independent junior (1- ycnr) In 
education retailing, resident, in Hai Dian, low income ofbdow RMB 00 
(0.1 %) 
Primay Old (51 over 60), politically independent, enior (7 to over 10 yenr), in 
(9.0%) repairing, in Xuan Wu, low income of below RM B300 
LlSecondary Old (41-50), 4 to 6 years in the job, non-re ident, in Xuan Wu, low 
(43.3%) income of below RMB300 
U/Secondary Aged 31-40, CYL member, resident, earning RMBJOI - IOOO 
(34.7%) 
P/Secondary Aged 31-40, CCP and CYL member, senior (over 10 years), rc idenl, in 
(9.7%) Rai Dian, earning RMB60 I-I 000 as well as 150 I to over 4000 
Degree-holder Aged 31-40, CCP member, new entrant (Ies than 1 years) in .. rV lclng. 
(3.2%) resident, in Hai Dian, earning RMB60 1-2500 as well as over 4000 
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Appendix 8 
Official 
Male 
(59.6%) 
Female 
(40.4%) 
18-30 
(36.8%) 
31-40 
(48.0%) 
41-50 
(13.2%) 
51-60 
(2 .0%) 
CCP member 
(58.3%) 
CYL member 
(1 7.2%) 
DP member 
(0.7%) 
Non-member 
(23.8%) 
Below 1 year 
(5.9%) 
1-3 years 
(21.1 %) 
4-6 years 
(15 .1%) 
7-10 years 
(15.8%) 
Over 10 years 
(42.1%) 
P/Security 
(11.2%) 
E/Protection 
(16.8%) 
I1Commerce 
(26.5%) 
Relationship between Personal Particu lar of the 
Government Officials 
Tend to be 
Old (41-60), CCP member, senior (4-6 year ), under Ilygiene. in 
Cheng and Xuan Wu, earning over RMB I 000, post-seconda!y 
I 
Young (18-30), CYL member, new recruit (less than I years), under 
Industry & Commerce and Civi l Affairs, in Hai Dian, upper~econdnr)' 
Female, CYL member, junior (less than I to 6 year) under Public 
Security and Environmental Protection, in Hai Dian, earning RMB60 I-
1000, degree-holder 
Politically independent, senior (over 10 years), under Fire crvic ' S, in 
Cheng, earning RMB 1 00 1-1500,_post-secondary 
I 
Male, CCP member, senior (over 10 years), under Hygiene, in uun Wu, 
earning RMB 1001-1500, upper secondary 
Male, CCP member, senior (over 10 year ), under Hygiene, in Il ili Dinn. 
earning RMB60 1-1 000, post-secondary 
Male, old (41-60), senior (over 10 year ), under hre erv ic 's and 
Environmental Protection, in XiChen& and Xuun WU,1)Ost-scconda~ 
Female, young (18-30), Jess than I or 4-6 years in the job under Publi 
Security and Industry & Commerce, earning RM B30 I -GOO de re ~-
holder 
Female, aged 31-40, senior (over 10 year ), under Hygiene, in Hoi Diun, 
earning RMB60 1-1 000, degree-holder 
Aged 31-40, senior (7-10 years), under ivil Affairs and fly ien' 
Female, young (18-30), CYL member, under Public ecurity, in Hoi 
Dian, earning RMB30 1-600, d~ee-holder 
Young (18-30), CYL member, under Environmental Protection , in lI oi 
Dian, degree-holder 
Male, young (18-30), CYL member, under Industry & omm'rc , in IIl1i 
Dian, earning RMB60 I-1000, degree-holder 
Politically independent, under Civil AlTair, earning RMB60 1- 1000, 
degree-holder 
Old (31-50), CCP member or independent, under Hygiene ond Fir' 
Services, in Xi Cheng and Xuan Wu, upper to post-secondary 
Young (18-30), CYL member, new recruit (Ie s than I year), in IIni ion, 
degree-holder 
Young (18-30), some CCP member, junior (Ie than I to 3 yenr,"), in Iin i 
Dian 
Female, CYL member, 4-6 years in the job, in Xi heng, urning 
RMB60 1-1000, upper secondary 
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Official Tend (0 be 
Civil Affairs Female, political independent, enior (7-10 ycar ), earnin ' RMO I 00 1-
(22.4%) 1500, degree-holder 
Hygiene Male, old (41-50), politically indepcndent, senior (ov r IO years), in 
(11.2%) Xu an Wu, post-secondary 
Fire Services Aged 31-40, CCP member, senior (over 10 ycar ), cumin' RMD 01 - 00, 
(9.1%) upper to post-secondary 
Hai Dian Female, young (18-30), CYL member, les (han 1 to (j years in th ' job, 
(50.7%) under Public Security and Environmenta l Protection, camin RMB 01-
1000 
Xi Cheng Male, aged 31-40, CCP member, enior (over 10 year ), lind 'r Industry 
(23.7%) and Commerce 
Xu an Wu Male, old (41-50), CCP member, senior (over lOy 'urs), und 'I' Ily il!1l , 
(25.6%) earning RMB30 1-600 and 1001-1500, post-secondary 
300 & less Male, old (41-50), CCP member, senior (7- 10 years), under Industry UTHl 
(0.7%) Commerce, in Xuan Wu, post-secondary 
301-600 CYL member, new recruit (less than I year), under rire 'rvices, in 
(19.3%) Xuan Wu, upper secondary 
601-1000 Young (18-30), 4-10 years in the job, under Indu try I omm rc' , in 
(67.3%) Hai Dian, degree-holder 
1001-1500 Old (31-50), under Civi l Affair , in Xuan Wu 
(10.0%) 
1501-2500 Male, aged 31-40, CCP member, senior (over 10 year. ), under Industry 
(1.3%) and Commerce, in Xuan Wu, post-secondary 
2501-4000 Male, young (18-30), CCP member, junior (1-3 years) und ' r 
(0.7%) Environmental Protection, in Xi Cheng, post-secondary 
Over 4000 Female, aged 31-40, CCP member, senior (7-10 ycnr ), under 
(0.7%) Environmental Protection, in Xi Cheng, post-secondary 
Llsecondary Female, aged 31-40, CYL member, 4-6 y ar in the job, undcr 
(0 .7%) Environmental Protection, in Hai Dian, earning RM 860 I- I 000 
U/secondary Female, old (41-50), politically independent, enior ( vcr 10 y 'urs), 
(16.4%) under Industry & Commerce and Fire Service , in Xi heng. 'n rnin' 
RMB301-600 
P/secondary Male, aged 31-40, CCP member, enior (over 10 year ), und r Il y Ii II' 
(48.7%) and Fire Services, in Xuan Wu 
Degree-holder Young (18-30), CYL member, less than I to 10 years in th job, lind r 
(34.2%) Public Security and Civil Affairs, in Hai Dian, earning RM060 I- I 000 
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